UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS THE RECOGNITION OF SOVIET RUSSIA

GEORGE S. MOYER

A THESIS

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Introduction

The question of opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet régime, which was established as a result of a successful *coup d'etat* and at present exercises sovereignty over the former dominions of the Tsar, has been an issue confronting the United States Executive during the post-war period. This problem has varied in importance according to the means and influence employed by interested parties to obtain a reversal of the adopted policy. Such pressure has never been of so overwhelming a character as to produce any alteration whatever in the original attitude taken and tenaciously maintained by the State Department. The President, who is solely responsible for the recognition of a government, may permit any consideration, moral, political, or economic, to influence his final determination of the policy which is deemed expedient. The object of the present work is to study some of the problems connected with the Russian question, and to determine the correctness or incorrectness of the policy pursued by the Executive.

With respect to the control of foreign relations former Secretary Hughes says: "The conduct of foreign relations pertains to the executive power, and the executive power of the nation is vested in the President, subject to the exceptions and qualifications expressed in the Constitution. Practice under the Constitution has abundantly confirmed the initiative of the President in the formation of foreign policy." The Department of State is the instrumentality though which Executive announcements are furnished to the public.[1] The management of negotiations with foreign nations is subject to certain limitations, and restrictions which relate to (1) the interest of one's own State, (2) to the requirements of honorable intercourse between States; and (3) to the maintenance of international good will. These measures impose a degree of secrecy in negotiations, with which even the most honest negotiators cannot wisely afford to

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[1] *American Journal of International Laws*, Vol. 16, 367, hereafter referred as to *Amer. Jl.*

[2] *Ibid.*, 369.

dispense.[2] It is precisely upon the basis of these three imperatives that refusal to recognize Russia has been established. This is especially true of the second and third conditions regarding honorable intercourse and international good will respectively, as will be subsequently shown.

The application of recognition of states shows numerous inconsistencies, and no rule can be formulated to cover all possible exigencies. The act usually acknowledges that a new state has arisen or that a governmental change has occurred, and that the recognizing nation admits the fact, or the alteration of status, and desires to enter into relations with the new régime. Recognition is essentially an independent act of the recognizing state. It generally does not involve any co-operation with the state recognized. It is implied when a state enters into negotiations with a new state. "Recognition is, as a general rule," says Moore, "absolute and irrevocable." Such relations once established are permanent, determined only by the existence of the governments participating therein.[3].

The existence of a state is a question of fact. But recognition is essential to admit a nation to the common family of nations, since no notice can be given to an unrecognized state. There are three conditions necessary to the existence of a state according to international law. They are usually accepted to be (a) a definite territory, (b) a population inhabiting this territory, and (c) a sovereignty exercised on this territory, both internally in the sense of being imposed on the inhabitants of the territory by legal measures, and externally in that it is not interfered with and rendered impossible in fact or irregular in law by the sovereignty of another state.[4] Russia has evidently met these requirements and might urge that she be recognized. However, another power is not bound to recognize any nation, and may assign or refuse to assign any reason for its action. The State Department is doubtless cognizant of the requirements constituting a state, but may exercise its own judgment

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[3] Moore, Dig. I, 72, 73 for the principles governing recognition. Also see the Recognition Policy of the United States by J. Goebel, 45.

[4] McBain and Rogers, New Constitutions of Europe, 365, 366. Contains a collection of Europe's post-war constitutions.

and refuse recognition until such a time as it thinks the necessary conditions it requires have been fulfilled. The Department of State is responsible alone to the Executive. The advisability of maintaining or altering a given policy is the deciding influence in the position assumed by the Department. Russia is no exception to this condition.

The greatest social and political alteration occurring during the war took place in Russia. The most reactionary and corrupt régime in Europe was superseded by one wherein the industrial and political organizations were united in a manner never attempted before. The Soviet Government presents one of history's most important political experiments.[5] The proper development and establishment of democratic institutions in Russia would be of special benefit to the world, but Russia, as at present organized, continues to present a world problem. The probable salvation of Russia depends upon stable democratic government expressed through an elective Constituent Assembly which actually will represent all Russian classes.[6]

Any attempt to compare the Russian situation with our own fails because no common comparative ground exists. No country in Europe has for so many centuries been so completely subjected to despotism, and one significant result of it is that eighty-five per cent of the people are illiterate.[7] Russia can also be better understood when it is remembered that she has not experienced certain of the social movements that made the evolution of other western states. Russia escaped the influence of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Enlightenment. These are movements which contributed towards the development of western individualism. Their effects proceeded downward from the higher source to the lower elements of society. They only reached the Russian intellectuals during the last century.[8] Such conditions gradually produced a state of affairs favorable to the growth of a radical Communism.

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[5] McBain, H. L. and Rogers, L. New Constitutions of Europe, 379. Also Gibbons, H. A. Europe Since 1918, 168.

[6] Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science, Vol. 84, 103, 106. Hereafter to be called "Annals."

[7] *Ibid.*, Vol. 114, 49.

[8] Brailsford, H. N. The Russian Worker's Republic, 127.

The advent of the Bolshevists to power has been predicated upon the social facts of Russian history, revealed upon different occasions. It is difficult to imagine its peculiar growth in any other European country.

Prior to the war the Tsarist régime was squandering much of its strength in factional disputes. When the war eventually came, the stupidity of the government was shown in refusing demands for the extension of the franchise. Many important officials were in the service of the enemy. The war and its objects were unpopular with the population. The court was dominated by Rasputin, a fanatical monk. Revolution was inevitable.[9] The Imperial Russian Government disappeared with the abdication of the Tsar on March 15, 1917.[10] Three days before his abdication the Tsar had suspended the Duma, and it refused to accede to his command. The soldiers joined the revolutionists, and the Revolution was a fact. The Tsarist officials were imprisoned, and the large cities joined the new order. The new régime under Kerensky was recognized by America. It was known as the Provisional Government. This Government expressed its intention not to interfere with the internal affairs of other nations, nor were they the least interested in the aims of the western allies.[11] The enthusiasm which America and the Allies exhibited over the new order in Russia failed to justify itself. Russia's value as an active ally had almost vanished, while, under the liberal régime of Kerensky, the extremists were granted an excellent opportunity to mature their plans for their *coup d'etat* when the favorable time arrived. This opportune moment occurred in November, 1917, when the radical leaders, taking full advantage of Russia's war-weariness and the weak Kerensky régime, suddenly overthrew the government and took possession of its administration. The second Revolution was accomplished by the highly organized Communist Party, and has continued to dominate affairs in Russia.

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[9] Buchanan (Sir) Geo. Diplomatic Memoirs II, 28 et seq. for a discussion of German influence at the Russian court. McBain & Rogers, New Constitutions, 381.

[10] Annals, Vol. 114, 70.

[11] *Ibid.*, See Gibbons, H. A. Introduction to World Politics, 480, for statement of Kerensky regarding Russia's war aims.

Thus by successive stages the Communists realized their ambition.

The Bolshevik seizure of power was not, as is so universally represented, a general uprising. The Bolshevists were not the result of a riot. Power was seized as the result of an organized party which was in possession of a definite governmental program. This *coup d'etat* was neither accompanied nor preceded by much disorder. It had been advertised in Petrograd and Moscow for some time previous that the Second Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies under the Bolshevists would attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government. The success of this coup would depend upon the attitude assumed by the garrison. The garrison did not oppose the new movement but joined it immediately and unconditionally. Lenin now took Kerensky's place.[12]

Lenin and Trotzky, the two leaders, were both demagogic and unscrupulous, but remarkably clever and successful leaders and agitators. They possessed a program that could be depended upon to prove acceptable to an ignorant and unpractical population whom war-weariness had made unusually susceptible to emotional appeals. The main points of their program to which the Allied and American Government objected were: First, an armistice followed by peace concluded by the proletariat; Second, repudiation of the national debts. The remaining portions of the program while also obnoxious, like the confiscation of landed estates, and the nationalization of industry were not of such vital importance to the outside governments.[13] Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to Russia, makes the following statement regarding the Bolsheviki: "The Bolsheviki... constituted a compact minority of determined persons who knew what they wanted and how to get it. They had, moveover, all the best brains on their side and, with the help of their German patrons, they developed a talent for organization with which no one had at first credited them."[14]

By January 1919, practically every European nation, with

[12] Antonelli, E. Bolshevik Russia, 225, 226.
[13] Ogg, F. A. Governments of Europe, 745, 746.
[14] Buchanan (Sir) Geo. Diplomatic Memoirs II, 217.

the possible exception of Germany, had terminated diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Thus Russia's isolation from the capitalistic world was complete. This was the inevitable result of Lenin's implacable hostility towards democracy and free institutions. He had a profound devotion to international revolution and a conviction that the salvation of the world depended upon the dictatorship of the proletariat along lines adopted in Russia.[15] Beginning with 1920 various nations have established diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, and more recently several of the most advanced nations in Western Europe have opened diplomatic connections with Moscow, the results of which are discussed elsewhere.

While politically dissimilar, America and Russia present marks of striking similiarity. Their huge bulk and continental character, under proper conditions, offer a fruitful field for internal development. They also render them impervious to outside attack. These nations under normal conditions should not fear each other, and may be of the greatest mutual service to each other. The sympathies between them have been curious and interesting, but the political dealings between them have not been of the highest importance.[16] Russia is not the impotent nation many suppose her to be, yet under proper conditions, internally and externally, profitable relations between America and Russia might be established.[17]

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[15] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Politics of Soviet Russia, 73. Also see Bulletin No. 6, June 30, 1925. 1. American Library in Paris, on the nations that recognized Russia.

[16] Coolidge, A. C. The United States as a World Power, 213. See Soviet Russia 3, Foreign Office Publication for 1924, for data on Rusisa's size, also the Russian Constitution of July 6, 1923, 29, published by the Russian Information Bureau at Washington, D. C.

[17] *Ibid.*, 223.

II

Propaganda

Propaganda is the organized effort of any institution or association to win adherents to its cause. During the war America was the scene of an organized attempt by both contestants to win American approval and active co-operation. Upon the overthrow of the Russian Provisional Government in November, 1917, by the Bolshevists, America and other nations became the centers of a persistent propaganda. The ostensible purpose was to gain converts to the radical Bolshevist program with the ultimate object of gaining control of the governmental machinery. Had this aim been accomplished a scheme of government fashioned after the Russian pattern would have been installed. Revolutions usually engage in some form of propaganda activities. After the war the social soil of western Europe, on account of the abnormal conditions, was peculiarly susceptible to the growth of radical ideas. The Soviet régime, fully realizing that their own prestige and permanency among the nations depended upon the growth of communist principles, made ample efforts to take advantage of the situation.

The first year of the Soviet régime was characterized by the express purpose and avowal to disseminate propaganda throughout the world in order to overthrow the existing governments. While the French Revolution was yet in the initial flush of its success the Convention was moved to declare itself "the friend of all peoples, and the enemy of all governments."[1] Likewise the object of the Soviet leaders was to destroy all existing governments. This purpose was not merely born of the war but was the sentiment held by the leaders prior to the seizure of power.[2] On December 13, 1917, a little over a month after the accession of the Soviet régime, a propaganda fund of two million rubles was appropriated "for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement." The object was to

[1] Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic, 95.
[2] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 71.

assist the radical left in all nations. The disposition of the funds was to have been made through the representation of the commissariat for Foreign Affairs.[3]

Bolshevism, it was feared, intended to deluge civilization in a blood bath of greater extent and duration than the world war catastrophe. The American constitution and magna charta would have been destroyed. The régime would have introduced the confiscation of individual property, and the nationalization of the means of production. In short "Bolshevism declares war on the whole present organization of society, destroying at one blow, free enterprises, universal suffrage and all democracy. Finally the Christian religion is ridiculed and reviled."[4] The United States was the nation selected above all others, wherein the Bolshevist leaders were most desirous to disseminate their propaganda which aimed at international revolution.[5]

The Allies fearing the pernicious effect of radical propaganda, dispatched a joint note to Germany, and to the neutral nations. It read: "The avowed hostility of the Bolsheviki to all Governments and their international program of revolution which they are spreading abroad, constitute a grave danger for the national security of all Powers." The neutrals were requested to assist in closing the net about Russia. Germany refused to comply with this request. She argued that compliance would stimulate the growth of Bolshevism in the world. It was also recommended that Bolshevist gold be kept from places where it could be utilized for subversive purposes.[6]

The instructions issued by Tchitcherin, Foreign Commissar for Russia, to Russian diplomats and agents, clearly shows the corrupting methods that were to be employed. A nation was to be kept in a state of turmoil while the work of the Bolshevists should proceed unobserved until complete control was secured. He said: "It is not to our benefit that we should be feared and our power exaggerated. It is best for us to be temporarily in the shadow. Official recognition of our representatives, devel-

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[3] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 71, 92.
[4] *Current History*, Vol. 13, 223.
[5] *Ibid.*, 225.
[6] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies Soviet Russia, 93. Allied note as quoted.

opment of trade relations, gradual dissemination of propaganda, and the strengthening of our authority among the proletarian masses—these are the aims of our work."[7] With such declaration of purpose by a highly placed Soviet official it is at once evident that responsible American authorities were wise to exercise extreme caution before renewing relations with Russia.

The duplicity of the Soviet in conducting their foreign relations was manifest even during the negotiation of peace-terms with Germany during the winter of 1917-18. After the German Command had accepted the invitation to a parley, the Soviets attempted to embrace the opportunity to slip through the half-open door of the armistice. First, they tried to introduce in the convention a provision which would authorize the spreading of propaganda. An effort was made to publish in German a pacifist paper intended to reach the German soldier and undermine his morale. Finally a committee was determined upon to go into Germany for the purpose of organizing the pacifist movement.[8] These maneuvers reveal a clear purpose to capitalize any situation that was likely to operate to their advantage.

The U. S. Department of Justice claimed to have had positive evidence of a gigantic conspiracy to destroy the Government of the United States. Being supported by public opinion the Department felt competent to deal quietly with the matter.[9] Soviet literature found in New York advised the abolition of the Government. Industry was to have been paralyzed by a general strike, whereupon nationalization would occur. The police were to have been shot, and criminals set free. Religion was to have been destroyed.[10] It was foolish for America to think that she would be immune from the effects of Bolshevism, which affected other nations.[11] While little progress was registered yet some effect was evident upon a portion of our population. The foreign element within our gates, the victims of European oppression in many cases, hated the American Government

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[7] Miliukov, P. W. Russia Today and Tomorrow, 114.
[8] Antonelli, E. Bolshevik Russia, 118. Treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed in March 1918.
[9] *Rev. of Rev.*, Vol. 61, 161.
[10] *Current History*, Vol 11, 429.
[11] *North American Review*, Vol. 210, 737.

equally as much as their native Government. These persons became the gullible victims of recent radical propaganda through the promise of rich rewards.[12]

The revolutionary movement in the Northwest was particularly strong in the period immediately after the war. This was clearly shown by the determined efforts of radicals to subvert the municipal functions in Seattle. A scheme had been carefully conceived whereby the proposed shipyard strike in Seattle should be extended as rapidly as possible until a general strike resulted. During the resultant chaos that inevitably would occur, the Government was to have been overthrown and a Soviet régime installed. The plan was to effect this peacefully if possible, but it must have been clearly apparent to every person that a peaceful revolution under the conditions was quite impossible. This plan was not the product of light-minded visionaries, but of serious-minded men who made radicalism a business. By the prompt action of the Mayor, supported by the municipal and national authorities, this plot against our national existence was completely frustrated.[13]

The Senatorial investigation conducted under the guidance of Senator Overman clearly revealed by its findings that it was practically impossible to have received Martens or any other individual who professed Bolshevist sentiments. America could not receive a representative from any nation whose known purpose was to foment rebellion against the government to which he was accredited. Martens was engaged in the same Seattle plot. Weinstein, one of Marten's lieutenants, said "we have come here to tell Comrade Martens that we intend to prepare to take over this great country just as the working class has taken over Russia." After such expressions of opinion nothing remained except to deport Martens.[14]

After the signing of the Armistice the mails were utilized to circulate seditious and pernicious literature with the design of establishing a revolutionary régime in America. The Postmaster General submitted to the Senate investigating com-

[12] *North American Review*, Vol. 210. 738.
[13] Hanson, O. Americanism Versus Bolshevism, 61.
[14] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies Soviet Russia, 468.

mittee a memorandum showing how the purpose of the mails had been misappropriated. James A. Horton, the assistant attorney, said that the Bolsheviki were conducting an energetic, world-wide propaganda campaign. Money was distributed among the masses to keep discontent aroused. Inflammable materials like famine, misery and despair were skilfully utilized for seditious purposes.

"The foremost means used," however, he said, is the "enticement of colossal gains against which the war-time profiteering appear as small sums indeed."[15] The seditious materials circulated through the mails consisted of two lines of attack. The first consisted in an appeal to the radical elements among the laboring classes to support the revolution, and the agencies interested in promoting the revolution. The second line of attack was more of an appeal to the intellect wherein it was alleged that the conditions of people were determined by social and economic factors. A change in these conditions would work to the advantage of the people.[16]

Secretary Colby in his note of August 11, 1920, referred to the fact of Soviet propaganda. He said: "The very existence of Bolshevism in Russia, the maintenance of their own rule, depends, and must continue to depend upon the occurrence of revolution in all other great civilized nations, including the United States."[17] Senator Kellogg, now Secretary of State, referred to the existence of disloyal propaganda in America, partially public, whose object was to destroy the Government with "fire and sword."[18] Trotzky before leaving America for Russia expressed his contempt for the American Government and institutions. He said: "I am going back to Russia to overthrow the provisional Government and stop the war with Germany. Keep on organizing until you are able to overthrow this damned rotten capitalistic government."[19]

Directing the propaganda activities throughout the world are

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[15] Sen Doc., Vol. 4, 66 Cong. 1 sess. 1919, 1111.
[16] *Ibid*, 1112, 1113.
[17] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 11, 1920. Note as reported.
[18] *Cong. Record*, Vol. 57, 65 Cong. pt. 3, 3 sess. 2652. Feb. 4, 1919.
[19] *World's Work*, Vol. 39, 477.

the Russian Communist Party and the Third International. Between these two institutions there is practically no difference. The program adopted by these institutions becomes at once the program and policy of all parties anywhere in the world that render allegiance to Communism.[20] The program of the Communist Party is directed towards the so-called liberation of the proletariat of the world through universal revolution.[21] The Congresses of the Russian Communist Party, where the propaganda procedure was evolved, have been attended by the leading personalities of the Soviet régime as delegates. Therefore the plea made that the Soviet Government was divorced from any program adopted by the Communist Party was mere fiction.[22] Zinoviev has been and remains the most virulent and prolific source of Communist activities not only in Russia but in the entire world. As president of the Petrograd Soviet he took a very active part in the proceedings of the "great Communist International."[23] Kalinin, the president of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, advised the proletariat of Western Europe to abolish the rule of the capitalist, and establish the authority of the Soviets.[24] Zinoviev in an article in the *Pravda* for November 7, 1919, stated that in a few years the Communists would rule the entire world.[25] Nor were there indications lacking to support his claim, as many powerful strikes were then in progress in England and in Western Europe, in connection with labor troubles in America.[26]

Lenin, in an address to the Second Congress of the Communist International, alluded with pride to the fact that the Soviet flag was being raised in Asia and the Orient. With the aid of the Third International the idea of the toilers running the State as against the non-toilers was making rapid progress even among the most ignorant workers. If the Communist régime had to

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[20] International Conciliation, No. 159, 66. Feb. 1921, Supplied by the State Dept.
[21] *Ibid.*, 59.
[22] *Ibid.*, 61.
[23] *Ibid.*, 63.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*, 64.
[26] *Ibid.*, 85.

retreat and compromise occasionally, such action was due to the fact that temporarily international imperialism was stronger than communism. He mentioned the fact that the first Congress of the International was merely to organize the propaganda machinery. However, the second Congress saw the work well advanced with proletarian armies in the field, although poorly equipped. Concluding his speech he said: "If you will help us to accomplish this, then no mental exercises or guesses with respect to what cannot be known and what no one can know, will prevent us from accomplishing our task, and this task will be that of leading on to the victory of the world revolution and to the establishment of an international proletarian Soviet Republic."[27] Zinoviev, in a report to the Congress, strongly recommended that the separate communist organizations existing in nations like France should be "united" and "centralized." National and international centralization was necessary. The parties of America and Russia were singled out as models.[28]

Radek remarked that 80 per cent of the workmen in America were outside the trade-unions. It was therefore decided to organize these less-skilled workers, whom the aristocratic unions did not want, into a union to promote the "class struggle."[29] The revolutionary trade-union movement was claimed to have about 3,000,000 members. These were scattered through the various countries of the world. They were organized to promote the erection of Soviet republics in each nation through a "merciless class struggle on an international scale, a close and inseparable union with the Communist Internationalist."[30] In addition to the organization of the workers another appeal of significant import was issued. The international Bureau of the Prolitkult was deeply interested in creating a distinctly proletarian culture for the masses.[31]

The American Communist Party was organized in Chicago

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[27] The 2nd Congress of The Communist International Official Reports, 30. Hereafter referred to as The 2nd Congress, etc.
[28] *Ibid.*, 37.
[29] *Ibid.*, 60.
[30] *Ibid.*, 109. Volume supplied by the State Department.
[31] *Ibid.*, 110.

in September, 1919. It was formed from the radical left wing of the Socialist Party. There were about 125 delegates present representing a constituency of about 50,000 workmen.[32] The Party emphasized the contention that the economic and political struggles of the proletarian elements were inseparable. Strikes were to be encouraged in order to bring home to the masses their political significance.[33] America, which entered the World War for the purpose of crushing Prussian militarism and establishing democracy, was described as the "most autocratic oligarchy of financial capital that has ever existed."[34] Liberation could only be achieved by an armed struggle.[35]

In regard to the fundamental tasks of the 2nd Congress of the Communist International and the Communist Parties throughout the world Lenin said: "Therefore the main task at the present moment of the Communist Parties from the point of view of the international proletarian movement is to bring together the scattered Communist forces, to organize in each country a united Communist Party (or strengthen and renew the existing party), in order to increase tenfold the work of preparing the proletariat for the conquest of state power, and for the conquest of power precisely in the form of a dictatorship of the proletariat."[36] No perceptible change of aim has occurred in Communist purposes since this utterance, even though the Soviet Government might have found it advisable to adopt new economic expedients.

In addition to the expropriation of factories, mines, landed estates, and other forms of property the proletariat must also put an end to the exploitation of the masses by means of large houses owned by capitalists. These were to be occupied by the workmen under the supervision of the local Soviets. The revolutionary epoch demanded that the proletarians apply and concentrate all their energies upon the mass struggle with its "logical conclusions." In the furtherance of this end the bour-

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[32] The 2nd. Congress, etc. 141. From *Izvestia* July 4, 1920.
[33] *Ibid.*, 142. From *Izvestia* July, 1920.
[34] *Ibid.*, 143. From *Pravada* July 18, 1920.
[35] *Ibid.*, 144.
[36] *Ibid.*, 157. From Communist International, July 19, 1920.

geois parliamentary institutions were to be employed if needed.[37] In the scheme of the Third International to overthrow all Governments by force, that of America was included.[38]

At the convention of the Communist Party at Bridgman, Michigan, the Communist International was regarded as the organization to direct the warfare of the proletariat. Its program must be accepted without any reservation. Documents presented at the Berrien County, Michigan, Criminal Syndicalist cases stated that "Indorsement and defense of Soviets in Russia with failure to advocate the Soviet form of proletarian dictatorship in the United States is hypocrisy."[39] The American Communist Party is thus the child of the International. It receives instructions which emanate from the Soviet régime. It passed a resolution during its session in 1921 which reads thus: "The United Communist Party will systematically and persistently familiarize the working class with the fact of the inevitability of the armed conflict in the proletarian revolution. The United Communist Party must prepare the working class for armed insurrection as the final form of mass action, by which the workers shall conquer the state."[40] It was shown during the above trial that if a member of the Party was subpoenaed to give testimony such testimony could be given only with the consent of the Central Executive Committee, and then only to expose the hypocrisy of the State.[41]

Mr. Frank Vanderlip was convinced that propaganda was carried on in numerous nations with Russian aid. The Russian Government has made specific denials of this accusation. However it cannot be doubted that the activities of propagandists for Communism have been undertaken with Government connivance. In support of this contention it was asserted that forty newspapers in Italy were controlled and directed from

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[37] Hearings before a sub-committee of the Committee On Foreign Relations United States Senate Sixty-eighth Congress Firts Session Pursuant to Senate Resolution 50, pt. 2, 229, also pt. 1, 82. Hereafter referred to as Hearings.
[38] *Ibid.*, pt. 2, 236.
[39] *Ibid.*, pt. 1, 107, also pt. 2, 249.
[40] Brasol, B. L. Balance Sheet of Sovietism, 249.
[41] Hearings, pt. 1, 141.

Soviet sources.[42] About the revolutionary propaganda campaign, Vanderlip said that every means and ingenuity to breed trouble throughout the world were employed. Their agents were everywhere fomenting disorder, and were the enemies of organized Society. To quote his estimate: "Their experiment as it had been conducted had nothing in it that promised good and a great deal that was evil."[43] Defending themselves against this charge the supporters of the Soviet régime admitted exercising violence and terror in the beginning, but now claim that propaganda efforts have been reduced to a minimum.

Trotzky thus explained the universal form of attack upon Capitalism. The technique and procedure which has been discovered efficacious in destroying the bourgeoisie in Russia were to be employed in the furtherance of the world-revolution. He said: "The press is a weapon not of an abstract society, but of two irreconcilable, armed and contending sides. We are destroying the press of the counter-revolution, just as we destroyed its fortified positions, its stores, its communications and its intelligence system."[44] Trotzky defended the Red Terror as the instrumentality which prevented the Russian Bourgeoisie and the world Bourgeoisie from conducting a successful reaction in Russia. The members of the Bourgeoisie were to have been placed on a probationary basis to test their loyalty. Those who failed in loyalty were to be punished severely.[45]

There is no warrant for assuming that there has occurred a fundamental change in Communist psychology. Working on the assumption that such a change had occurred certain European statesmen entered into agreements with the Moscow régime, but none of these agreements have proven distinctly profitable. Early in 1922 Apfelbaum made the statement that despite changes in tactics "merciless war with the outside world remains the guiding policy of the Soviets."[46]

President Harding in his message dealing with the distressed

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[42] Vanderlip, F. A. What Next in Europe, 172.
[43] *Ibid.*, 175, 176.
[44] Brasol, B. L. The Balance Sheet of Sovietism, 161.
[45] *Ibid.*, 162.
[46] *Ibid.*, 237.

American industrial situation while not mentioning communism, nevertheless said that no hope can be found for those who were interested in the development of seditious activities. Legislation must be kept free from those elements which would unjustly assault labor as well as from the "extremists who strive for class domination." Concluding his plea for the re-establishing of legal authority within the nation the President said: "We must reassert the doctrine that in the Republic the first obligation, and the first allegiance of every citizen, high or low, is to his Government, and to hold that Government to be just and unchallenged sponsor for public welfare, and the liberty, security, and rights of all citizens. No matter what clouds may gather, no matter what storms may ensue, no matter what hardships may attend or what sacrifice may be necessary, Government by law must and will be sustained."[47]

In his message of December 9, 1922, President Harding declared that we are desirous of assisting the world. We also participated in international councils not with the intention to dictate, but with the desire to counsel. We had no vengeance or territorial greed to satisfy. We also would rejoice to assist in re-establishing the currencies of the world, and to be of assistance in other respects. Continuing, the President said: "While I have everlasting faith in this republic, it would be folly indeed to blind ourselves to our problems at home. Abusing the hospitality of our shores are the advocates of revolution, finding their deluded followers among those who take on the habiliments of an American without knowing an American soul. There is the recrudescense of hyphenated Americanism which we thought to have been stamped out when we committed the national life and soul to the world war."[48] In this connection Mr. O. L. Smith, Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, wrote to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and offered to submit evidence that revolutionary propaganda was being circulated in America directed from Moscow. A note signed by responsible officials of the International, instructed the working men to

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[47] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 19, 1922. 2. Message as reported.
[48] *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1922. 6. Message as reported.

resist the attempts of the Government to control revolutionary activities.[49]

The Red International of Labor Unions was composed of the most experienced representatives of revolutionary unions in all countries. It is an instrument for bringing to each union the wisdom and experience gained in revolutionary activities in other countries. The Workers' Party of America urged the radical unions in the United States to pursue the policies outlined by the Red Labor Union International.[50] On January 12, 1922, instructions were issued to all members of the Communist Party of America. These instructions were binding upon all members of the Party. The preliminary revolutionary work of the Party must be perfected upon the basis of preparedness, to take care of any unforeseen contingency.[51] No Government, it should be observed, can permit any agency within its jurisdiction to be regulated by an alien authority, of hostile principles, unless it is willing to surrender a portion of its self-respect.

In August, 1922, the Executive Committee of the Trade Unions International made an appeal to the members of the Industrial Workers of the World, and advised it that its leaders were becoming too compromising. The Executive Committee declared: "We stand for the union of revolutionary elements with the masses of the labor organizations already existing. This would help the laboring classes to realize the idea of a united front against their bloodthirsty enemy—against American Capitalism."[52] In September, 1922, the *Voice of Labor*, an organ of the Workers' Party of America, made a virulent attack upon American institutions. Open resistance was advocated, and the freedom of the press, movement, and assemblage were demanded equally with the Ku Klux Klan and the Chambers of Commerce, which enjoyed these rights. The Democratic Party was accused of converting the nation into a military machine at the bid of financial interests. The Harding Administration was assaulted as the vicious enemy of Labor. The

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[49] *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 23, 1923. 2.
[50] Hearngs, pt. 2, 270.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*, 216.

Democratic Administration, it was alleged, was dominated by the "lick-spittles" of the Morgan Bank, while the Republican Administration was controlled by the "lick-spittles" of the Standard Oil and the Morgan interests.[53] The existing capitalist state was maintained for the suppression and exploitation of the workers. So long as the capitalists remained in power no successful progress could be made. Therefore a political struggle must be begun to obtain control of the Government.[54]

Secretary Hughes in answering the delegation of the Women's Party quoted the statements of prominent Soviet officials, thus Zinoviev said: "The eternal in the Russian revolution is the fact that it is the beginning of the world revolution." Lenin in his last speech before the Fourth Congress of the Third International on November 13, 1922, said: "The revolutionists of all countries must learn the organization, the planning, the method and the substance of revolutionary work, then I am convinced the outlook of the world revolution will not only be good but excellent."[55] Trotzky addressing the Fifth Congress of Communist Youths at Moscow in October, 1922, said: "That means, comrades, that revolution is coming in Europe as well as in America, systematically, step by step, stubbornly and with gnashing of teeth in both camps. It will be long, protracted, cruel and sanguinary." Mr. Hughes declared the Department was anxious to "promote peace in the world—but the world we desire is a world not threatened with the destructive propaganda of the Soviet authorities, and one in which there will be good faith and recognition of obligations and a sound basis of international intercourse."[56]

In December, 1923, the Department of Justice assured the Department of State that the instructions which Zinoviev, President of the Communist International, had issued for the guidance of the Workers' Party of America were authentic. The International was pleased that all discord in the Party had seemingly been satisfactorily adjusted. The Party which was

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[53] Hearings, pt. 2, 485.
[54] *Ibid.*, 274.
[55] *N. Y. Times*, March 22 1923. 2. Also Hearings, pt. 1, 62.
[56] *Ibid.*

the "advance guard of the revolutionary proletariat of the United States would now be enabled to conduct their work among millions of Americans."[57] The instructions contained six separate parts. The first portion recommended that the activity of the Party should be directed among the workers in the large industries. Second, these workers were to be organized into units of ten under the direction of a trusted member. Third, these units must be organized according to "occupation and nationality." Fourth, the head of each unit must know each member intimately and report his condition to the central committee of the Party. Fifth, each unit must have a fighting force of three men approved by the central committee, who were to meet once a week for drill purposes. Sixth, the leaders of the units were to meet bi-monthly in order to discuss their progress, and to adopt future plans. The International also congratulated the Workers' Party of America for the organization of the Federal Farmer Labor Party. In commending the boldness of the Party the International concluded: "We hope that the Party will step by step conquer (embrace) the proletarian forces of America and in the not distant future, raise the red flag over the White House."[58]

Steklov in an article in the *Izvestia*, No. 252 (1691), November 7, 1922, discussed the essential connection between the Republic of Soviets and the Third International. He mentioned the fact that already in 1914–15, the Russian Bolsheviks regarded themselves as part of the future Third International, and in accordance with its principles carried out the Russian revolution.[59] The connection was thus expressed by Steklov: "In the Soviet Republic the International proletariat has an inaccessible stronghold in which the elaboration of the international Communist Program and tactics is proceeding, and where the systematic accumulation of creative proletariat experience and the construction of a proletariat state are going on."[60] The Third International and the Soviet Republic were mutually essential

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[57] Dept. of State, Press Release for December 20, 1923, 1.
[58] *Ibid.*, 1, 2.
[59] *Ibid.*, Release for December 25, 1923, 1, 2.
[60] *Ibid.*, 3.

to the welfare of the other party. The International in the past guarded Russia from the attacks of capital, and in the future its aid will be more effective. The International will also contribute to the political and economic consolidation of Soviet Russia's position. The unity of purpose was thus described: "The spiritual, moral, and material bond between them is based on the complete solidarity of interests."[61]

G. Zinoviev in an article in the *Moscow Pravda*, No. 284, of December 14, 1923, addressed the American Communists. They were to be complimented upon their success in establishing a daily Communist newspaper in the English language. This accomplishment was the result of much protracted and serious effort among the American workers and the trade unions. The workers were to rid themselves of the influence exercised by Gompers and Hillquit.[62] The growth of revolution could not be urged too rapidly since it develops with varying speed in different countries. This was natural and could not be altered.[63] The vitality of American Communism was evidenced by the readiness with which the work among the peasants (small farmers) was pursued.[64] The position of the Roumanian Communists was commended. They had succeeded in subverting the trade unions, and now were seeking the conversion of the peasants.[65] This conquest of the peasantry in each nation was very necessary, otherwise the proletarian revolution would be confined to a narrow class only, the object being to give it greater universality by including the peasantry.[66]

Attorney General Daughtery said that the Department of Justice had "abundant evidence to support the State Department with respect to Communist propaganda in this country directed from Moscow." This information was given to the State Department which would render any advisable information.[67] The strength of the Communist movement in France

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[61] Dept. of State. Press Release for December 25, 1923, 3, 4.
[62] *Ibid.*, Release for Jan. 4, 1924, 1.
[63] *Ibid.*, 2.
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Ibid.*, 3.
[66] *Ibid.*, 4.
[67] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 10, 1924. 3.

and Germany as was shown by the vote registered was interpreted by Zinoviev as a very favorable indication of the future prospects of Communism. The explicit aim then was to inaugurate a movement in London and New York to secure a like firm footing for the Communists similar to that obtained in Paris and Berlin.[68] The Workers' Party while in convention in Chicago, late in 1923 and the beginning of 1924, received instructions directly from Moscow. The Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion were attacked as illegal capitalistic organizations. The workers were told to form factory groups and penetrate into the labor unions. American imperialism in the West Indies and Central America was scored. The Monroe Doctrine was attacked along with loans to Latin-American peoples. The workers were urged to resist American imperialism.[69]

During the course of the Anglo-Russian Conference, the British Government protested that the Soviet propaganda was destroying the loyalty of the subjects in India and Afghanistan. The answer was returned that whatever activities occurred in these sections was not due to the Soviet Government, but was the action of political parties over which the Soviet Government had no control. The duplicity of this evasion was proven by the fact that the Politikbureau directing these activities was also the supreme power at Moscow.[70] This Conference held in the spring of 1924 is of especial importance to those intrusted with the formulation of America's foreign policy. The Russian delegates insisted upon two principal concessions both of which were obtained; first, the promise of a loan to be guaranteed by the British Government; and second, diplomatic immunities for the members of Russia's trade delegation. The promised loan did not materialize as the Baldwin Government came into power, and the Commons were opposed to extending England's credit for the loan.[71] Germany when she resumed relations with Russia, had granted similar concessions to Russian trade delegates. While trade was considerably augmented it was also

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[68] *N. Y. Times*, May 26, 1924. 3.
[69] Hearings, pt. 2, 436.
[70] *N. Y. Times*, *Aug.* 10, 1924. Sec. II, 5.
[71] *Ibid.*

observed that the number of trade delegates increased abnormally. Upon investigation by the German police it was discovered that these apparently superfluous delegates were occupied in subversive activities under direction of the Politikbureau, as was shown by captured documents.[72] It is not reasonable to presume that in event of recognition by the United States the Soviet régime would adopt a different code of ethics than it did in the case of the nations already considered.

In view of the pernicious attempts at propaganda it was necessary that a conscious effort should be made against any attempt, wherever arising, to destroy the institutions of our Government, and to interfere in our own exclusive internal affairs. The activities of the Department of Justice were justified. The Workers' Party as the Soviet agent in America receives its directions from Moscow. Their success has not been great, but the danger lies in the fact that an organization within the United States receives instructions as to conduct from an agency outside of America. It is therefore necessary for those entrusted with the foreign policy of the United States to insist that these propaganda activities cease before we seriously consider diplomatic relations with such a régime![73]

The untrustworthy intentions of the Soviet régime and of some of its leaders was explicity shown by a statement attributed to Zinoviev and published in *Pravda*, the official organ of the Soviet Government. The statement said: "If a revolution comes in England, we cannot promise MacDonald that we will keep our word regarding the payment of interest and principal on this loan. On the contrary we promise that we will break it and once more repudiate our debts, although unfortunately we cannot fix a date for the English revolution." This statement was made a short time before the convening of the Anglo-Russian Conference in April, 1924.[74]

While propaganda was actively pursued in the Occident, the Orient was by no means neglected. Russia, occupying a position between Europe and Asia, would naturally endeavor to

[72] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 10, 1924. Sec. 2, 5.
[73] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 74, 75.
[74] *N. Y. Times*, March 8, 1925. Sec. VII, 12.

spread her influence throughout the Orient, as she is herself an Asiatic power. The most logical point of attack was China, and next Japan. Considerable progress was made in China. Dr. Ma Soo, a Chinese publicist and former representative of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, in the United States during the course of an address to the faculty and students of Fuh Tan University, referred to the dangers of dealing with Russia. He admitted that while he favored recognition he was aware that no sooner was recognition conferred than the Communists would take advantage of the situation to spread their propaganda. Examples were cited to show how the press in certain sections of China was gradually swung completely over to the Communist viewpoint. This process of press subsidizing and propaganda was financed with gold furnished by Moscow.[75] It is well known that Chinese students were sent to Russia to study the Soviet Government.

Significant changes occurred recently in China's attitude towards foreigners. These important alterations according to observers were due to Russian influence, which has been steadily at work since November, 1917. These activities were said to have had more effect upon China than the Washington Arms Conference of 1921–22. The movement appears to be directed towards conditions imposed by foreign treaties upon China. The continuance of the Soviet régime in power has given it considerable influence in Asia aside from China. Russian statesmanship would apparently be much gratified if China should join them in the Union of Soviet Republics.[76] The Bolshevists have made distinct progress in China during 1925. This was due not so much to the fact of popular acceptance of Sovietism, as to the fact that the opposition parties are mostly unorganized, and not united upon any anti-Soviet program.[77] The Roman Catholics have begun to publish Chinese papers with the avowed purpose of opposing the extension of Bolshevism. Foreign business interests, chiefly British, have raised a large fund to combat the propaganda. Many of the Soviet officials engaged

[75] *Literary Digest*, Feb. 21, 1925. 17.
[76] *Ibid.*, March 14, 1925. 18.
[77] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 17, 1926. Sec. I, 4.

in this work were formerly employed by the Imperial Government. These speak Chinese fluently and are acquainted with Chinese customs. The outline of the Soviet program as reported is as follows:

"First, to reconstitute Parliament.

"Second, to reorganize the Provincial Assemblies.

"Third, to eliminate the principal militarists who are not in sympathy with the radicals.

"Fourth, to better equip Chinese labor elements to carry out during the summer a series of nation-wide demonstrations and arouse a national feeling against capitalist Governments."[78]

After the penetration of China the next most logical point of attack was Japan. Diplomatic negotiation between Russia and Japan had been in progress for a considerable time without indications of producing any tangible results. Therefore when the news was spread that an agreement had been reached and a commercial treaty signed, it was received with demonstrations of joy by the Japanese. Article V gave reciprocal promises that the contracting parties would lend no assistance to any organization interested in disturbing "the order and security in any part of the territories of Japan or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." This article was intended to protect Japan from the effects of radical activities and secure the Russians in their position in eastern Asia.[79] The enthusiasm over the treaty was suddenly cooled when the remarks of M. Kopp, the newly-appointed Soviet Ambassador to Japan, reported to have been made at Harbin, while enroute to Japan, were received by the Japanese.[80] The Ambassador was reported by the semi-efficial Nippon Dempo News Service as having said that the treaty was a scrap of paper of no value whatever. The restoration of friendship between Russia and Japan was significant only as a "prelude to Russia's future co-operation with the United States." He also is reported to have said that he would entrust all political movements to Japanese socialists, and support and labor disputes that might develop. In regard

[78] *N. Y. Times*, January 17, 1926. Sec. 1, 4.
[79] *Ibid.*, March 22, 1925. Sec. 2, 1. *Text Russian Review, April 1, 1925,146*
[80] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1925. Sec. 9, 6.

to propaganda he would disseminate communist doctrines among the Young Men's Associations in Japan for the purpose of establishing an influential Communist Party in Japan.[81] The authenticity of this speech has been challenged. Whether accurate or not the speech is at least of a character in keeping with known utterances of responsible Soviet officials.[82]

The opening of the Russian archives by the Soviet régime revealed facts of especial importance to Americans. It was shown that the old Russian autocracy was a consistent opponent of the American "open door" policy. If Russia had emerged victoriously from the war there is every reason to assume that she would have assumed the leadership of a coalition to oust American interests from the Far East. In view of this consideration it is evident that the recent Soviet activities in the Orient, especially in China, are merely an enlarged continuation of the designs attributed to the vanquished autocracy. This distinction, however, exists in that the Soviet activities are directed against all powers in their attempts to bring the Orient under communist dominion.[83]

Secretary Kellogg at the celebration of the Norse-American centennial, strongly emphasized the fact that insidious propaganda was being conducted within the nation. He urged loyalty to the Constitution as the foundation of American liberty. He was not an "alarmist" but fully realized that the danger to our institutions was not "imaginary." Few persons knew of the amount of propaganda which was being "distributed in this country by foreign influence." If people were not satisfied with our institutions "let them go where they can find a government which does satisfy them. This is no place for them." The Secretary said that the doctrines of the Constitution were being "assaulted" by "propagandists who advocate the overthrow of the Government and the substitution of class tyranny" and by "a considerable body of our citizens who in the name of liberty and reform are impatient of the constitutional restraints

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[81] *N. Y. Times*, April 24, 1925. 6. Text of Kopp's speech as reported.
[82] *Ibid.*, May 31, 1925. Sec. 9, 6.
[83] Beard, C. A. Cross Currents in Europe Today, 179.

and by insidious approaches and attacks would destroy these guarantees of personal liberty."[84]

Indications are present that Communist propaganda is being renewed in a more energetic fashion. Such activities are most destructive and pernicious at a time when public opinion considers the danger past, and is inclined to dismiss the rumors or view them tolerantly. Periods of public apathy and lethargy can be fully capitalized by the ever-alert agitators. In the beginning of 1925 the Communist International set aside $340,000 for work in America at a time when it proclaimed itself too poor to supply funds for other nations where the prospects of success were less favorable. The monthly expenditures were set at $25,000 with an initiation cost of $40,000. Koparoff, General Secretary for the International, at about the same time issued secret instructions to the Communist Party in America to regulate their activities.[85] That there has been no subsidence of operations during 1925 has been proven by the statement of the secretary of the Communist Party in America. The secretary said that $1,000,000 was spent for propaganda in 1925.[86] Even if it is true, as Rakovsky stated, that Russia is too poor to finance it fully, propaganda, however, persists, and the effects on America are the same whatever the source of funds.[87]

The program of the Communist International adopted at its congress in July, 1924, contains measures for the expropriation of large industrial enterprises and banking institutions. Trotzky has been elected a member of the Political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party which controls the policies of the Communist International. The program of the Communist Party; the Communist International, and the constitutions of different divisions of the Soviet Union are known in America. These all envisage the establishment of a world Soviet Republic along Communistic lines.[88]

America at various times has been the scene of propagandist

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[84] *Public Ledger*, June 9, 1925. 1.
[85] *N. Y. Times*, Feb. 15, 1925. 6
[86] *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1926. Sec. 1, 18. Also *Public Ledger*, Jan. 19, 1926. 1.
[87] *Ibid*, Sec., 9, 8.
[88] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 626.

efforts. The periods of the American and French Revolution produced sporadic and short-lived attempts to alter the character of our Government. However it does not appear that any of the previous movements had been as thoroughly and competently organized as the present movement to extend radical power. The movement has more adherents than is usually supposed, nor do they all hail from the lower and ignorant strata of society. Whenever any measure is advocated to restrict immigration or regulate the "freedom of speech", a united front is presented at once in opposition to such proposals.[89]

Propaganda has been of an intensive political character generally and certain points have been selected for specific attack. The negro problem was selected as one of the fields where most productive results might be attained. At the 2nd Congress of the International in 1920 the negro question was fully discussed. It was shown that the United States had a negro population of about 10,000,000. The negroes in the north were urban while those living in the south were rural. It was declared that the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution, granting negroes rights of citizenship, was not enforced.[90] The discriminations produced by the "Jim Crow" system, and the disinclination of the American Federation of Labor to admit negroes to membership were discussed. The old Socialist Party also appeared reluctant to admit negroes to membership.[91] The return of the soldiers was said to have increased the negro worker's desire for equality, and better social consideration. The riots that occurred in Washington, Chicago, and Omaha, were taken as evidence that a new consciousness of their importance had possessed the negroes. This was accepted as a favorable omen encouraging to the success of propaganda efforts among them. The presence of a monthly journal with a circulation of 150,000 was a great aid in arousing race-consciousness and "propaganda in favor of an armed revolt against the whites." The movement "Back to Africa" was not to be encouraged. Negroes considered themselves Americans. As such the propaganda among them

[89] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 17, 1926. Sec. 9, 12.

[90] The Second Congress, 151.

[91] *Ibid.*

would be greatly facilitated.[92] The American Communists were to regard the negroes as laborers. Activity was easiest among the industrially employed negroes of the north, as the southern negroes were yet very backward. Common labor unions of whites and blacks were to be formed. The Communists were urged to take advantage of this situation to show "the necessity for a social revolution not only to liberate all laborers from slavery but also as being the only effective means of liberating the oppressed negro people."[93]

The revolutionary problem among the negroes is assuming ever increasing importance. This has resulted in the formation of organizations "racial and militant" to combat the so-called oppression of the negro. The Communist International recognized the negro as a valuable asset in the furtherance of world revolution. It appointed a committee to study the problem. However, owing to lack of information as to specific conditions in each nation it failed to accomplish anything concrete.[94] Mr. McKay during a speech said that the negroes as a subject race would come to Moscow to learn how to fight against exploitation the same as other subjects races have done. Already in 1918 the Manifesto of the International, which referred in part to exploited colonies, was circulated by negro radicals among their people. When in 1920 the American Government began the investigation of radical activities among the negroes, they returned the accusation that the Communists were interested in emancipating the negro from his inferior social position.[95] The *Izvestia*, the official organ of the International, on November 16, 1922, admitted that the American negro offered a fine field for activities. The cultural level of the negro was known to be low. This was asserted to be due to unusual exploitation and starvation wages. The negro's status was appalling, and his association with the white proletariat should meet with an enthusiastic response among the negroes themselves. Considering the fact that the negro is healthy and uncorrupted by

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[92] The Second Congress, 153.
[93] *Ibid.*, 154.
[94] Hearings, pt. 2, 289.
[95] *Ibid.*, 413, 495.

capitalist civilization, the prospects for propaganda among them were very hopeful.[96]

The reaction of Asiatic and Musselman nationalties after the war against capitalism also affected the negroes. They were described as having been oppressed not only in Africa for centuries, but also with even greater severity in America. The negro problem has thus become more intense on both subjective and objective grounds, and is a vital issue of revolution. The co-operation of the negro was deemed essential to the destruction of capitalistic power.[97] The Fourth Congress of the International formulated four theses upon colonial and negro problems. First, the movement among the negroes to undermine capitalism was to be encouraged. Second, negro workers everywhere should be organized. Third, work among the negroes was best conducted by negroes themselves. Fourth, steps to convene a negro congress at Moscow should be taken.[98] The hope was expressed that the members of the International would co-operate with the negroes in their respective countries. This discussion of the negro question was one of the most significant developments of the Congress. The International pledged itself to fight for racial equality, and equal wages as between whites and negroes. The negro delegates from America were the recipients of distinctive consideration from the Congress.[99]

In the *Izvestia* for February 15, 1923, Trotzky wrote to the negro communist McKay regarding work among the negroes. He said: "The training of black agitators is the most important revolutionary problem of the moment. The problem becomes more agitated in the United States of America on account of the abominable stupidity and race hatred among the privileged circles of the working class itself which do not want to recognize negroes as brethren in labor and struggle. One of the most important methods of struggle against this capitalistic corruption of minds is to wake up the human dignity and revolutionary protest among the black slaves of American Capital. This work can

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[96] Hearings, pt. 2, 419.
[97] *Ibid.*, 495.
[98] *Ibid.*
[99] *Ibid.*, 417.

best be carried on by the devoted and politically educated negro revolutionists. Naturally, the work must not assume the character of black chauvinism but must be carried on in a spirit of solidarity among all laborers, regardless of the color of their skin. I am at a loss to say what are the most expedient organization forms for the movement among the American negroes because I am not familiar with the concrete conditions and possibilities, but the organization forms will be found as soon as sufficient will for action is displayed."[100]

More recently there has occurred an energetic renewal of the radical movement among negroes, especially in the industrial centers. The negroes are demanding organization, and simultaneously there appears to be a disposition on the part of the American Federation of Labor to lower the bars raised against admission of negroes to membership in the Federation.[101] There is also an apparent effort by the Communists working through the Worker's Party and the American Negro Labor Congress to influence the negro labor movement along radical lines. The aim is to wrest control of negro labor from the conservative labor movement in America.[102] The Communist approach to the negro is shown by the selection of ten young negroes to study under Soviet scholarships in a Soviet university. They were being prepared for the Communist "diplomatic service" in various parts of the world inhabited by backward colored races, and finally in America if needed.[103] The training of negro diplomats and a consideration of their future functions should constitute a careful guide or warning as to what might reasonably be expected from dealings with Communist diplomats generally. The Negro Congress hailed the Soviet Government as the first to produce general equality. Communist leader stated that the Congress would assist the oppressed "colonial peoples against capitalism."[104]

The presence of Communistic influence among the negroes

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[100] Hearings, pt. 2, 209, pt. 1, 60. *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 624.
[101] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 19, 1926. Sec. 2, 1.
[102] *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1926. Sec. 2, 1.
[103] *Ibid.*, 2.
[104] *Ibid.*

has given rise to violent divergence of opinions among negro leaders. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People favors organization of the negro along conservative trade union lines. This position is supported by James Weldon Johnson, and Dr. W. F. B. DuBois. Dean Kelly Miller of Howard University opposes negro unionism. Negro newspapers are attacking the union movement claiming it is fostered by the American Federation of Labor, which is accused of discrimination against the negro. Few groups support Communism. The Federation of Labor is going to oppose the progress of radicalism among negroes. Dr. Dubois thinks the American people must treat the negro better if they want the progress of Communism to cease among their ranks.[105] The American Federation of Labor admits negroes to membership in all but three of its unions. However the feeling of discrimination persists. White officials are charged with being hostile to negro members. It is pointed out that unless this prejudice against negroes ceases, they would form unions which under certain conditions would become a fruitful field for propaganda efforts.[106] That a dangerous situation exists within a large element of our population is now fully acknowledged. This situation demands the most judicious and cautious treatment on the part of our responsible leaders, otherwise irreparable damage may result.

In connection with the efforts to demoralize the negro population, a concerted attempt was made to secure control of union labor in the United States. The United Mine Workers of America have recently investigated the extent of radical progress, and have made some startling disclosures. The object of the investigation was two-fold; first, to discover those who were boring "from within" to gain control of the members and through them of the trade-unions; and second, to inform the American public of the sinister activities conducted "within their midst." The object is to control the Government and establish an "arbitrary dictatorship" that would stifle all forms

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[105] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 17, 1926. Sec. 2, 1.
[106] *Ibid.*, 2.

of popular influence in "government affairs." The Communist movement directed from Moscow is represented in America by more than six thousand leaders and about "one million members, adherents, and sympathizers."[107]

The dangers of Bolshevism to America and Canada were not the result of an overworked imagination but real and actual. The Moscow leaders were waging a "definite contest" to wrest the sovereignty from the people of America and Canada. Millions of dollars have been spent. Much of the money came from continental Europe. The remainder was collected through "organizations and committees" created for the purpose, and from donations received from sympathetic persons in America. At the beginning of the miners' strike on April 1, 1922, the sum of $1,110,000 was sent from Moscow to enable the radicals to control the strike. The purpose was to gain control first of the union leadership, and then promote armed insurrection.[108] In the prosecution of their aim the country was divided into two parts. The eastern section had their headquarters in New York and were to direct activities in the Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, southeastern Ohio, and eastern Kentucky coal fields. The headquarters directed the movement and plan of campaign in Illinois, Indiana and northern and central Ohio.[109] The insidious plan of approach to their design was to let the original cause of the strike disappear and gradually work sentiment of an "insurrection," and the recognition of the Soviet régime.[110]

The sums to promote these movements run into the millions of dollars. These amounts are collected from the American people. Collections of money for revolutionary purposes has become an organized industry in America. Moscow and other European Bolshevist centers have contributed millions. The United Mine Workers have discovered that the European funds came to America through the usual international banking channels of Moscow, Berlin, or Stockholm and were deposited to the credit of individuals in various banks. Some of the money

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[107] Sen. Doc., No. 14, 68. Cong. 1, ses, 1.
[108] *Ibid.*, 3.
[109] *Ibid*, 12.
[110] *Ibid.*, 16.

was collected from members of the United Mines Workers themselves under the impression that it was to be employed for constructive purposes.[111] The available evidence indicates that a most insidious and destructive effort was secretly made to gain control of the unions by a process of internal corruption. No means are too reprehensible that will conduce to the promotion of their ulterior purposes. Legitimate organization of labor is to be recommended, as a protection against any possible rapacious capitalists. However, constant vigilance should be kept upon the maneuvers of radicals by the local and national authorities, with a view to protecting the people. The independent investigations and co-operation of such organizations like the United Mine Workers will greatly assist the Government in uncovering the sources of sedition.

The army and navy have also been selected as points where seditious propaganda might flourish. As is well known, many of the men are always dissatisfied with the treatment received in either branch of the national services. The promoters of radical sentiment realizing this condition of the men in the services, have made consistent attempts to capitalize the discontent in favor of Communism. This attempt to penetrate the American army began in 1919 when American troops were in northern Russia, but was unsuccessful.[112] President Wilson was described as the "greatest of the rascals of imperialism."[112] Lenin in his appeal to the proletariat said: "The exploiters of the whole world have not sufficient strength to hold back the victory of the world proletarian revolution, which is liberating mankind from the yoke of capital, from the constant threat of long imperialist wars that are inevitable under the capitalistic régime."

In January, 1921, important documents were taken in New York City which contained instructions regarding the conduct of propaganda in the army and navy. Each district of the Communist Party was to ascertain the number of army and navy posts in the district.[113] A committee of "five members" in each

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[111] Sen. Doc. No. 14, 68 Cong. 1. sess. 22.
[112] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies Soviet Russia, 466 Lenin quoted.
[113] Hearings, pt. 2, 453.

district was to have been selected of the best "material" to conduct propaganda at each of these posts. The district organizers were to have charge of these committees. Each subdistrict was to appoint a "committee of five" for work among the militia. The subdistrict organizers controlled these latter committees. Ruthenberg stated, in a conversation, why he wanted the illegal Communist Party maintained. The reason was, he said, "To do the illegal work, such as send men in the Army and Navy to distribute illegal propaganda in facts, not in words, as has been the case in the past, and other things that would be illegal under the present form of society." An attempt was made in February, 1922, to organize ex-soldiers for propaganda work.[114]

The Second Congress of the Communist International established twenty-one conditions for membership in the International, one of which provided that "systematic propaganda" should be carried on in the army where "Communist groups should be formed." In case agitation is prohibited by legislation then the work was to be conducted illegally. Refusal to conduct such activities would be considered as treason to the revolutionary cause.[115] The Third Congress of the International in the summer of 1921 recommended an educational and espionage organization service to observe the number, distribution and size of the army. The equipment and efficiency of the army was to be carefully observed. The relations between the army and the police were to be the object of special study. This was one of the means of approach whereby the proletariat was to have been prepared for the conquest of the State.[116] In addition to the foregoing the Communist Party of America in convention in New York City in March, 1923, recommended the creation of organizations to conduct propaganda work among the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion.[117]

Responding to inquiries concerning the presence of radical agitation within the army the Secretary of War admitted that

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[114] Hearings, pt. 2, 453.
[115] *Ibid.*, 454.
[116] *Ibid.*
[117] *Ibid.*

the existence of such propaganda in the army ranks was known to the War Department. Much of this activity was supported undoubtedly by many loyal Americans who were unaware of its purpose. However, the Secretary thought that the spirit of loyalty and patriotism resulting from military training would prevent any considerable growth of radical ideas in its ranks.[118] The Secretary of the Navy remarked that he was aware of an attempt by "foreign countries to undermine the morale of the Navy." He recognized that some discontent prevailed in the Navy, but that was always a normal condition with the men. All members of the Navy were advised to "disentangle themselves" from any disloyal allegiance before they were detected. The patriotism of the service was regarded as proof against the progress of seditious ideas.[119] The existence of sedition within the branches of the National services is a matter of important concern to every loyal American. It should be extirpated as rapidly as possible. A seditious condition within the Army or Navy is intolerable because in event of a serious crisis the arms of protection would be paralyzed by the effects of propaganda.

The radical situation had become so acute by the end of 1920 that the States passed laws against "anarchy, criminal syndicalism, sabotage, red flag demonstrations," and the advocacy of political and economic violence.[120] The leading Federal case arising from these laws was Martin Abern v. Wallace. This was a habeas corpus proceeding. District Judge Knox in his opinion upheld the laws. He maintained that the Communist Party was the advocate of "force and violence"; of confiscation of property; and the use of "forbidden instrumentalities" in the pursuit of its aims.[121] In the case of Benjamin Gitlow, Chief Magistrate McAdoo, of New York City, held that the manifesto of the Communist Party urged "coercion and suppression," and a mass "strike" to paralyze industry. The defendant took an appeal to the appellate division of the New York supreme court. Judge Laughlin writing the opinion of the court, which was

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[118] Hearings, pt. 2, 454, 455.
[119] *Ibid.*, 455.
[120] *Ibid.*, pt. 1, 98.
[121] *Ibid*, pt. 1, 98, 99. Also pt. 2, 243. Taken from 268, Fed. Rept. 413.

unanimous, said that the dictatorship of the proletariat involved the use of force and violence. The judgment of the magistrate's court was affirmed.[122] In People v. Lloyd it was maintained that the constitution provides lawful means for its alteration. It was also held that documents and newspapers of the defendants advocating the overthrow of the Government, might be introduced in court as evidence against them. Besides Lloyd, 17 others, all Communists, were involved.[123] In People v. Winitsky the New York Supreme Court in March, 1920, convicted the defendant on charge of violating the criminal anarchy law of the State. The opinion of the Court was in line with the above opinions, and stressed the illegality of radical procedure.[124] The anarchy laws of New York have recently been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. The courts in upholding the law against the elements of disorder and chaos have rendered a patriotic service of the most exalted character, and vindicated their own noblest traditions.

Concluding, it was the purpose of the present chapter to show the presence, purpose, and development of propaganda in America. Its presence in various sections of the world reveals its universal character. The organizations, agents, and financial needs essential to propaganda work have been adequately supplied. Specific lines of attack have been shown among the negroes and labor unions, also in the army and navy. Propaganda will fail of its purpose, but vigilance should not be relaxed.

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[122] Hearings, pt. 1, 99, 100. Taken from N. Y. Supreme Court Appellate Div. No. 5870.
[123] *Ibid.*, pt. 1, 100. Also pt. 2, 245. Taken from 304 Illinois.
[124] *Ibid.*, pt. 2, 245.

III

Features of Russian Goverment

The internal character of any government should be immune from interference by any power. Each government has the sovereign privilege of adopting and maintaining whatever type of government it considers best adapted to its peculiar interests. Mutual non-interference in internal affairs is the accepted rule prevailing in the community of nations. While not possessing the power to dictate what form of government a sovereign state should adopt yet a recognizing state inevitably will have a deep interest in the character of that state's government. This is especially true when a state adopts a system of government at variance with the usually accepted models, and assumes an attitude of hostility to these. The internal character of a state generally determines the nature of its external conduct. If, in addition to being established upon new concepts, it is actively aggressive toward neighboring states, they are justified in adopting protective measures, and in requesting such alterations of conduct as in their view, safety may require. The national policy of any state is not regulated by law, but is determined by those temporarily invested with this responsibility. If these persons think recognition should be withheld for any cause whatever it can be done.

The intricate character of the Soviet Government has been the object of much discussion by officials representing various departments of that Government. The Soviet régime is different form any other, and is especially designed to serve the purpose of a world-state with Moscow as the center issuing edicts, and controlling the outlying areas. Russia probably was the only nation providing the necessary social and spiritual circumstances favorable to the erection of a Communist régime. In 1847 The Communist League held a session in London attended by Marx and Engels. They were delegated to write a manifesto. This manifesto was later expanded into the "Communist Manifesto" which became the basis of Marxian philosophy. In 1852 some of the officers of the League were sentenced to impris-

onment in Germany. In 1864 the International Association of Workers was organized in London and became the "First International." Marx now dedicated his energies to raising the working class to an intellectual level where his program would be acceptable.[1]

In Russia revolutionary activities were much in evidence during the sixties and seventies. Nechayev recommended revolutionary propaganda and advocated direct action. Organizations and education were tasks for future generations. He said "Our own task is a terrible, thorough, ubiquitous and pitiless destruction. . . Let us unite with the world of robbers, the only true revolutionaries."[2] The growth of Marxian sociology made considerable progress during the eighties and nineties. After the persecution of the radicals in the early eighties, Plekhanov abandoned anarchistic philosophy, and dedicated his energies towards establishing and popularizing Marxian socialism. The movement revealed its presence among factory-workers and the laboring masses in the form of strikes.[3]

The intellectuals recognized the character of the movement, but hoped that the process of social evolution might terminate it in trade-unionism, or political opportunism. The revolutionary spirit was kept alive by persecution. In 1903 the Social Democratic Party of Russia was consolidated. The remnant of the "Peoples Will" party resented being absorbed by the triumphant Marxism. This party interpreted the "masses" to include the peasantry as well as the city proletariat. They also favored vigorous action rather than peaceful strikes, and advocated reviving the terror. Later a rural section was organized called the "Agrarian League."[4] In 1903 the Bolshevist Party was formed. Nicholas Lenin was one of their leaders.[5] The Second International which met in 1889 was repudiated in 1914. The extremists alleged that the bourgeoisie were favored

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[1] Hearings, pt. 2, 227.
[2] Hecker, J. F. Russian Sociology, 41.
[3] *Ibid.*, 43, 44. Hearings, pt. 2, 227.
[4] Hearings, pt, 2, 227. Hecker, J. F. Russian Sociology, 43, 44.
[5] *Ibid.*

at the outbreak of the war.[6] After many years of agitation, strengthened by propaganda and iron discipline, the Bolshevists were powerful enough to overthrow the Provisional Government of Russia, and to establish the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. The executives of the Government are mostly members of the Communist Party of Russia, and subject to its orders.[7] Upon the formation of the Russian Communist Party and its ascent to power, Communism in the world received a renewed impetus. In February, 1919, the Russian Communist Party issued a call for the assembly in Moscow of the First Congress of the Communist (Third) International.[8]

It will be of interest to observe what effect the commune will ultimately have upon the Soviet régime. The probabilities are that if the present Russian régime avoids interfering with this institution that it may secure the loyalty of the peasant and perpetuate itself indefinitely.[9] If a reverse policy should be inaugurated it is conceivable that the present régime would only hasten its own dissolution.

The village commune regulated its own political and social affairs by its own customs which became law: "The plenary council of all chiefs of families—men and women—was judge, the only judge in civil or criminal matters."[10] The communal character of the Russian peasantry is manifest. Only a few of these people availed themselves of the opportunity to withdraw their lands when permitted by law in 1906. About nineteen per cent withdrew taking eleven per cent of the land with them.[11] This communistic passivity of the peasant provided the opportunity for both the autocracy and the revolutionary régime to control.[12] The Slavophils regarded the Greek Church, the Autocracy, and the Parish Land-Commune as the fundamentals of Russian life. The Land-Communes were considered the foundation of Russian social institutions. The commune

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[6] Hearings Pt. 2, 227
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*, 228.
[9] Hecker, 70, contains a discussion on the commune.
[10] *Ibid.*, 243.
[11] *Ibid.*, 20.
[12] *Ibid.*, 20.

was regarded as the actual fulfillment of the Utopian dreams after which western socialists were seeking. They contended that the common ownership of land and the tools of production need not be attained by force in Russia. They professed that it was a natural product having grown from the very heart of the people.[13] Whether this contention be correct or false it remains a fact that the most extensive socialistic experiment found the soil for its fruition in Russia.

The consciousness of superiority of the former Russian aristocracy over the peasant was an inborn trait. They firmly believed the peasant to be of different clay, nor did the laws applying to one class apply to the other. The Russian aristocracy was considered a biological inheritance with which no social customs should interfere. These conceptions were mainly responsible for conditions existing in pre-war Russia. The elimination of the aristocratic leaders is largely accountable for the present social and economic situation in Russia.[14] The Russian slav was considered apathetic, plastic, pacific, long-suffering and forgiving, rather submitting to injury than resisting oppression. He was mystically inclined, and was sentimentally communistic, as is shown by his tenacious adherence to the land commune.[15]

Russia as a direct result of misrule and defeat in the war was driven to desperation. She turned against Tsarism, deposed the Romanovs, accepted republicanism, and control was finally gained by the Bolshevist faction. She erected a political and social order that was unparalleled, and unprecedented not only in Russia, but in the annals of the world's history.[16] The provisional government from the time of its installation after the March Revolution was very meagerly supported outside of the capital, while extra-legal soviets "councils" of workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' deputies organized after the fashion of the Committee of Workers of Petersburg, received the support and interest of the masses. These soviets were dominated by

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[13] Hecker, J. F. 31.
[14] Scribner's, Feb. 1925, 156.
[15] Hecker, 20.
[16] Ogg, F. A. Governments of Europe, 737.

the radical elements, who opposed what they conceived to be the middle-class rule of the Lvov government. They would be satisfied with nothing less than a complete economic and social transformation under the control of the workers.[17]

Communism means "the replacement of private property in land and capital by common ownership, and of private management of production by collective management."[18] The attitude of the Communists is expressed best in the Manifesto, which says "The Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. In all these movements they bring to the front as the leading question in each, the property question, no matter what its degree of development at the time. The Communists openly declare that their aims can be attained only by the overthrow of existing social institutions.[19] The ideal of American democracy is to elevate, not to pull down. We have no desire, however, to pull down the most advanced individuals in order to place them on the same level as those lower in the scale.[20] Democracy believes in the direction of natural forces by those of the spirit.[21]

The Communistic aims were set forth in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Laboring and Exploited People." This program provided for the abolition of exploitation, the elimination of classes in society, and the ruthless suppression of the exploiters. Chapter I, Sec. 2, of this Declaration placed all power in the working classes, provided for a Red Army, and the disarmament of the propertied classes. Chapter II, Sec. 5, stated that this arming of the laboring classes and the disarming of the propertied classes was necessary to maintaining the workers in power. Chapter IV denied the propertied classes from holding any responsible position in the Government.[22] President Wilson writing on November 12, 1917, to the American Federation of Labor at Buffalo said: "Let us show ourselves Americans by showing that we do not want to go off in separate

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[17] Ogg, F. A. Governments of Europe, 737.
[18] *Review of Reviews*, Vol. 62, 498. "What is Bolshevism," by Prof. R. T. Ely.
[19] *Ibid.*, 500.
[20] *Ibid.*, 501.
[21] *Ibid.*,
[22] *Ibid.*, 502.

camps or groups by ourselves but that we want to co-operate with all other classes and all other groups in a common enterprise which is to release the spirits of the world from bondage."[23]

Article 64 of Section IV of the Soviet constitution of July 10, 1918, enumerates the persons qualified to exercise the right to vote. This includes those laborers who are workers in industry, trade, agriculture, peasants and cossacks, also agricultural laborers who hire no one for the purpose of profit, soldiers of the army and navy, and those of the above classes unable to work.[24] Article 65 enumerates those debarred from voting. No one employing another for profit can vote, nor can anyone living on invested capital returning interest. Merchants, brokers, clergymen of all denominations, and persons employed by the Tsarist policy, also members of the former royal house are disfranchised.[25] It is at once evident that if similar provisions were introduced into American law that a very large portion of our present electors would be disfranchised. It would also disfranchise the influential and intellectual elements of American society while conferring these privileges on a particular class alone who already possess the right of franchise. Such a program would thus disfranchise one section of our social order, and elevate another already enfranchised, to the position of political control.

Mr. Simmons testifying before the Senate Committee investigating Bolshevism said: "The Bolshevist revolution has for its object the putting into power of a few over the many. The worst feature of their program, and this feature is always emphasized, is that of the spirit of class hatred. In every corner of Russia these people are preaching the religion of class hatred."[26] The theoretical "dictatorship of the proletariat" was admitted to be the rule of a minority adhering to a definite policy of destruction. This has degenerated, in fact, into a monopoly of power by a

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[23] *Review of Reviews*, Vol. 62, 502.

[24] *Ibid.*, 503. McBain & Rogers, New Constitutions of Europe, 397.

[25] Text of Constitution of 1918 in McBain & Rogers, New Constitutions of Europe, 397. Current History, Vol. 11, 327. Cong. Record, Feb. 21, 1923, 4194.

[26] Current History, Vol. 10, 128 and Vol. 13, 172. United States Inquiry into Bolshevism.

small group, who employ the most tyrannical methods, including the mass terror.[27] The principle of the Soviet dictatorship when once established is absolute. In its conduct it does not recognize the voice or representation of the people. The individual is conceived as of no consequence in the general scheme of things. Only the masses are to be taken into account to be directed by the authority and "wisdom" of the Soviet dictatorship.[28]

As early as March, 1919, the workers of the Putilov Works became aware that the Soviet system was oppressive and unrepresentative. In a petition they declared that the Bolshevik Government had betrayed the ideals of the revolution, and thus betrayed the "workmen and peasants of Russia." The Government was characterized as not representative of the proletariat and peasants but as a dictatorship of a central committee of the Bolshevik party aided by extraordinary commissions, communists and police. They protested against "the compulsion of workmen to remain at factories and works, and the attempt to deprive them all of elementary rights, freedom of the press, speech, meetings, inviolability of persons, etc." They presented seven demands requesting better treatment, and greater privileges in the management and control of factories.[29] This shows that contrary to the general belief the workingmen in many factories are not pro-bolshevist, but many acquiesce for fear of punishment.[30] Secretary Hughes in his letter to Gompers in July, 1923, referred to the abrogation of the rights of free speech, and the abridgment of civil liberties. He said: "Attacks were made not only upon property in its so-called capitalistic form, but labor was also requisitioned.[31] Labor desertion, evasion of general registration ordered by instruments regulating labor mobilizations, failure to report for work, and abandonment of an assigned task are each punished with "compulsory labour for a period of not less than one week."[32]

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[27] Sen. Doc., No. 172, 7, 66 Cong., 2 sess.
[28] *Ibid.*, No. 14, 4, 68 Cong., 1 sess.
[29] Reports on Russia, 95. Abridged Edition of Parliamentary Paper, Russia No. 1.
[30] *Current History*, Vol. 10, 131.
[31] *N. Y. Times*, July 23, 1923. 1, Text of letter to Gompers.
[32] Criminal Code Soviet Russia, 31.

Laborer desertions prejudicial to the country's defence are punishable with "compulsory labour for a period of not less than six months, or confiscation of property in whole or in part." If a manager wastefully uses the "conscripted labour" placed at his disposal he is punishable with "imprisonment for a period of not less than six months."[33]

The Bolshevists early realized that their system of socialized industrial production was unworkable. Hence to insure production it was essential to employ the dictatorial powers, so abhorrent in the old régime. Demobilized soldiers were at first used, but eventually the rule of labor compulsion was adopted to resuscitate the nation's ebbing industrial life. Every attempt to organize labor, and to maintain proletarian independence was severely repressed.[34]

Mr. Bertrand Russell, the celebrated English mathematician, laborite and a man of known pacifism, made an impartial and unprejudiced investigation into Russian affairs. His findings describe the Bolsheviki as too cruel and destructive to be of any positive value to world progress. They are fanatic, and despotic in their espousal of communistic principles. He says "Opposition is crushed without mercy and without shrinking from the methods of the Czarist police, many of whom are still employed at their old work."[35] The Soviet answer to the question of the British Independent Labor Party revealed that ceaseless war against existing institutions was their program.[36] A new criminal code proposed contains provisions to punish crimes directed against the overthrow of the Russian State even though the crimes were committed "beyond the borders of the Union."[37] This would be an extra-territorial law, which is foreign to present legal conceptions. All crimes are punished at present in accordance with the laws of the nation where committed, not according to external law. The present criminal code provides severe punishment for

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[33] Criminal Code Soviet Russia, 31, 19. Pub. by H. M. Stationery Office, 1925.
[34] *Current History*, Vol. 13, 172, 173.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.*, 174.
[37] *Ibid.*, Feb. 1926, 625

those engaged in counter-revolutionary activities, with the intent to seize power, or to detach any part from the Soviet Republic. These are punishable with "the supreme penalty and confiscation of all property. The punishment may, however, in extenuating circumstances be reduced to imprisonment for not less than five years, with strict isolation and confiscation of all property."[38] Should America see fit to adopt these same measures for her own protection it would mean that all the agitators and agents in the employ and direction of Moscow and the International would be severely punished. While punishing counter-revolutionary activities in her own confines with utmost severity, Moscow yet continues to encourage energetically these same activities in other states whose political conceptions differ from her own.

The following decrees for the annulment of national and state loans were agreed upon by the Central Executive Committee on January 21, 1918: (1) "All national loans concluded by the Governments of Russian landowners, and Russian Bourgeoisie enumerated in specially published lists are annulled from December 1, 1917."[39] The December coupons of these loans are not subject to payment. (2) "In the same manner are annulled all guarantees given by the said government on loans for different undertakings and institutions." The decree for the abolition of state debts reads similarly. All guarantees given by national and state governments are annulled. It was also provided that "all foreign loans are annulled unconditionally and without any exception" for both the nation and states.[40] Another decree reads, inheritance "whether by law or by will" is abolished. After the death of an owner the property which belonged to him whether movable or immovable becomes the property of the Government of the Russian Socialistic Soviet Federative Republic.[41] The Constituent Assembly approved these decrees, repudiating the loans contracted by the old régime. Such action was considered the first and necessary blow to be aimed

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[38] Criminal Code Soviet Russia, 14, 15.
[39] Sen. Doc., Vol. 4, 1237, 1238. 66 Cong., 1 sess. Hearings, pt, 2, 206.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*, 1259. See Criminal Code, 10 for definition of confiscation.

at international finance. The hope was expressed that the Soviet authority would pursue this course until labor achieved a complete victory over the "yoke of capital." Again it was provided that "All forests, minerals, and waters of state-wide importance, as well as the whole inventory of animate and inanimate objects, all estates and agricultural enterprises are declared national property."[42] The Russian Constitution of July 10, 1918, declares for the socialization of land as state property, without compensation to the former owners. It was henceforth to be known as "national property." It was to be apportioned among the peasants in accordance with their cultivating ability.[43]

In marked contrast to this train of annulments, repudiations and confiscations is the American practice which is adequately expressed in Section I of the Virginia Bill of Rights which provides for the "acquiring, possessing, and protecting" of property. Section 9 protects against depriving anyone of his "life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land." Section 12 offers further legal protection against "injuries or wrongs" against one's "person, property, or character."[44] The Declaration of Rights of Virginia recommended the "freedom of the press" as a bulwark of "liberty" which despotic governments alone restrain. In constrast to the atheistic attitude assumed by the Moscow Government the Declaration states that it is the "mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love and charity towards each other."[45] Washington in his Farewell Address said in part, "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports . . . reason and experience both forbid

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[42] Text of Russian Constitution of July 10, 1918, as given in McBain and Rogers New Constitutions of Europe, 386.

[43] *Ibid.*, Section 1, Chapter II, Article 3, part (1) reads as follows: "For the purpose or realizing the socialization of land, all private property in land is abolished, and the entire land is declared to be national property which is to be apportioned among husbandmen without any compensation to the former owners, in the measure of each one's ability to till it." Parts (2) and (3) extend the scope of nationalization.

[44] Rowland, K. M. Life of George Mason, Vol. 11, 445–447, containing his writings and speeches.

[45] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 440, 441.

us to expect that nationa morality can prevail in exclusion to religious principle."[46]

The following are some of the results that would occur in America if she should decide to adopt a purely communistic program. The farms, industrial establishments, invested capital, forests, dwellings, newspapers and periodical publications, banks, life insurance and institutions of learning would be taken over by the state.[47]

The Russian Constitution of July 6, 1923, in its declaration of union assumes the existence of two hostile camps: Capitalism and Socialism. In the former exists hatred, bondage, oppression, massacres and wars. In the latter, exists peace, freedom, equality and co-operation of peoples. Further it declares that only under the direction of the "proletarian dictatorship" can the people rally to destroy "national oppression," to create mutual understanding, and establish the essentials of co-operation.[48] The disturbed condition of the world it alleges, and the dangers, of attack makes it necessary for the Soviet Republics to maintain a "common front" against the world of capital.[49] The

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[46] Marshall, J. Life of Washington, Vol. 5, 699, 700.

[47] The Report of the Senate Committee on Bolshevism published in *Current History*, Vol. 11, 328, contains the following information. Bolshevism would involve the confiscation of 6,361,502 farms of whicn 62.1 per cent or 3,948,722 are owned in fee by the farmers themselves. Property to the value of $40,991,-449,000 would be expropriated. The 275,000 industrial establishments representing $22,790,980,000 of invested capital would be seized as property of the State. Church edifices numbering 203,432 would be included. Forests amounting to 555,000,000 acres would be appropriated, and an income of $1,375,000,000 taken by the dictatorship. Dwellings numbering 17,805,845 of which 9,093,675 are owned in fee with the remainder free of debt, would be seized and confiscated. The 22,896 newspapers and periodicals would meet a similar fate. The 31,492 banks in the United States would be taken over by the Government, and the savings of 11,397,553 depositors placed in serious jeopardy. The life insurance policies numbering almost 5,000,000 and representing about $30,000,000,000 of insurance would be confiscated. The property of 194,759 Sunday Schools, and of a great number of seminaries, colleges and universities would be placed under state control, and numerous persons deprived of their beneficent influence. Catholic schools, colleges and seminaries numbering 6,681 would be suppressed. Church property to the value of $1,676,600,582 would be confiscated and 41,926,845 members of 227,487 church organizations would be placed under the domination of the dictatorship.

[48] The Constitution of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, July 6, 1923, 6. Hereafter referred to as the Russian Constitution. Also Soviet Russia, 11. Foreign Office publication.

[49] Russian Constitution, July 6, 1923, 7. Also Soviet Russia, 11.

Soviet constitution was so constructed and designed that other outlying states or nations embracing the faith can easily be incorporated within the union. That the Soviet Union serves the purpose of a "firm bulwark against world capitalism, and forms a decisive step toward the union of the toilers of all countries into one World Soviet Socialist Republic."[50] The spirit of this organic law declaring for the undermining of other governments is not an argument conducing toward recognition by the governments slated for destruction.

The basis of representation in the All-Russian Congress reveals decided discriminations. The urban populations send one delegate for every 25,000 voters, while the rural sections send one delegate for every 125,000 inhabitants.[51] This provision of the Constitution of July 6, 1923, is to be found in part 9 of Article III of the latter.[52] The supreme authority in Russia during the intervals of sessions of the Soviet Congress is the Central Executive Committee.[53] The voting for delegates to the Soviet Congress is not direct. Each voting unit elects a delegate to the Provincial Soviet. In event there is no provincial unit the delegate is elected to the Soviet Congress of the Constituent Republic. When these conditions have been satisfied, the respective Congresses make a selection of a delegate to the All-Russian Congress.[54]

Secretary Hughes in replying to Gompers made reference to the limited character of the suffrage in Soviet Russia.[55] The new Constitution of July, 1923, was designed to continue the *coup d'etat* of 1917 under a new title. It contains no bill of rights, and the civil liberties of the people remain insecure.[56]

Representative Burton L. French expressed the conviction that the Soviet scheme of government could not be made demo-

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[50] Russian Constitution, July 6, 1923, 8., Soviet Russia, 12.
[51] McBain & Rogers New Constitutions of Europe, 390.
[52] Russian Constitution, 12. Soviet Russia, 14.
[53] *Ibid.*, 11.
[54] *Ibid.*, 12.
[55] *N. Y. Times*, July 23, 1923, 3. The Secretary said about the suffrage, "So far as it may be exercised it continues to be limited to certain classes and even among them the votes of some categories count more than the votes of others."
[56] American Federationist, Vol. 31, 84, 85.

cratic except by very radical alterations.[57] The people in Russia vote for a particular craft. They can only vote for members to the local Soviet, and here their power of voting ceases absolutely.[58] The American people have the right to vote for practically all the offices from the smallest to the highest. This contrasts with the Russian practice.[59] The Soviet system would practically disfranchise the farmer in the United States.[60] The "dictatorship of the proletariat" in actual practice becomes the control of the city proletarian over the peasant. The rural proletarian is victimized in the interest of the urban proletarian.[61] In theory there is no difference between the two classes of proletarians, but in actual practice there is.[62]

Under such a system of political mechanics a highly centralized form of government results, removed from the people, and easily adapted to the control of a small group of determined comunists.[63] Among advanced circles in the West there is much discussion as to the relative merits of an occupation as compared with a territorial franchise. The question has its interest but there is little light to be derived from Russian practice. The fact is that the Soviet has been evolved as a fighting unit adapted to the conduct of a general strike. It is an organ of the Communist régime. By this expedient the opposition can be reduced to insignificant proportions.[64]

Russia as a sovereign has the right to adopt any system of suffrage, restricted or liberal, she desires; that is her own affair.

Under Section 18, Article IV, of the recent Constitution the

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[57] *Current History*, Vol. 11, 313. The Soviet System and Ours. An Analysis, by Rep. French. He said, "The fact of the business is there is absolutely no philosophy by which the Soviet form of government can be made representative unless the fundamental principles on which it rests shall be transformed and changed as completely as the change of elements would be in color to make black white."

[58] *Ibid.*, 314.

[59] *Ibid.*, 316.

[60] *Ibid.*, 319.

[61] *Ibid.*, 318.

[62] Sen., Doc., No. 172, 8. 66 Cong., 2 sess.

[63] International Conciliation No. 185, April 1923, 232. Governor Goodrich says that a government is not a democracy where representation is based upon occupation and not upon "territory and population." In this connection also see Lowell's "Public Opinion," 143.

[64] Brailsford, H. N. The Russian Worker's Republic, 41.

Central Executive Committee is granted very wide power. It is given supervisory powers over the Soviet Union. Any alterations in the political and economic status of Russia must be approved by the Committee before becoming effective. Any change in the internal organization of a member of the Union must secure the approval of the Committee, otherwise it lapses.[65] Under this section, if it were conceivable that the United States should adopt communism, and join the Soviet union, the laws and regulations passed by state legislatures in the United States would become subject to revision or confirmation by this Committee functioning in Moscow.[66] Section 19 provides that all the "decrees, regulations and orders" of the Committee are "compulsory throughout all Russia." Section 20 of Article IV lodges the absolute power of veto and suspension of all laws or decrees of the Presidium or of the constituent states in the hands of the Central Executive Committee.[67] Section 29 of the present Constitution provides for a Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. This Presidium is a small body which is the legislative and administrative organ of Russia during times when the Central Committee is not in session.[68] Section 30 empowers them to enforce all regulations of the All-Russian Congress and the Central Committee.[69] Under Section 31 the Presidium is authorized to set aside or annul the decisions of the "Council of the People's Commissars," and the regulations adopted by the organs of the constituent Republics.[70] Section 33 further elaborates the reviewing and revisionary authority of the Presidium.[71] Theoretically the supreme power in Russia is the All-Russian Congress, and in intervals of sessions the Central Committee. This Congress could naturally transact all legislative work, and the necessity for another organ would not appear essential. However such is the Soviet genius for government

[65] Russian Constitution, 14. Published by the Russian Information Bureau, Washington, D. C., 1924.
[66] Sen., Doc., No. 14, 42, 68. Cong., 1 sess.
[67] Russian Constitution, 14.
[68] Sen., Doc., No. 14, 42. 68 Cong., 1 sess.
[69] McBain & Rogers, New Constitutions of Europe, 390. Cong., Rec., Feb. 21, 1923, 4193.
[70] Russian Constitution, 16.
[71] *Ibid.*, 17.

that another organ, the Presidium, was evolved to function in intervals when the Central Committee was not in session. However concealed and secluded the Presidium may be in the verbiage of the Constitution, which is skilfully done, the fact remains that this body is the actual ruler of the Russias, and its very complicated system of government, which includes largely the Russian Communist Party, and the Communist (Third) International. This is the small group that in the last analysis would rule America if she should turn to Communism and join the Soviets.

The judicial system is equally complicated and is subordinate in its powers to the Executive. Section 43 of Article VII provides for the formation of a "Supreme Court" which shall be attached to the Central Executive Committee, which is dominated largely by the Presidium as already indicated. The Court has power to render an opinion on the legislation of the constituent Republics. On motion of the Attorney General of the Soviet Union the Supreme Court is empowered to review the decisions of the Supreme Courts in the constituent Republics and appeal these to the Central Executive Committee where such decisions run counter to the laws of the Union.[72]

The Presidium appoints seven members to the Court. The Attorney General of the Union and his deputy are appointed by the Presidium. His duties are to render an opinion on all questions submitted to the Court. In event the opinion of the Court differs from his own, the Attorney General has the right to appeal from the Court decision to the Presidium. Appeal to the Supreme Court lies with the Central Executive Committee, the Presidium, the Attorney-General of the Union, the Political Department of the Union, also it is the Supreme Court and Attorneys-General of the Constituent Republics. The Supreme Court of the Union has power in plenary session over criminal and civil cases, and over impeachment of members of the Central Committee. However, no case can be tried before the Supreme Court except upon a motion made by the Central Committee, or the Presidium.[73] By this method the Committee

[72] Russian Constitution, 19.
[73] *Ibid.*, 21.

can by withholding its assent prevent its members from becoming amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Presidium here again emerges as an irresponsible body in control of the highest judicial organ. Here the power of the Committee, and more particularly the Presidium is observed to be as complete as in the instance of the legislative department already studied. In the event of America embracing Communism this same unlimited and irresponsible organ of a few persons would revise our laws as desired.[74] No better system designed to promote complete centralization of power in international affairs, into a few hands, could be conceived than the Soviet system.

Aside from the unity of control observed within the Soviet Government itself there is a similar unity of aim and control in the various Bolshevist organizations. These organizations are the Russian Communist Party, the Third International, and the Soviet Government itself. The Soviet Government is the creation of the Russian Communist Party. A close relationship, therefore, exists between the two bodies. The Political Bureau dominates the Russian Communist Party, and in consequence, the Soviet Government. The Communist International was revived under direction of the Russian Communist Party which controls it. Thus functioning back of the Russian Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the Third International, and regulating them in many respects, is the Political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party. This Bureau is the center of power of the Communist hierarchy.[75]

The Political Bureau consists of seven regular members, and four alternates. Four of the regular members were also members of the Presidium, while two of the alternates in the Bureau were were regular members of the Presidium.

In December 1922 the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics omitted the word Russian. This omission is significant but logical since in the Soviet scheme of things, if fully realized, the world would consist of a worldwide union of Soviet republics with governments founded upon the dictatorship of the proletariat.

[74] Sen., Doc., No. 14, 42, 68. Cong., 1 sess.
[75] Hearings, 161. See Cong. Rec., Jan. 7, 1924, 593, Vol. 65, pt. 1, 68, Cong. 1, sess.

Therefore the necessity for designation as nationals of a particular state would disappear.[76]

A study of the membership of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets presents some interesting data. In the Congress of November, 1918, ninety-seven per cent of the members were communists. In the Second Congress of December, 1919, ninety-six per cent were communists. In the Congress of December 1920, ninety-three per cent were communists. The Congresses that met in December, 1921 and 1922, had ninety-three and ninety-four per cent of communists respectively. Russia has a population of about 120,000,000 while the membership in the Communist Party is 400,000. These figures demonstrate the absolute control of the Communist Party in the Congresses which theoretically represent the Russian people.[77] This small membership is compact and highly disciplined. It has arrogated the powers of the state unto itself. This state of things is an accurate indication of conditions that will occur in any State which adopts the Soviet system. The individuals who have been accustomed to exercise their rights as citizens, in the conduct of Government, would be deprived of their privileges.

A careful investigation has revealed that the most influential leaders of the Russian régime belong to one or more of the six divisions of the Russian Government. Lenin belonged to nine different subdivisions of these primary six divisions, of the Government. A system akin to interlocking directorates in industry, and of most intricate complexity has been developed. This enlarged system which includes the Presidium and Central Executive Committee and thereby the letter of the Constitution itself is the real super-Government of Russia. All power is theirs, and they are collectively responsible.[78] The claim that the Russian Soviet Republic governs Russia independently of other powerful influences is unfounded. The system with its invisible personalities controlling would dominate any nation embracing Communism. It is especially adapted to the exercise of international control.

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[76] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 72.
[77] Cong. Record, Jan. 7, 1924, 593.
[78] *Ibid.*, 595.

Four of the leaders belonged to the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. This shows that the Russian Communist Party occupies a dominant position in Russia. Senator Lodge in analyzing the Soviet system said: "This small group of men is absolutely in control of the Russian Communist Party and they are found in key positions in all the other divisions and sub-divisions of the Russian Soviet Government. This is the point to bear in mind. These men are the Government of Russia. They are not merely the heads of one branch of the Government; they are the heads and the controlling force of all parts. They are the Government, and therefore they are responsible for all the parts. They are the Government, and therefore they are responsible for all that is done, whether by the Federated Republics, by the Russian Soviet Republic, or by the Russian Communist Party, which controls them all." The Communist Party, it should be noted, is the only legal party in Russia, or the Federation.[79] This constitutes a significant lesson for party-leaders in other nations.

Among the characteristics of the Soviet régime are the wanton repudiation of those rights and privileges, such as free speech, the right of assembly, and the freedom of association which have been considered indispensable to the development of civilization. Freedom of speech from the beginning of the Soviet régime has been severely criticized by Bolshevist theorists. Since 1919 the freedom of speech in Russia has ceased to exist. Authors are restricted in the expression of their opinions, while publishers find their privileges distinctly curtailed.[80] An insistence on the rights of speech and civil liberties has been considered counter-revolutionary and thus punishable with death.[81] While these privileges do not exist in Soviet Russia, yet the agitator in America possesses unlimited freedom of expression to disseminate his doctrines of revolution.

The apologists for the Communist philosophy fully approve of these measures. They maintain that their system is superior to our ideas of government with its constant change of parties.

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[79] Cong. Record, Jan. 7, 1924, 597.
[80] *Ibid.*, 612.
[81] *American Federationist*, Vol. 31, 84, 85.

The Russian experiment is considered the best form of government so far devised by the wit of man. It will require ten years, however, for its complete working out.[82]

As a mechanism constructed to execute the will of an unscrupulous and irresponsible autocracy it is a model of perfection much more efficient than the autocracy it has superseded. The guarantee of liberty in a republican government lies in the fact that the political power belongs to representatives of the people. The government is conducted by agents deriving their power from and who are responsible to the people. The question whether free institutions will be maintained rests ultimately on the "general genius of the government."[83] Secretary Buchanan writing to Minister Bush said: "In exposition of the value of popular government, free institutions are in their very nature progressive; and if permitted to extend themselves by their own intrinsic power and excellence, they must gradually and surely pervade the civilized world."[84] This forecast made about eighty years ago has been amply sustained by the growth of liberal institutions in the meantime. Mr. Raiguel, a deep student of Russian psychology, expresses the conviction that the Russian instinct does not lie "along communistic lines," and that Russia will again recover herself.[85] This may be an accurate prediction, but no evidence exists at the present time that the Moscow régime has weakened in its control of the situation.

While the internal character of a state is of no particular concern to an outside nation, yet when such internal character has been consciously constructed for the purpose of governing the world it does naturally become the concern of all interested in the preservation of their traditions. The attempt has been made to indicate, in at least a small degree, the alterations that would conceivably occur in our political organization if the Soviet program should triumph in the United States. Effort has also been made to show how the center of political sovereignty

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[82] The Nation, March 4, 1925, 237.
[83] Merriam, C. E., American Political Theories, 119.
[84] Sen., Exe., Doc., 53, 5, 30 Cong., 1 sess.
[85] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 92.

would be shifted from Washington to Moscow in event of Communistic success. American traditions and ideals have been purchased at too high a price to be thus unthinkingly relinquished. With the thinking public aroused and alert the danger will pass away. Refusal to think and study is of the greatest assistance to agitators. These factors are not conducive to the promotion of amicable relations between the two nations.

IV

Historic Policy of Recognition

America is one of the youngest of the world's great nations and was ushered into existence as the result of a successful revolution. Her geographical isolation and the political principles she professed and to which she adhered tended to develop a nation, on this new continent, devoted to political ideals generally different from those that prevailed among the continental nations during the same period. America was the first great nation of modern times that has been founded on republican institutions, and has maintained these successfully to the present time. While representing different political conceptions America was nevertheless admitted into the international fellowship of nations, and she has never by chicanery or deception proved unworthy of any genuine confidence which other nations deemed advisable to repose in her. America's position as a member of the international community necessarily caused her to adopt a policy of intercourse with other nations consistent with her traditions and position in the world. It is the object of the present chapter to state in a brief form the American policy of recognizing new nations as it has developed historically. An examination of the facts reveals that a remarkable continuity of similiarity has been consistently maintained by the National Government in regard to recognition ever since its inception under the Constitution.

From the beginning of American national existence the Government has been frequently confronted with the question of recognizing new governments. Many of these governments came into being as the result of successful revolutions waged against parent states with which the United States often happened to be on friendly terms. The question naturally arose what relations should be assumed towards these new nations, and the recognition of new governments as a result of successful rebellion, has been a difficult task. The maintenance of a rigidly definite policy is almost impossible, but a high degree of uni-

formity has been characteristic of America's recognition policy. The Executive may give weight to any consideration deemed necessary in the question of recognizing any particular nation. Regarding the President's constitutional control over the conduct of foreign relations and recognition Secretary Hughes says, "To the President is confided the authority to receive ambassadors, and other public ministers. By virtue of this constitutional relation to the conduct of foreign affairs, the correspondence and negotiations with foreign powers are exclusively in the hands of the President," and again "The power of the President to receive ambassadors and ministers vests in him exclusively the authority to determine what governments are entitled to recognition, and the accredited medium for friendly intercourse."[1]

The American foreign policy during the Revolution and under the Articles of Confederation was only consistent in seeking recognition and commercial relations. The inauguration of the new government in 1789, with a strong executive, witnessed an alteration in our attitude towards European states. New concepts of international law and practice, such as defining and maintaining a state of neutrality, resulted from the new attitude assumed by America in her international conduct. American ideals of political and individual liberty have largely determined our relations with other states. It is significant that Thomas Jefferson, the advocate of democracy, should have been the author of numerous important phases of our foreign policy.[2] He was especially interested in the formation of the policy of recognition of de facto governments which played such an important function through succeeding administrations.

Senator King, recently in an elaborately argued senatorial speech regarding the Russian question, reviewed America's policy of relationships with other nations. In this the Senator said, "The Government of the United States in its history adopted a policy at variance with the then-accepted one in

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[1] *Amer. Jl.*, Vol. 16, 355.

[2] Goebel, J. Recognition Policy of the United States, 97, 98, listed in Columbia University Studies as Vol. 66.

dealing with new states and governments, particularly when these states and governments were the product of revolution. The gulf between a de facto and a de jure government was great. Legitimacy was the important consideration, and the idea of legitimacy was usually with that of dynastic interests and the perpetuating of monarchial government. Under the leadership of Jefferson the United States was more concerned in the question as to whether a government seeking recognition was one in fact rather than in the principle of legitimacy, as it might be involved in the application of the de jure principle. He stated that it accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared. His view was that the essential of the de facto theory of recognition is that the new government will carry out all the international obligations of the state, and conform to the principle of international law. Of course a state may be independent and may have capacity to discharge international obligations without being recognized, but the United States from the beginning has been guided by the policy of recognizing governments, whether monarchial or republican, which the people within the state have acknowledged.[3]

"But even under the liberal policy of recognition announced by Jefferson and followed by this Republic, it does not mean that every government which may have won its way to power shall be recognized."[4] The principle is here completely explained that it was Jefferson's original conception that the assumption and performance of a nation's international obligations was a condition precedent to according de facto recognition to such nation by the United States. Any contention that it has been the set policy of the United States to recognize nations regardless of their international morality and conduct is not in exact accord with the historic precedents. This position will become more evident as the policy is further examined.

It is a curious coincidence that the question of recognizing states should have presented itself during the first year of our national existence. The nation seeking such recognition was

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[3] Sen., Doc., 126, 68 Cong. 1 sess., 121.
[4] *Ibid.*, 122.

no other than France, our own revolutionary ally, at this time in the throes of internal revolution. This problem confronted Washington in 1789, and he was not hasty in reaching a decision, for years elapsed before diplomatic relations were established between the allies. On August 16, 1792, Minister Morris announced that another "bloody" revolution had occurred in Paris. The King was deposed and the progress of the revolution was rapid. Morris wanted instructions about the conduct he was to pursue "in the circumstances about to arise." He said he was "in a state of contingent responsibility of the most delicate kind." Jefferson replied that it was the principle of the United States "to acknowledge any government to be rightful which "is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared." With such a government any kind of business might be done. Some matters like the regulation of commerce and navigation might be adequately transacted with a de facto government.[5] Hamilton, Washington's most influential cabinet member, was completely opposed to a policy looking towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with the National Convention of revolutionary France. He feared that the revolutionary authorities would leave their debts repudiated by a possible succeeding régime.[6] He cautioned Jefferson about the probable consequences of such recognition. Jefferson favored recognition and believed in the ability of the Convention to establish a definite form of government. Jefferson said, "as we had recognized the former government, because established by the authority of the nation, so we must recognize any other which should be established by the authority of the nation." Hamilton said we had recognized the former because it contained an important member of the ancient, to wit; the king, and wore the appearance of his consent, but if in any form, they should omit the King, he did not know that we could with safety, "recognize or pay money to its order."[7]

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[5] Moore's, International Arbitrations, Vol. 5, 4403. American State Papers of Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, 333, 334. Jefferson's Works (Washington Ed.) Vol. 9, 489.

[6] Jefferson's Works (Washington Ed.), Vol. 9, 125, 126.

[7] *Ibid.*

Morris in reporting to America the departure of Genet remarked that, "the pompousness of this embassy could not but excite the attention of England." Genet evidently came with the desire to sow the seeds of revolution. After leaving France Morris reported that the Council had supplied Genet with three hundred commissions to be distributed among persons who wished to fit out vessels in the United States to prey on English commerce.[8]

Even before the deposition of the King, Morris insisted upon the removal of a person (name not given) who had been appointed as minister to the United States. Morris pronounced the character of this person "as bad as need be and stained by infamous vices." Morris was not informed officially about the appointment of the new minister Genet, a "young man of ardent temper" who was selected French Minister to America. He had served at several European centers, and owed his preferment to special influence at the French Court.[9] At this early period America already showed by her practice that she was only interested in dealing with diplomats of the highest integrity.

On April 8, 1793, Genet arrived at Charlestown, S. C. Two weeks later the news was received in Philadelphia. At Charlestown Genet lost no time in fitting out privateers, and after having completed his preparations he proceeded to make the journey to Philadelphia by land. On the way he was the object of much popular sympathy, which strengthened his confidence in the course upon which he had entered. It was also leaned that the privateers which he had fitted out had made several captures which the French consuls in America had condemned and ordered to be sold.[10]

Genet was instructed that the treaty which he was authorized to negotiate might assume the form of a "national agreement, in which two great peoples shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding to defend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be

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[8] Moore's, International Arbitrations, Vol. 5 4405. American State Papers on For. Rel. 1, 350, 396.
[9] *Ibid.*, 4405, Amer. St. Papers, 1, 333.
[10] *Ibid* 4406.

embraced; to guarantee the sovereignty of the people, and punish those powers who still keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial system by declaring that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of the contracting parties." Genet was also to direct the energies of America against the "destructive projects" of George III. He was to ascertain the sentiment of the Louisiana inhabitants towards the French republic and the design of the Americans on the Mississippi.[11] The revolutionary enthusiasm of the French was of a different character than that back of the Russian revolution. The French, at least, aimed, theoretically, to promote the interests of popular sovereignty throughout the world. This is precisely, in fact, the consideration which the Soviet Government is least desirous of promoting, as an examination of the governmental machinery reveals.

Genet maintained that the French Consuls were invested by the National Assembly to act as courts of admiralty. The United States replied that every nation was sovereign in its own territory, except so far as it might have yielded it by treaty. Genet after a stormy period of about six months was recalled. Morris was instructed on August 16, 1793, to request Genet's recall. The French foreign minister, M. Dlforques, granted the request, and stated that the activities of Genet were not authorized by his instructions. His successor, M. Fauchet, demanded Genet's arrest and punishment. The United States refused this request "upon reasons of law and magnanimity."[12] These facts prove that at a time of slow communication and travel Genet was tolerated for a much shorter period than was M. Martens during the recent war period. Genet's activities were of a different character than those of Martens' since they were not revolutionary in aim. The attitude of the French in disavowing Genet's acts and in demanding his arrest contrasts strongly with the known purpose of Moscow in making their representatives advance agents of revolution.

At the time the advisability of receiving Genet was under consideration it was evident that Hamilton opposed such

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[11] Moore's International Arbitration, Vol. 5, 4409, Amer. State Papers, Vol. 1, 362, 363.
[12] *Ibid.*, 4410, Amer. State Papers, 1, 151.

reception. He regretted that an incident had occurred that would sanction recognition of the revolutionary régime. He called attention to our treaties with the King of France. He believed that the French Government of the time did not represent the "free, regular, and deliberate act of the Nation," and questioned the validity of its acts.[13] On April 18, 1793, Washington submitted to various members of the cabinet, questions about relations between America and France. The first was whether a proclamation of neutrality should be issued; the second, whether a minister from France should be received; the third, whether, if received, it should be absolutely, or with qualifications; and fourth, whether the treaties between the United States and France were still in force. At a meeting the next day it was decided to issue a proclamation of neutrality. The French Minister was also to be received. On the question of qualifications Hamilton favored same and was supported by Knox. On April 22, 1793, Washington issued the proclamation of neutrality.[14]

The cabinet met on April 19, 1793, and unanimously decided to receive the Minister from the French Republic. When Genet arrived in Philadelphia he was received without qualification. In presenting his letters of credence he stated that the French Government had "under present circumstances" the right to require the United States to guarantee their islands, but would not insist upon it. He proposed that the two peoples should "by a true family compact, establish a commercial and political system" on a "liberal and fraternal basis." Jefferson told Genet that no action could be taken on his proposal until the Senate met.[15]

The Administration of Washington adopted regulations to vindicate its proclamation of neutrality, which was constantly violated by the fitting out of privateers. The prizes were con-

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[13] Jefferson's Works, Vol. 9, 125, 126.
[14] *Ibid.*, 140 to 143. Spark's, Washington, 11, 533. Moore's Arbitrations, 4405, 4406.
[15] *Ibid.*, 3, 563. Moore's Arbitration, Vol. 5, 4409.
Also see Borah, W. E. American Problem, 260, 261.

demned by the French consuls sitting as courts of admiralty. Vessels even were captured within the jurisdiction of the United States. Genet defended these activities in which he was interested as being not only in conformity with the treaties between the two nations but also in agreement with the spirit of neutrality itself. Jefferson cited writers on the law of nations to censure the French activities. Genet dismissed these as "diplomatic subtleties," and as "aphorisms of Vattel and others." He contended that the twenty-second article of the treaty of amity and commerce conferred the right to arm vessels. This article stated that the vessels of a nation at war with one or the other party might be fitted out in the port of the other party to the treaty. By implication he claimed this gave the citizens the right to fit out ships in the ports of the other party.[16] Genet's thesis was not accepted by the Administration, and his recall effected as previously noted.

There does not appear to have been any fundamental distinction between Hamilton and Jefferson as to the conditions essential to merit recognition on the part of a nation seeking recognition. Both believed that recognition should be accorded to nations where the government represents the will of the people, and receives their acquiescence. The controversy arose between them over the question whether, in a specific instance, the government of a nation was installed by popular consent or not. Jefferson maintained that the revolutionary Government in France issued from popular approval, and, therefore, was worthy of receiving recognition, while Hamilton entertained an opposite view and accordingly opposed such recognition. Citizen Genet's position in seeking recognition was essentially different from that shown by the recent efforts of M. Martens to be received as the accredited representative of the Russian nation. Genet arrived as the representative of a nation with whom America entertained in common many identical political ideals, and the revolutionary Government did not indulge in any innocuous campaign directed against our Government, and subversive to its existence even if some of Genet's activi-

[16] Amer. State Papers, 1, 150, 151.

ties were not exactly justifiable. M. Martens, in contrast, represented a nation that had by decree deliberately repudiated its financial obligations to external nations, even before America participated in Russian intervention, and engaged in an extensive propaganda campaign intended to secure the eventual overthrow of the Government.

Washington was a strong advocate of conservatism in the administration of government, and was opposed to revolutionary procedure on both economic and political grounds, as a study of his principles reveals. He, however, expressed sympathy for the French nation suffering from the ravages of revolution. He said, "I have always wished well to the French Revolution; I have always given it as my decided opinion that no nation has a right to intermeddle in the internal concerns of another; that every one had a right to form and adopt whatever government they liked best, to live under themselves."[17] This quotation from the Father of his country is frequently referred to, by those favoring recognition of Soviet Russia, as containing a reasonable presumption that Washington would, if living, accord recognition to Soviet Russia. This presumption is scarcely tenable as a careful analysis of Washington's career shows that he was an advocate of integrity in all relationships. It is therefore to be inferred with reasonableness that the above quotation, while probably correct as a statement of a political principle, must be taken in connection with a nation's expressed or known willingness to perform the requirements of international integrity before it can be the recipient of recognition from the members of the international community. It is precisely because sufficient proof exists that efforts were made "to intermeddle in the internal concerns" of America that she has deemed it thus far expedient to withhold recognition from Soviet Russia.

In 1794 the American Minister to Holland wrote stating that the French conquest of Holland was imminent. He desired to know what instructions to follow in that event occurring. His course of conduct was ordered to be guided by the following instructions: "The maxim of the President towards France

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[17] Borah, W. E. American Problems, 267. Washington quoted.

has been to follow the government of the people. Whatsoever régime a majority of them shall establish is both de facto and de jure that to which our minister there addresses himself. If therefore, the independence of the United Netherlands continues, it is wished that you make no difficulty in passing from the old to any constitution of the people." Here again the fact of a government established by the people was made a primary condition of recognition.[18]

During the Napoleonic turmoil the war was not confined in its ravages to Europe, but extended beyond the seas involving the West Indies and South America. The United States became involved in conflict with England. These were serious times for those charged with the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. The question of recognition involved problems concerning our neutrality. The question of our commerce was also concerned. If America conferred recognition, she might be accused of favoring one party at the other's expense, and if recognition was withheld, her commerce would suffer. From the consequent confusion two cardinal facts became clear: (1) that the recognition policy cannot be founded upon ideals, or principles, but must be dedicated by expediency; and (2) that the constitutional provision whereby the recognition of foreign governments is lodged in the hands of the Executive exclusively, is one of the most valuable in the entire Constitution.[19]

Jefferson at the outset of the nineteenth century, declared it to be consistent with American principles, as already before stated, "to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared." He

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[18] Gibbons, H. A. America's Place in the World, 156.
"De facto recognition means what it says: recognition of the existence of the fact of peaceful political control over territory by a government. Approval is neither expressed nor implied in granting such recognition. The policy of the government recognized or the means of its establishment have nothing to do with such recognition; the internal customs or the laws of the country, so long as they do not threaten foreign interests, have no bearing upon it. This has been repeatedly defined by American statesmen, and is one of the cardinal principles both of international law and of American statesmanship." Pamphlet Foreign Policy Assoc. No. 12, Series 1921–1922, 1.

[19] *Ibid* 152.

admitted that a change in government did not affect the continuity of a state's existence. He believed that ultimately recognition would be given to those who succeeded in controlling a state's affairs. He said that "The will of the nation" was "the only thing essential to be regarded." The present policy of the last three American Administrations is not so far removed from Jefferson's position as is generally supposed. The Executive in determining upon a policy of recognition or non-recognition determines to his own satisfaction the factors, which in his estimation, constitute "the will of the nation" in any given case, and renders judgment accordingly.[20] A recent student of America's recognition policy made the following statement regarding the Jeffersonian concepts that "There is no doubt that in so far as he conceived recognition to be an independent act depending not upon the whim of the recognizing state, but conditioned solely by the governmental stability of the new organization he laid down the doctrine of de facto recognition in its purest form.[21]

The arguments of those who contend that America should recognize Soviet Russia, base their contentions upon the assumption that under exactly similar circumstances, Washington, over a century and a third ago, recognized the revolutionary Government of France. This argument is suggestive and deceptive, and is very likely to produce a favorable reaction on the part of individuals who have never investigated critically the recognition policy of the United States, especially the policy actually adopted by the Washington Administration. The argument is based upon a faulty historical analogy regardless of the respective merits in the case. The conditions in the Washington Administration were not the same as those prevailing during the last three Administrations. America's political and economic situation in the community of nations during the early years of her independent existence was entirely different from the position of eminence she occupies at present in world

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[20] Jefferson's Works (Ford Ed.) Vol. 6, 199. Moore, Dig., 1, 120; Hyde, C. C. International Law, Vol. 1, 68.

[21] Goebel, J. Recognition Policy of the U. S., 3.

affairs. This altered situation must of necessity be taken into account in formulating any policy of intercourse, nor need this involve a sacrifice of America's former political ideals. The international community of nations, at least the more important members, have during the intervening period undergone radical political transformations. At the time of America's entrance into the status of independent statehood all the nations of continental Europe were dedicated to the propositions of absolutism. Even England, the traditional home of liberalism, was struggling to maintain her hard-won liberties against the attack of a half-demented monarch impelled with a tendency towards absolutism.

America was the child of a different set of circumstances, and represented ideals completely at variance with those then almost universally held in the civilized world. France helped America to win her independence, and between the two nations there existed a cultural and political affinity that never existed between America and Russia. The teachings of the French political philosophers had, in the pre-revolutionary period, exerted a great influence upon America political ideals. America, therefore, representing a lone political condition in the world was naturally favorably inclined to recognize the nation from whose savants she derived many of her most cherished political concepts. The advent of another nation, especially her old ally, dedicated to principles of liberalism could not but have a favorable reaction on America. America as a lone political personage was desirous of seeking the association of a nation which espoused sentiments similar to her own. In many respects a political obligation was due to France, resulting from her revolutionary assistance, that could in part be paid by according recognition to the French Republic. France did not repudiate her obligations by decree nor engage in destructive propaganda directed against America. America's action in recognizing revolutionary France was therefore entirely proper and normal.

The constitutional provision which places the conduct of foreign relations in the President's hands enables him to adopt such an attitude towards other nations as in his viewpoint is calculated to serve the then present interests of the United

States. He is under no obligation or restriction to adhere to precedents, any such adherence is conditioned by elements of expediency. Any attitude the President may assume is logical, in relation to the circumstances calling it forth, whether in accord with the precedents or not. Today the most progressive nations profess principles of political enlightenment mostly similar to those historically held in America. Therefore a political fellowship exists among the nations so far as America is concerned that did not exist when she first appeared as a nation. Even aside from the communistic principles professed by Soviet Russia, it is evident and apparent that the relation maintained by America towards revolutionary France was of an entirely different character, and under a different set of circumstances than are the present circumstances conditioning our attitude towards Soviet Russia. Therefore the analogical argument favoring recognition of Soviet Russia while apparently convincing, is found upon careful examination to be established upon inadequate historical evidence.

In 1810 when Napoleon conquered Spain, Venezuela sent two representatives to the United States who stated that she had severed her allegiance with Spain. This declaration of independence was referred to the President who took a proper interest in the matter. In his message of November 5, 1811, President Madison reviewed the situation in South America. At no place did he recommend recognition, although he manifested a freiendly interest in their welfare. He said, "In contemplating the scenes which distinguish this momentous epoch, and estimating their claims to our attention, it is impossible to overlook those developing themselves among the great communities which occupy the southern portion of our neighborhood. An enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur in imposing on the national councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their destinies, to cherish reciprocally sentiments of good will, to regard the progress of events, and not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established."[22]

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[22] Richardson's Papers and Messages 1, 494; Moore, Dig., 1, 75.

Madison's message was referred to a committee which reported the sense of Congress. Congress beheld with satisfaction the erection of sovereignties by the Spanish provinces, and manifested a deep interest in their welfare. Whenever they attained the condition of nations "by the just exercise of their rights" Congress would co-operate with the Executive in establishing such amicable and commercial relations as were considered necessary.[23] While both the President and Congress expressed sympathetic views regarding the well-being of the revolting Spanish provinces, yet the time for de jure recognition, had in their estimation, not arrived at that time.

In a letter to Joel Barlow, November 17, 1811, President Madison said, regarding the situation in Spanish America, "Venezuela, however, has thrown off this mask, has communicated to us its declaration of Independence, and solicits our acknowledging it by receiving a public Minister, etc. Mexico, according to our intelligence, which is difficult and obscure, is still in the struggle between the revolutionary and royal parties." The attitude of England towards the Spanish provinces, in maintaining a benevolent position, was carefully followed.[24]

The Revolution in South America continued to pursue its intermittent course; finally on July 9, 1916, a Congress at Tucuman declared the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata to be free and independent. Colonel Thompson, the agent of this government at Washington, was removed. The new agent, Don de Aquirre, did not immediately request recognition. However, in December, 1817, the request for political recognition was made. Several of the provinces were yet in the power of Spain, and the Portuguese still occupied some territory. There was also some contention among the revolutionary factions. Mr. Adams, the Secretary of State, stated that under these circumstances the acknowledgment of the La Plata Government was deemed inexpedient by the President.[25] The de

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[23] Amer. St. Pap. For. Rel., 3, 538. *Annals*, 12, Cong. 1, 335,343. Moore, Dig., 1, 75.

[24] Madison's Works, 2, 521.

[25] Sen. Doc., 40, 54, Cong. 2, sess., 4. Amer. St. Papers, 4, 228, 173-183. Moore, Dig., 1, 77, 78.

facto character of the Government was in this instance not sufficiently established, and its ability to discharge the duties incumbent upon a member of the international community questioned.

President Monroe, who succeeded Madison, was confronted with the problem, inherited from the previous administration, of taking some stand in regard to the constant requests for recognition coming from South America. He appeared in doubt regarding the extent of Executive competence in matters regarding the recognition of new states. He formulated several propositions and submitted these to a cabinet discussion. He inquired, "Has the executive power to acknowledge the independence of new states whose independence has not been acknowledged by the parent country, and between which parties a war actually exists on that account?

"Will the sending or receiving a minister to a new state under such circumstances, be considered an acknowledgment of its independence?

"Is such an acknowledgment a justifiable cause of war to the parent country? Is it a just cause of complaint to any other power?

"Is it expedient for the United States at this time to acknowledge the independence of Buenos Ayres or of any other part of the Spanish dominions in America now in a state of revolt?"[26]

These searching and inclusive questions show that Monroe had carefully studied the problem of recognition, and appeared to realize that a great responsibility was attached to such action.

In the war between Spain and her colonies, President Monroe said that America had taken the "greatest care" to maintain her neutrality. The war was in favor of the colonies. Buenos Ayres had enjoyed her independence since 1810, and declared it in 1816. Similar successes had been attained by other colonies. Spain, after it became impossible to subdue the colonies, should have discontinued the contest. Friendly powers might have helped Spain to reach a peaceful settlement.[27]

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[26] Monroe, Writings, 6, 31.

[27] Amer. State Papers, 4, 628. Richardson's Message, 2, 58, 59. Moore, Dig., 1, 83, 84.

While no recognition was granted the United States was, however, deeply interested in South America affairs. A commission in 1817 was sent to ascertain the exact conditions then existing in South America, especially in Buenos Ayres and Chile. The separate reports of the commissions were transmitted to Congress, in addition to a special report from Mr. Poinsett. These reports revealed that Buenos Ayres was unable to enforce her authority in certain portions of her pretended dominions. Chile was under the rule of a despot with no representative government. No action favorable to recognition was taken.[28]

The attitude towards this continuous pleading for recognition was firm on the Administration's part. The Cabinet had decided that no further action should be recommended until the attitude of the European powers was known more definitely. The inability of Buenos Ayres to establish a substantial de facto régime constituted grounds for a postponement of relations.[29] President Monroe in his message of December 2, 1817, stated the policy which America had thus far pursued in regard to the wars in South America. He said, "It was anticipated at an early stage that the contest between Spain and the colonies would become highly interesting to the United States . . . Through every stage of the conflict the United States has maintained an impartial neutrality giving aid to neither of the parties in men, money, ships, or munitions of war. They have regarded the contest not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal rights. Our ports have been open to both."[30]

John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, opposed recognizing the independence of Buenos Ayres. The vacillation of President Monroe caused strong congressional opposition. Clay announced on December 6, 1817, that he intended moving the recognition of Buenos Ayres, and possibly of Chile, at the

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[28] Adams, Memoirs, 4, 165, 166. Richardson's 2, 42. Amer. St. Papers, 4, 323. Moore Dig., 1, 81, 82.

[29] 5 British and Foreign State Papers, 1818, 801.

[30] Moore, Dig., 1, 172.

session of Congress then in progress. No one seemed to question this procedure as an infringement upon executive privileges.[31]

A proposition was made to the British Government in August 1918, which favored a joint recognition of Argentine (Buenos Ayres). She was at this time the only state that had declared its independence, and had no Spanish army on its soil. This Government had succeeded, by this time, in establishing a de facto régime. The British from matters of policy declined the offer. At this time it appeared that the European allies of Spain would assist her in the suppression of the revolted colonies. President Monroe felt that the course pursued by the United States was proper, and recommended its continuance under the conditions.[32]

In his message of December 3, 1821, Monroe again referred to the internal disturbances in South America, and of Spain's inability to restore her power. He thought that considerations of intelligence ought to convince Spain of the foolishness of continuing the contest. America desired to help Spain, if needed, with friendly council.[33] On January 30, 1822, the House wanted information about South America, or from the American agents in South America. In reply President Monroe sent his message of March 8, 1822. He said, "This contest has now reached such a stage, and been attended with such decisive success on the part of the provinces that it merits the most profound consideration whether their right to the rank of independent nations, with all the advantages incident to it in their intercourse with the United States is not complete." Chile declared its independence in 1818. Colombia established a fundamental law in December 1817. The revolution had extended to Peru. In Mexico there was no opposition to the new Government. This having been the case, President Monroe thought the time for their acknowledgment as independent nations had arrived. Respecting the attitude of other powers towards South America, Monroe said, "A sincere desire has been cherished to act in

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[31] Adams, Memoirs, 4, 15.

[32] *Ibid* 205. Richardson's Mess., 2, 44. Moore Dig., 1, 83.

[33] Amer. State Papers, 4, 739. Richardson's Mess., 2, 105. Moore, Dig., 1, 84.

concert with them in the proposed recognition." In case the war continued America would observe "the most perfect neutrality between them."[34]

In November, 1921, the request for recognition was renewed for Colombia. It was urged that such action would produce favorable political results in Peru and Mexico, stimulating these provinces with much confidence to adopt "popular Representative Government." The proposition of a federation of the nations of the Western Hemisphere to counteract the European alliance was advanced. No action was taken as a result of these recommendations.[35]

Colombia was formally recognized on June 19, 1822. This was the first recognition of any South American government. The recognition of Argentine occurred on January 27, 1823, by the appointment of an American minister. Chile and Mexico were recognized on the same date in a similar manner. Internal conditions postponed the recognition of the Central American Confederation until August 4, 1824. Peru was recognized on May 2, 1826.[36] These facts clearly demonstrate that America has been exceedingly cautious in granting recognition. These revolutionary disturbances had continued for over a decade, before America finally decided to confer de jure recognition upon the former rebellious provinces. America had every sentimental reason to act sooner, but a judicious and impartial attitude prevented any official action until the arrival of the proper moment.

The Spanish Minister, Mr. Anduaga, protested bitterly against the proposed recognition of the South American states by the United States. Secretary Adams told the Minister that a question of duty was involved, even if moral considerations were not so dominant. The revolted colonies had determined thus to live, and America recognized the fact. The Secretary said "Recognition is the mere acknowledgment of existing facts with a view to the regular establishment with the nations

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[34] Moore, Dig., 1, 85. Richardson's Mess., 2, 116, 117, 118. Annals 17, Cong., 1, sess., 825, 828, 1238, 284, 285, 286. Amer. State Papers, 4, 818, 819.
[35] 9 British and Foreign State Papers, 413, 414.
[36] Sen. Doc., 40, 54, Cong., 2 sess, 4, 5, 13.

newly formed, of those relations, political or commercial, which is a moral obligation of civilized and Christian nations to entertain reciprocally with one another."[37] In 1829 the United States recognized Dom Miguel as King of Portugal. America was one of the few nations which recognized him. Secretary Van Buren stated the reasons for America's action. He said, "But even apart from the foregoing considerations, the course which had ever before been pursued by the United States of always recognizing the government existing de facto, and which had but recently led to the acknowledgment of that of Brazil, left them no choice in the instance under consideration."[38]

The question of extending recognition to Texas in 1836 aroused considerable discussion, especially in Congress. In a report of the Committee of Foreign Relations on the recognition of Texas, Henry Clay said, "In cases where an old established nation has thought proper to change the form of its government, the United States, conforming to the rule which has ever governed their conduct, of strictly abstaining from all interference with domestic concerns of other states, have not stopped to enquire whether the new government has been rightfully adopted or not. It has been sufficient for them that it is, in fact, the Government of the country in practical operation."[39] In the above report of June 18, 1836, Mr. Clay continued to expound America's recognition policy. He said, "The policy which has hitherto guided the Government of the United States in respect to new powers, has been to act on the fact of their existence, without regard to their origin, whether that has been by the subversion of a pre-existing government, or by the violent or voluntary separation of one from another part of a common nation."[40] Mr. Clay believed that a different kind of discrimination must be employed in the recognition of an old nation with changed government than in the case of a new state sprung freshly into being. He stressed the fact of a young nation being able to discharge its obligations to other nations as a necessary

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[37] Moore, Dig., 1, 87, 88.
[38] *Ibid.*, 87, 88, 137. Hyde 1, 68.
[39] Pamphlet, F. P. A., No. 12, Series of 1921-1922, 2.
[40] Sen., Doc., 406, 24 Cong., 1, sess, 1.

condition to receiving recognition. He said, "There is, however, a marked difference in the instance of an old nation which has altered its form of government, and a newly organized Power which has sprung into existence. In the former case—the nation had existed for ages as a separate and independent community. It is a matter of history; and the recognition of its new Government was not necessary to denote the existence of the nation; but, with respect to new Powers, the recognition of their Governments comprehends; first, an acknowledgment of their ability to exist as independent states; and secondly, the capacity of their particular Governments to perform the duties and fulfil the obligations towards foreign Powers incidental to their new condition. Hence more caution and deliberation are necessary in considering and determining the question of the acknowledgment of a new Power than that of the new Government of an old Power."[41]

Recognition of a new government should be granted only after a careful consideration of the facts in the case. The issue of recognizing Texas emphasizes this view in Mr. Clay's mind. He said, "The committee share fully in all these sentiments; but a wise and prudent Government should not act solely on the impulse of feeling, however natural and laudable it may be. It ought to avoid all precipitation and not adopt so grave a measure as that of recognizing the independence of a new Power until it has satisfactory information, and has fully deliberated."[42] Caution is here emphasized as the keynote of any policy looking towards the recognition of any power.

Mr. Rush, American Minister to France, in 1848 recognized the new French Republic by his "personal presence" at the Hotel de Ville a few days after the Republic was proclaimed. Secretary Buchanan highly commended this action. He said, "We recognize the right of all nations to create and re-form their political institutions according to their own will and pleasure. We do not go behind the existing government to involve ourselves in the question of legitimacy." President Polk also com-

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[41] Sen. Doc., 406. 24 Cong, 1, sess. 1.
[42] *Ibid.*, 2, 24 Cong., 1, sess, 1.

mended Minister Rush for his actions. The President said, "The policy of the United States has ever been that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, leaving each to establish the form of government of its own choice."[43] Minister Rush as "envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary" was the first to recognize the "provisional government of the French Republic." The speech Mr. Rush made at the Hotel de Ville was considered "eminently judicious," and the statement of "leaving to other nations the choice of their forms of government" was approved. The sympathy which the American public manifested towards France upon hearing of the "late glorious revolution" was shared by the President. France had now an opportunity of demonstrating that Republics are stable. France was advised to abstain from any action that would provoke the aggressive ambitions of neighboring monarchial powers. The Secretary in his philosophical exposition of the nature of the centralized authority in France, showed himself amply familiar with French politics, and perceived a possible danger to democracy in it.[44] The Secretary, while solicitous for the welfare of republican institutions, urged the maintenance of correct conduct towards other nations, even if monarchial, by the new republic. Republican institutions when properly conducted are founded upon the highest conceptions of integrity and fair dealing.

The suspicions of Secretary Buchanan were not long in materializing for in 1852 Napoleon III, then President of the second Republic, felt sufficiently powerful to execute the successful *coup d'etat* which he accomplished. The movement of the French President was regarded with surprise in Washington. America sympathized with the French constitution since France was the only great European nation committed to republican ideas. America felt depressed at the transition of events in France, and she remained the only nation of first-class rank in the world devoted to republicanism. Long experience convinced us of the benefits of democracy, and its ability to main-

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[43] *Amer. Jl.*, Vol. 15, 1921, 60.
[44] Sen. Ex. Doc., 53., 30 Cong. sess., 3, 4. Moore, 1, 124.

tain liberty and order. Secretary Webster said that it (democracy) had raised us "to eminence and distinction among the nations."[45] America's interest in the perpetuation of liberalism in France was dictated by the fact that in republican France and America there existed a community of ideals. This same community of interest does not prevail between nations devoted to antagonistic conceptions of government.

The duties of a state, as a person under international law, to the external world are not altered by any internal changes that may occur. The change from a monarchy to a republic, or the overthrow of a republic by opposing internal factions are in one sense matters of local concerns which do not alter a state's external obligations.[46] Mr. Rives, the Minister to France in 1851, was in doubt about according recognition to the Second Empire under Napoleon III. He believed that such action would be inconsistent with the representative of a "free constitutional republic."[47] Secretary Webster, in a letter to Minister Rives on January 12, 1852, expounded America's policy of recognition. He said, "From President Washington's time down to the present day it has been a principle, always acknowledged by the United States, that every nation possesses a right to govern itself according to its own will, to change institutions at discretion, and to transact its business through whatever agents it may think proper to employ. This cardinal point in our policy has been strongly illustrated by recognizing the many forms of political power which have been successfully adopted by France in the series of revolutions with which that country has been visited."[48]

During President Pierce's Administration there had arisen a controversy between President Rivas of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Transit Company. American citizens interested in the company, claimed that they were being injured by Presi-

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[45] Sen. Ex. Doc., 19. 32 Cong. 1 sess., 19. Sen. Doc., 40. 54 Cong., 2 sess, 2. See Moore 1, 122.

[46] Hyde, C. C. International Law, 1, 65. See Hamilton's Works, 4., Fed. Ed., 395.

[47] *Amer. Jl.*, Vol. 15, 1921, 60, 61.

[48] Sen. Ex. Doc., 19, 32 Cong., 1 sess., 19. Hyde 1, 66., Moore 1, 126.

dent Rivas, and accordingly demanded assistance from America. American citizens who owned property and had an interest in the interoceanic route asserted that their interests were in jeopardy. The question of resuming diplomatic relations with Nicaragua now arose. President Pierce believed that in such resumption of relations existed the most efficient medium for adjusting the trouble.[49] However, at no time was the inviolability of property rights, a firmly established principle, questioned. On May 15, 1856, the President, in a special message, stated what may be considered to have been the uniform policy of the United States from Washington's time down to the Wilson Administration. He said, "It is the established policy of the United States to recognize all governments without question of their source of organization, or of the means by which the governing persons attain their power, provided there be a government de facto accepted by the people of the country, and with reserve only of time as to the recognition of revolutionary governments arising out of the subdivision of parent states with which we are in relations of amity. We do not go behind the fact of a foreign government's exercising actual power to investigate questions of legitimacy; we do not inquire into the causes which led to a change of government. To us it is indifferent whether a successful revolution has been aided by foreign intervention or not; whether insurrection has overthrown existing governments and another has been established in its place, according to pre-existing forms, or in a manner adopted for the occasion by those whom we may find in the actual possession of power. All these matters we leave to the people and the public authorities of the particular country to determine; and their determination whether it be by positive action or by ascertained acquiescence, is to us a sufficient warranty of the legitimacy of the new government."[50]

During the period of American history preceding the Civil War, the Jeffersonian theory of recognition seems to have been

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[49] House Ex. Doc., 103. 34 Cong. 1 sess., 6. Richardson's Mess., 5, 373, 374.
[50] *Ibid.*, 5. Richardson's Mess., 5, 372,373. *Amer. Jl.*, Vol. 15, 1921, 61.

generally applied, without any serious examination of the government recognized. Whenever any internal change occurred recognition was accorded without any question of legitimacy interfering to determine the result. America apparently concerned itself only with the fact that some party was in actual control of affairs.[51] While this is unquestionably a satisfactory analysis of the pre-Civil War policy of recognition there is no evidence available where America recognized a nation which openly ignored its external obligations, and which based the conduct of its foreign relations upon principles of duplicity. The evidence shows that the post-Civil War policy of recognition was of similar character to that of the preceding policy.

At the commencement of the Civil War Secretary Black instructed all American ministers that the seceded states had organized themselves into the "Confederate States of America." He also anticipated that an effort would be made to obtain recognition of their independence from the Emperor of Russia. He said, "It must be very evident that it is the right of this Government to ask of all foreign powers that the latter shall take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movement in the seceding states." If the great powers recognized the Confederacy such action "would tend to disturb the friendly relations" then existing between America and those powers. Secretary Seward's instructions were of a similar character, and he opposed the efforts of the Confederacy to obtain Spanish recognition.[52]

After the establishment of the Confederacy Jefferson Davis appointed three commissioners to visit Washington in order to adjust the outstanding difficulties between the two nations. They were refused an audience by Secretary Seward, and consequently demanded a reception as accredited agents from "an independent nation de facto and de jure." Seward exercised extreme caution in handling this request. He refused to reply directly to the request. He answered indirectly by filing a memorandum with the State Department. The United States

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[51] House Ex. Doc., 103, 34 Cong. 1, sess. 5-6, Moore Dig., 1, 142. Hyde, 1, 68.
[52] Moore Dig., 1, 103, 104.

Government refused to consider the situation as one requiring recognition. Seward argued that no rightful and accomplished revolution existed but merely a temporary suspension of the sovereign authority. He was prevented by the principle pronounced in Lincoln's inaugural address to admit that either in law or fact these states had seceded from the union.[53] He said, "Of course the Secretary of State cannot act upon the assumption or in any way admit that the so-called Confederate States constitute a foreign power, with whom diplomatic relations ought to be established. Under the circumstances the Secretary of State whose official duties are confined, subject to the direction of the President, to the conducting of the foreign relations of the country and do not at all embrace domestic questions or questions arising between the several States and the Federal Government, is unable to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford." He had no authority to receive them as diplomatic agents, nor to conduct any communications or correspondence with them.[54]

Seward on April 10, 1861, told Adams, American Minister to England, that the United States would not submit to any compromise suggested by England. If England recognized the Confederacy she might as well join in an alliance with the Confederacy. He acknowledged the right to recognize a nation after it had achieved independence, but opposed recognition intended to assist the insurgents.[55]

Secretary Seward in an instruction to Mr. Dayton, Minister to France, on May 30, 1861, said: "The United States can not for a moment allow the French Government to rest under the delusive belief that they will be content to have the Confederate States recognized as a belligerent power by states with which this nation is in amity." Mr. Adams told Lord Russell that the recognition of Confederate belligerency was advantageous to America in one respect, since she would not be responsible

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[53] Goebel, J. Recognition Policy of the U. S., 173. Richardson's Mess. and Papers of the Confederacy, Vol. 1, 70, 84 et seq.
[54] Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln 3, 402, et seq.
[55] Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 79.

for any misconduct that the confederacy might commit towards England.[56]

The Maximilian Government in Mexico presented difficult problems for the Administration. The course pursued was one of strict neutrality. Recognition was refused and business relationships were continued with the Juarez Government. Attempts were made to force recognition from Washington by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in 1863. In event of recognition the French troops were to be withdrawn.[57] Seward communicated the Government's views, in regard to the régime established in Mexico, to the French Minister on April 6, 1864. He said, 'This Government has long recognized, and still does continue to recognize, the constitutional government in the United States of Mexico as the sovereign authority in that country, and the President, Benito Juarez, as its chief. This Government at the same time, equally recognizes the condition of war existing in Mexico between that country and France. We maintain absolute neutrality between belligerents, and we do not assume to judge, much less to judge in advance, of the effect of the war upon titles or estates."[58] These sentiments contained little encouragement for either Maximilian, or the French.

The Civil War, on account of its unprecedented character, gave rise to many complex problems in the conduct of our foreign relations. After the British recognition of the belligerency of the Confederacy, Secretary Seward and his successor found it advisable to follow a slightly different course in granting recognition to other nations. They announced that a revolutionary government in a republican state in defiance of an existing constitution, and having gained control by force of arms ought not to be recognized by the United States. This new pronouncement showed the reaction to British recognition of Confederate belligerency. When the people themselves adopted and approved of a change then recognition was in place. Here the conception appeared that the will of the nation and the will of the people were considered to be synonymous.[59]

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[56] Moore, Dig., 1, 185.
[57] Goebel, J. Recognition Policy, 195.
[58] Dip. Cor., 1864, 3, 212. Moore Dig., 1, 184
[59] Hyde, C. C., International Law., 1, 68, 69.

The opportunity for carrying into effect the Seward ideas was not long in presenting itself. Mr. Hovey, American Minister to Peru, was desirous to present his credentials to the new revolutionary government which was recently installed in Peru. Such action would have involved de jure recognition of the revolutionary régime by the United States. Secretary Seward was of the opinion that the time for recognizing the new régime had not arrived. On March 8, 1866, in an instruction to Mr. Hovey he said: "The policy of the United States is settled upon the principle that revolutions in republican states ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law, with the solemnities, which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permenancy. This is the result of reflection upon national trials of our own."[60] In a further communication to the same Minister, Secretary Seward, on May 7, 1868, said: "What we do not require, and all that we do not require, is when a change of administration has been made, not by peaceful constitutional processes, but by force, that then the new administration shall be sanctioned by the formal acquiescence and acceptance of the people."[61] The effects of the Civil War are here reflected by the cautious and restrained attitude assumed by Secretary Seward towards recognizing new governments, even those that resulted from revolutionary movements.

At the end of the Civil War the question of America's attitude towards Cuba, then in a state of insurrection, arose. President Grant said on June 13, 1870, in a special message, that the contest in Cuba had not assumed the proportions of a war according to international law. There was not sufficient evidence available to justify de facto recognition of Cuba. America was its own judge as to the acceptance of conditions upon which a recognition of belligerency could be based.[62]

With the deposition of Napoleon III in 1870, and the proclamation of a Republic under the provisional government of the National Defence Committee, the question of recognition arose

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[60] Dip. Cor., 1866, 2, 630.
[61] *Ibid.*, 1868, 2, 864.
[62] Richardson's Mess., 7, 31, 32. Moore, 1, 194.

again. The American Minister at Paris was instructed on September 6, 1870 to recognize the new government if it is in "actual control and possession of power and is acknowledged by French so as to be in point of fact de facto government." The Minister was to tender the "congratulations of the President and people of the United States on the successful establishment of Republican government," whenever, in his estimation, the situation was favorable. America, true to her historic policy, was the first nation to recognize the new republic.[63] President Grant in his message of December 5, 1870, spoke of the favorable impression that the erection of a Republic in France produced upon America sentiment. The institution of simple republican forms of "representative government" was an occasion for much satisfaction in America. Regarding the policy of recognizing new governments he said: "While we make no effort to impose our institutions upon the inhabitants of other countries, and while we adhere to our traditional neutrality in civil contests elsewhere, we can not be indifferent to the spread of American political ideas in a great and highly civilized country like France."[64] Here President Grant again states the sympathy, already observed on several previous occasions, which America naturally feels for a nation trying to establish democrats institutions.

During the War of the Pacific 1879–1883 between Peru and Chile, the question arose of recognizing the various governments established in Peru. The four governments successively established by General Pierola, Senator Calderon, Senator Montero, and General Iglesias were recognized. The recognition of General Iglesias as President, by America, was made dependent upon his confirmation by the representative assembly. This confirmation was granted by the assembly and General Iglesias was accorded recognition.[65] The restrictions placed by Secretary Seward on our freedom to recognize other nations was a natural condition that arose from the tension of the Civil War. The tendencies during the eighties, and later was to revert to the

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[63] Moore, Dig., 1, 127.
[64] Richardson's Mess., 7, 96, 97. Moore, 1, 127.

de facto principle maintained during the Ante-Bellum period. The revolutionary governments established in Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and Ecuador in 1889, 1891, 1892, and 1895 respectively were recognized, and reveal a movement back to the de facto principle. Secretary Blaine instructed our Minister to Brazil to accord recognition to any government supported by the majority of the people.[66] Our Minister to Chile, Mr. Egan, was likewise instructed to acknowledge the Congressional Government if accepted by the people.[67] The instructions, in regard to Venezuela, were equally specific. These provided for recognition of the new government when "it is accepted by the people in possession of the power of the nation and fully established."[68] The new Government in Ecuador was to be recognized when fully established by general consent, and when the Executive could execute her international obligations.[69] In all these recognitions the factor stressed was the will of the people unmistakably expressed.

In connection with the recognition of Ecuador Secretary Olney stated the American policy of intercourse. He said: "The precedents by which the intercourse of the United States with foreign nations is governed have established the clear right, under the law of nations and treaties to maintain through its properly appointed agents, communication with the de facto authorities of a foreign state upon all matters affecting either this Government or its citizens, the only limit to this proviso being that our agents are bound to avoid interference in the domestic question of the state." The Secretary continued: "As to formal recognition the practice of this Government has been to enter into effective relations with the de facto government when it shall have been fully established under the general consent of the people." Mr. Tillman was instructed that since, "the new Government (Ecuadorian) is in possession of the

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[66] Foreign Relations of the United States 1881, 909. Richardson, 8, 173. Moore, 1, 158.
[67] *Ibid.*, 1889, 60. Richardson, 9, 108. Moore, 1, 162.
[68] *Ibid.*, 1891, 161.
[69] *Ibid.*, 1892, 635.
[69] *Ibid.*, 1895, 249.

executive forces of the nation, and administering the same with due regard for the obligations of international law and treaties, you will enter into full relations with it."[70]

The attitude of President Grant towards Cuba has already been discussed, but the question refused to disappear and remainded to plague the quiet of succeeding administrations. In the mid-nineties the revolutionary turmoil in the island was renewed with unusual vigor. The McKinley Administration just inaugurated was confronted with the perplexing problem of adopting some attitude with regard to conditions in Cuba. President McKinley did not believe that Cuba had arisen to the status of a belligerent power to whom the rights of belligerency could be accorded. The question of recognition also lurked in the background. In regard to the question of belligerency President McKinley said: "It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor." Such recognition would involve the United States into many international complications, which the situation did not warrant. Therefore, the President said, "I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty, the Executive will take it."[71]

At the beginning of the twentieth century America appears to have made her recognition of a new state contingent upon the manifest ability of a state to respect its obligations more than before. This attitude was already evident in the case of Ecuador above considered. In 1899 Secretary Hay manifested a willingness to grant recognition to a government when it appeared "to be established in control of the machinery of administration and in a position to fulfil its international obligations." More recently there has again been a revival of Seward's doctrine of constitutionality as a determining factor in conferring recogni-

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[70] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Vol. 1, 249.
[71] Moore, Dig., 1, 200.
[72] Hyde, C. C. International Law, 1, 70.

tion. The United States is also reluctant to grant recognition to newly formed governments established upon force, unless evidence is manifested that popular sentiment approved the change.[72] The United States apparently now takes a definite stand in refusing to recognize a government based upon force, and established unconstitutionally in defiance of the people's will. Such a government may be considered an international menace, which sows seeds of discord that may disturb the general peace.[73]

On September 8, 1900 the American Minister to Columbia, Mr. Hart, was advised to keep a view on the political situation until the facts were known when appropriate action would be taken. Pending the resumption of de facto relations, he was to insist upon the "protection of American life and property from injury or damage and respect for all American rights secured by treaty and international law" by those who exercised authority.[74] In the instructions to the American Minister on the above date, Mr. Hill, the Acting Secretary of State, said: "The policy of the United States announced and practiced upon occasion for more than a century has been and is to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the de jure control of the executive power of a foreign state; but to base the recognition of a foreign government solely on its de facto ability to hold the reigns of administrative power. When by reason of revolution or other internal change not wrought by regular constitutional methods, a conflict of authority exists in another country whereby the titular government to which our representatives are accredited, is reduced from power and authority, the rule of the United States is to defer recognition of another executive in its place until it shall appear that it is in possession of the machinery of the state, administering government with the assent of the people thereof and without substantial resistance to its authority, and that it is in a position to fulfil all the international obligations and responsibilities incumbent upon a sovereign state under treaties and international law."[75]

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[73] Hyde C. C. International Law 1, 73.
[74] Foreign Relations, 1900, 411.
[75] *Ibid.*, 410. Moore 1, 138. Hyde, 1, 70.

In 1907 the provisional government of Honduras was under the presidency of General Dovila. The provisional minister of foreign affairs for Honduras was informed that the President had decided to accord recognition to the new government. The President was convinced that the newly established government was in a position to discharge "international obligations." The movement to revive "the constitutional régime" in Honduras was approved by the President, and was largely instrumental in causing him to grant recognition.[76]

The question of recognition arose in 1911 in regard to Haiti which had experienced some internal disturbance. In instructions to the American Minister to Haiti on August 18, 1911 Secretary Knox said: "It is the practice of the Government of the United States to refuse to recognize any Government resulting from a revolution unless it appears to represent the will of the people, and to be able and willing to respond to its international obligations."[77] On January 23, 1912 the Secretary sent similar instructions to Mr. Russell, American Minister to Santo Domingo. The Minister was to inform the revolutionary leaders to compose their activities and await the results of the coming elections. The matter was of vital importance to America on account of her treaty interests.[78]

Woodrow Wilson inaugurated a new and more positive American foreign policy. Wilson, in concluding his election campaign on November 4, 1912 laid down the following set of principles which should control American international relations if he was elected. He said: "We must shape our course of action by the maxims of justice and liberality and good will, think of the progress of mankind rather than of the progress of this or that investment, of the protection of American honor and the advancement of American ideals rather than always of American contracts, and lift our diplomacy to the level of what the best minds have planned for mankind."[79] Such was the prophecy of the spirit of altruism and idealism which Mr. Wilson incorporated in his foreign policy as President of the United States.

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[76] Foreign Relations, 1907. 11, 605. 1907, 2, 605.
[77] *Ibid.*, 1911, 290.
[78] *Ibid.*, 1912, 342.
[79] *Amer. Jl.*, Vol. 7, 330.

When Wilson became President there existed a state of chronic disorder in Mexico. His views regarding our Latin-American relations are expressed in a telegram which he caused the Secretary of State to dispatch on March 12, 1913 through diplomatic officers to Latin America. He said, in part: "We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves." He said that America could render no encouragement to those who defied constitutional rights; discredited the government; and injured an unfortunate people; that America will always be glad to associate with such nations as protect private rights and respect the restraints of constitutional provisions.[80] This was a striking reaffirmation of American political ideals as originally expressed in the Declaration of Independence. Here also plain intimations were given of the ideals which President Wilson later incorporated in the formulation of America's policy towards Soviet Russia.

In February 1913 the Mexican Government under President Madero was overthrown. General Huerta then became the provisional president. Madero, while in the custody of the authorities was assassinated on February 22, 1913. During the month of March, April and May 1913, Huerta was recognized by several European powers. President Wilson refused to recognize Huerta, and sent Mr. John Lind to Mexico with instructions to endeavor to secure an adjustment of the conditions prevailing in Mexico. In the estimation of President Wilson the pacification of Mexico could have been accomplished by the acceptance of the following conditions, first the establishment of an armistice, and the cessation of fighting in Mexico, second the promise of a free election; third, Huerta was to refuse to be a candidate at this election; and fourth, all parties were to abide loyally by the results of such an election. These

[80] *Amer. Jl.* Vol. VII., 331, 332.

terms were declined by Huerta and the Lind mission accomplished nothing. President Wilson in August 1913, announced that America could not act as umpire or take sides in the controversy. He announced that "neither side to the struggle" should receive aid from the United States and simultaneously prohibited the sale of arms to any faction in Mexico.[81]

President Wilson in his annual message of December 2, 1913, declared that no prospects of peace could exist in Mexico so long as Huerta retained his "usurped authority." It should be understood "on all hands" that the Government of the United States would have nothing to do with such "pretended governments." He claimed that government in Mexico had collapsed, and that a military despotism was maintained under the appearances of a national authority. Wilson said that Huerta, after playing the part of a constitutional President, "cast aside even the pretense of legal right and declared himself dictator."[82] It was said that there existed in Mexico a condition of things which made it difficult to safeguard the rights, "either of her own people or of the citizens of other countries resident within her territory." The President declared that Huerta had even forefeited the moral support of those who had reposed confidence in him.[83] The mediation of Argentine, Brazil and Chile at Niagara Falls, Ontario, in 1914, resulted in the formation of a plan whereby constitutional government was to be re-established in Mexico which America could recognize, and with which she could resume diplomatic relations. This virtual agreement between Huerta and America was rendered fruitless by the position taken by the constitutionalists under General Carranza.[84]

After July 1914 the constitutionalists divided into several factions and General Carranza found himself opposed by several of his former lieutenants. The pacification of the country was much delayed. On June 2, 1915, President Wilson appealed without results to the leaders of these factions to act together for the "relief and redemption of their prostrate country."[85]

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[81] *Amer. Jl.*, 7 Supp., 279. Hyde **1, 71.**
[82] Hyde, 1, 71, 72.
[83] *Ibid.*, 72.
[84] *Amer. Jl.*, 8, 579-585, 860-864. Hyde **1, 72.**
[85] Sen. Doc., 324, 64 Cong., 1 sess., 15.

On August 15, 1915, Secretary Lansing and diplomatic representatives from Brazil, Chile, Argentine, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Guatemala appealed vainly to the Mexican leaders to convene a conference to settle their differences, and offered to act as intermediaries.[86]

When Carranza's authority extended over about seventy-five per cent of Mexican territory, it was recognized by the United States, as the de facto Government of Mexico. Recognition was conditioned upon the promise to hold popular elections, restore domestic peace, and protect the property and lives of foreigners. This de facto Government was not a constitutional government, but a military government which was expected by the United States within a reasonable time to be "merged in or succeeded by a government organized under the Constitution and laws of Mexico."[87] President Wilson in refusing to recognize Huerta announced a new standard of recognition for America. He made American recognition contingent upon "the orderly processes of just government based upon law and not arbitrary or irregular force."[88] The Carranza régime was superseded by another which failed to receive recognition from America. Finally under the Administration of President Obregon satisfactory evidence was presented that internal order was being restored, and that the property rights of foreigners would be protected. In view of this altered situation America felt justified in recognizing the Mexican Government, and this was accordingly done in August 1923, when normal diplomatic relations were resumed between the two nations.[89] Secretary Hughes in an address to a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations referred to the turmoil that existed in Mexico during the last thirteen years. However under Obregon there appeared a disposition to put the finances of Mexico in order, and to make provision for the "payment of the foreign debt." The Secretary said: "When it appeared that there was a disposition to discharge the obligations which are incident to membership

[86] Sen. Doc., 324, 64 Cong., 1 sess 10, 15.
[87] Hyde, 1, 72.
[88] Fenwick, C. International Law, 113.
[89] *Ibid.*,

in the family of nations, this Government was glad to recognize the existing Government of Mexico and to resume diplomatic relations."[90] He also stated that it was considerations of peace and order which induced the Harding Administration to sell munitions and supplies to Obregon when insurrection threatened Mexican stability. America was interested in the preservation of constitutional government in their neighboring states.

The policy of recognition pursued by the Administrations from Washington's time onward has been uniformly consistent. While deviations occurred according to the necessities of any particular occasion, and while difficult expressions were at times given to the policy of recognition by various Secretaries of State, yet a definite continuity is discernible throughout. The de facto principle first announced by Jefferson has never been abandoned by succeeding administrations. It still forms and is likely to remain a cardinal principle in our policy of recognition. This principle demonstrates that the existence of a government as an actual fact is a necessary condition precedent before the question of recognition can be approached. In addition other questions of almost equally vital importance present themselves whenever our recognition is desired; namely the stability of the government, and its ability to competently and voluntarily discharge all obligations, financial or otherwise, incident to reception into international fellowship. America, while not requiring it as a condition precedent to receiving our recognition, nevertheless, was and remains sentimentally and spiritually interested in the spread of republican institutions and established constitutional government. This condition, however, must always be taken into account with considerations of the highest integrity. Seward's alleged departure from the uniform American policy in opposing recognition of the belligerency of the Confederacy is not well established. Seward argued that the insurrection was not a permanent or successfully established fact that could continue to exist indefinitely in defiance of the National Government. The southern victories

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[90] Hughes, C. E. Address before the Meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-9.

were numerous and brilliant, but at no time decisive. The force of Seward's logic became increasingly apparent to Europe after Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The hasty recognition of the Confederacy by certain European powers was in marked contrast to the deliberation which America pursued in questions involving recognition. The refusal to recognize Soviet Russia cannot be conditioned upon absence of stability or the lack of a de facto government but must be determined by other elements associated with America's policy. These are respect for valid international obligations and the rights of property; opposition to unconstitutional and violent assumption of power; and the evident consent and acquiescence of the people in any governmental alteration.

V

Executive Attitude Toward Recognition

The policy maintained towards any nation is that which the Executive considers most advisable to adopt. The Executive policy adopted and continuously maintained by successive administrations, towards Soviet Russia, is conditioned by considerations of discretion. The policy adhered to is established upon the Executive's conception of the factors determining international morality and integrity. The principles would obviously apply to all nations henceforth seeking American recognition.

The President at an early date was recognized as the dominant authority in controlling our foreign relations. Jefferson in 1793 regarded the President as the only agency of communication between America and foreign nations.[1] He said that from the President alone "foreign nations or their agents are to learn what is or has been the will of the nation"; that whatever he communicated was "the expression of the nation." No foreign agent can be "allowed to question it," or "to interpose between him and any other branch of government under the pretext of either's transgressing their functions." This view of the President's prerogative is now of common acceptation.[2]

The President's control of the foreign service, and of the policy of recognition of new states is contained in the following clause of the Constitution, Article II, Sections 1 and 2. The clause says "He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; . . . He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers."[3] The President advised by the State Department makes the final

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[1] Amer. State Paper on For. Rel., 1, 184. Sen. Doc., No. 56, 21. 54 Cong. 2 sess. Moore, 4, 680. Lay, T. H. Foreign Service of the United States, 43.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] U. S. Constitution, Art. 2, Sec, 1, 2.

decision, after considering the manifold interests of the United States. The formulation of policy at any time should pay particular regard to the precedents. The determining factor should be the wisdom of the proposed course to be pursued.[4]

The wisdom of the course to be pursued is of especial importance in regard to the proposed recognition of Soviet Russia. A careful study of the speeches and utterances of the Bolshevist leaders during the period immediately following their accession to power reveals one important consideration. The spokesmen realized that it was impossible for Soviet Russia to exist as a communist state in a bourgeois world. They felt that either the Soviet régime must return to the accustomed social order of the world, or the other nations must remodel their social order according to accepted communist formulas.[5] The accuracy of these predictions was amply shown when in later years the Soviet régime was compelled to modify its theories in resuming trade and commercial relations with non-communist nations. The excessive gravitation towards communism which followed the war, appears to be definitely stemmed in Europe.

President Wilson, when he refused to recognize Huerta because he usurped power, laid down a new principle of international morality. The nations of Europe opposed this new departure with all their diplomatic skill. The principle, however, was supported by democratic sentiment in America, and has since received the approval of intelligent opinion throughout the world. Doubtless the Huerta experience provided many of the guiding principles later incorporated in the policy adopted toward Soviet Russia.[6] The President is the fountain source from which policy flows. If he decides to give moral considerations much attention in formulating a definite policy, that is his privilege, nor can the position he takes be altered by anyone.

The first indication of America's policy towards Soviet Russia was manifested by President Wilson in December 1917. In his speech to Congress, about a month after the Bolshevist

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[4] Gibbons, H. A. America's place in the World, 158.
[5] *Annals*. Vol. 114, 70.
[6] American Federationist, Vol. 31, 157.

revolution, he referred to pernicious attempts being made by German agitators and propagandists to pervert the meaning of the phrase "no annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities."[7] About the effect this misrepresentation had on Russia, President Wilson said: "Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to the right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray, and the people of every other country their agents could reach."[8] The President believed that if the Russian people had been properly instructed in regard to the true purposes and aims of the war that the revolution and the reverses that have overtaken them might have been fully avoided, and the Russian people "enlisted on the side of the Allies." However, "The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark and the poison has been administered by the very same hands. The only possible antidote is the truth. It cannot be uttered too plainly or too often."[9] German intrigue is thus held responsible for many of the conditions which resulted in the collapse of the empire, and the installation of the revolutionary régime.

President Wilson in the speech that outlined the fourteen points reviewed at considerable length the open propositions made by the Russian delegates to the Brest Litovsk Conference. Their position was concise, clear, and open. The German terms, dictated by the military autocracy, included the retention of territory conquered and all points of vantage. American interests in the tangled Russian problem were reviewed by President Wilson. Mr. Wilson said: "Whether their present leaders believe it or not it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty, and ordered peace."[10] The principle was expressed at this time, and since followed of extending every possible assistance to

[7] *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 5, 1917, 3. President's Message quoted as reported.
[8] *Ibid.*, 1.
[9] *Ibid.*, 3.
[10] *N. Y. Herald*, Jan. 9, 1918, 2. President's speech as reported.

Russia without recognizing the Soviet régime. This attitude of rendering to the Russian people imperative assistance was shown in the administration of American relief during the famine of 1921 to be discussed later.

Several months after the November Revolution of 1917 the Allied Governments, including America, sent various representatives and military delegations to Russia. The object was to persuade Russia to continue the struggle, in the common cause, until final victory was achieved. If Russia decided to continue the struggle the Allied were determined to render her every possible assistance. Colonel Robins, the head of the American Red Cross in Russia was the American representative in these negotiations. On January 2, 1918 Colonel Robins obtained a statement from Ambassador Francis that he would recommend de facto recognition of the Soviet régime by the United States provided the Bolshevists should decide to continue the war and "seriously conduct hostilities" against Germany![11]

The Soviet régime, according to Colonel Robins, sought economic co-operation with America. For two months under instructions from the American Ambassador, Colonel Robins maintained relations with the Soviet authorities. The object was to keep the Bolshevists from signing the treaty dictated by Germany. In event of Russian refusal America was to give economic, and military assistance to Russia. The Russians agreed to this proposal, and offered to put American officers on the frontier to prevent raw materials reaching the Central Powers. The railway systems were also to be placed under American supervision. Nothing materialized from these conversations as the American Government failed to act.[12]

The Brest Litovsk Treaty had just been signed and the question of ratification was before the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Lenin and Trotsky assured Colonel Robins that the treaty could be blocked provided that America would comply with certain conditions concerning Russian international relations. The conditions concerned the assistance America would render, in event Russia renewed the war against Germany,

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[11] Miliukov, Paul N. Russia Today and Tomorrow, 106.
[12] *Annals*, Vol. 84, 140.

especially in the form of equipment, and living necessities. The question was asked what the American attitude would be if the Japanese should exert undue pressure in Siberia. Lenin promised that in the event of acceptance by America of these conditions he would oppose ratification of the treaty at the session of the All-Russian Congress. All hope of receiving a favorable reply to these conditions was abandoned when the Department of State replied that "There was in fact no Russian Government to deal with." Colonel Robins' attempts to establish some working basis of relationships between Soviet Russia and the United States, were now terminated.[13]

Secretary Lansing in May 1918 instructed Ambassador Francis at Vologda, to inform the Soviet Government, that the American consul at Vladivostok had not assisted anti-Bolshevik propaganda, nor interfered in the internal affairs of Russia. The informal relations existing then between the United States and Russia were not to be regarded as constituting recognition of the Soviet régime by the government of the United States.[14] No further important developments occurred until the following year.

During the summer and autumn of 1919 many rumors that serious efforts were being made to subvert our republican institutions were current. The persistence of these activities, in addition to the information gathered by the agents of the Department of Justice was the occasion for the formation of Congressional inquiries. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, in accordance with a resolution, requested, from the State Department, information relative to Communist activities. Secretary Lansing in acknowledging the request said "since the overthrow of the autocracy in March 1917 the Department of State has studied developments in Russia with the sympathy which America has traditionally shown towards all movements for political betterment. The study which has been made of the Bolshevist movement . . . show conclusively that the purpose of the Bolsheviks is to subvert the existing principles of

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[13] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 460, 461.
[14] *N. Y. Times*, May 10, 1918. 4.

government and society the world over including those countries in which democratic institutions are already established. They have built up a political machine which by the concentration of power into the hands of a few and the ruthlessness of its methods suggests the asiatic despotism of the early Tsars. The results of their exericse of power . . . have been demoralization, civil war, and economic collapse."[15]

Attempts were made at the same time by the Soviet authorities to have M. Martin accepted as the accredited Russian Ambassador representing the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for Russia. The State Department refused to acknowledge his credentials. M. Martin demanded that M. Bakhmateff, the Kerensky Ambassador, should surrender to him the Russian archives at Washington. M. Martin's activities in New York were suspected. These resulted in a raid upon his headquarters, by the police. M. Martin became objectionable to the government and was accordingly deported in December, 1920.[16]

President Wilson in his message of December 3, 1919, discussed the respective rights of capital and labor, and the means of adjusting disputes between these forces. Regarding radical agitators he said: "There are those in this country who threaten direct action to force their will upon a majority. Russia today, with its blood and terror, is a painful object lesson of the power of minorities. It makes little difference what minority it is, whether capital or labor, or any other class; no sort of privilege will ever be permitted to dominate this country."[17] President Wilson continued "In America there is but one way by which great reforms can be accomplished, and the relief sought by classes obtained, and that is through the orderly processes of representative government. Those who would propose any other method of reform are enemies of this country."[18] The President here clearly indicated that any government established upon communist doctrines cannot expect to receive our encour-

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[15] Sen. Doc., 66 Cong., 2nd Session, No. 172, 3.
[16] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 468.
[17] *Literary Digest*, Vol. 63, 15. President Wilson's message as reported.
[18] *Ibid.*

agement and support. A challenge was also thrown to those engaged in subversive propaganda activities.

On June 12, 1920, Mr. Gompers inquired of Secretary Colby concerning America's policy towards Soviet Russia. Secretary Colby in reply justified the policy of non-recognition on the ground that "The existing régime in Russia, does not represent the will, or consent of any considerable proportion of the Russian people."[19] The Secretary affirmed that America had no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, nor to recommend the kind of government they should adopt. About the character of the Soviet régime he said: "It repudiates every principle of harmonious and trustful relations, whether of nations, or of individuals, and is based upon the negation of honor and good faith and every usage and connection underlying the structure of international law."[20]

Secretary Colby in his note, which was sent to the convention of the American Federation of Labor convened at Montreal, made clear the fact that no licensed trading was being conducted between the United States and Russia. He acknowledged that several conferences regarding trade relations were held in Europe. The purpose was to devise some plan whereby the trade restrictions might be removed. No definite results were accomplished since "The Soviet Government is insistent upon political recognition as a condition precedent to renewal of commercial contact."[21] The convention in its closing session by a very emphatic and energetic resolution supported the Secretary's attitude. The resolution adopted by the Federation of Labor stated that it was ascertained on the "highest authority" that the Soviet Government is an "autocratic, militaristic Government that does not believe in democracy" and is ruled by the "iron hand of dictatorship."[22] The American Federation of Labor here adopted its position in support of America's Russian policy to which it has adhered with consistent firmness, through succeeding Administrations to the present time.

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[19] American Federationist, Vol. 31, 156.
[20] *N. Y. Times*, June 16, 1920, 17.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*, Resolution of the A. F. of L.

The American Government during the summer of 1920 was known to have been desirous of stating definitely America's attitude towards Soviet Russia. No situation existed at the time that would have justified the State Department in issuing its desired promulgation since no requests for information, calling forth a statement of policy, was made of the Department. An occasion which justified a statement of policy occurred in August 1920. In response to a rumored intimation that the Italian Government would welcome the American views on the situation presented by the Russian invasion of Poland in the summer of 1920, Secretary Colby found occasion to state America's attitude towards recognizing Soviet Russia.[23] The Secretary in his famous note of August 1920 to the Italian Ambassador expressed the genuine friendship entertained by the American people for the Russian people. He said that America could not participate in any general European conference which might have two very probable results equally distasteful to American sentiment; namely "The recognition of the Bolshevist régime" and a settlement of the Russian problem based on her dismemberment. From the revolution in March 1917 America has been solicitous for the welfare of Russia and their ability "to reconstruct their national life upon a broad basis of popular self-government." The United States was the first nation "to acknowledge the validity of the revolution and to give recognition to the Provisional Government of Russia."[24] As already indicated America was usually the first nation to recognize a new government ushered into existence by way of revolution. Therefore America's consistent refusal to recognize the Soviet régime was not conditioned upon the fact that this régime was the child of revolution but was conditioned by factors of a political character injurious to our institutions.

Secretary Colby also showed that the Government of the United States was thoroughly informed about the war-weariness of Russia. America was therefore obligated, according to Secretary Colby, to render "moral and material support to the

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[23] Hyde, 1, 73.
[24] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 11, 1920, 1. Secretary Colby's note as reported.

Provisional Government." The Provisional Government was confronted with a two-fold task to reorganize the life of the nation, and to establish a "Stable government based on popular sovereignty." He showed that the friendship shown by Russia towards this nation during times of distress has produced "an imperishable sense of gratitude." Colby also expressed his conviction that the character of the Russian people would triumph over the "suffering and destitution" produced by the prevailing anarchy.[25]

American friendship was shown to have been consistent throughout in the manifestation of its Russian policy. Secretary Colby said, "We are unwilling that while it is helpless in the grip of a non-representative Government whose only sanction is brutal force, Russia shall be weakened still further by a policy of dismemberment conceived in other than Russian interests."[26] He asserted that America's friendly sentiments towards Russia, and respect for her territorial integrity was revealed by the fact that America refused "to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations independent of Russia." America also disapproved of the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris recognizing the so-called Republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia. When Armenia was recognized America took the position that, since naturally some of Armenia's territory must include land formerly belonging to the Russian Empire, in consequence of this fact no "final determination of its boundaries" could "be made without Russia's co-operation and agreement."[27]

Secretary Colby showed that America was entirely in acocrd with the desire and purpose to restore tranquility in Europe, and to solve its vexed problems. She is, however, says the Secretary, unable "to perceive . . . that a recognition of the Soviet régime would promote, much less accomplish this object." America was therefore, "averse to any dealings with the Soviet régime beyond the most narrow boundaries to which a discussion of an armistice can be confined." The present rulers of Russia were declared to be unrepresentative of the Russian

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[25] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 11, 1920, 2. Secretary Colby's note as reported.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*

people, that they had seized power after having promised to protect the Constitutional Assembly from any attacks upon it. The position was taken that the Bolsheviki, although a small majority, by seizing power prevented the creation of a "popular representative government based upon universal sufferage," and that their continuance in power was conditioned upon oppression.[28]

Secretary Colby was careful to state that America again reiterated her policy of non-interference in Russian internal affairs, and that she did not desire to suggest any type of government, but that she hoped the time would arrive when a government representing the "free will and purpose" of Russia would be established. He promised that when that time arrived America would take "measures of practical assistance "provided Russia had not placed herself beyond the pale of friendly intercourse.[29] Concerning the granting of political recognition to Soviet Russia the Secretary said "it is not possible for the Government of the United States to recognize the present rulers of Russia as a Government with which the relations common to friendly governments can be maintained," but that this declaration did not concern any "political or social structure" the Russian people might themselves voluntarily choose.[30]

The Secretary adds that the Soviet leaders have repeatedly avowed their willingness to sign "agreements with foreign powers while not having the slightest intention of executing such promises." An examination of the official correspondence of nations that accorded recognition to Russia plainly indicates that their commitments, and promised performance of obligations assumed are to be accepted only after a careful study of the factors involved. He showed that the Soviet attitude was based upon the theory that any agreement made by them with a non-Bolshevist Government was not morally obligatory upon them. This attitude has been exemplified by their practice.[31] Little reliance was placed upon the Soviet promise to give "assurance" and "guarantee" not to abuse diplomatic immuni-

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[28] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 11, 1920, 2.
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*

ties. Such promises in view of their practices he asserted were not to be "very seriously regarded."

The proposition is maintained that the Third International is heavily subsidized by the Soviet régime. The funds thus obtained were to be used for the "promotion of Bolshevist revolutions throughout the world."[32] Every positive indication existed that Soviet diplomatic agents would support the activities of the agents representing the Third International. The Secretary says, "Inevitably therefore the diplomatic service of the Bolshevist Government would become a channel for intrigues and the propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws of countries, with which it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which an enlightened Government cannot subject themselves." Therefore this Government (American) cannot stand upon any "common ground" with a power whose conceptions of "international relations are so entirely alien to its own," and "we cannot recognize or hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a Government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions.[33]

Tchitcherin in reply to Secretary Colby denied the accusation of infidelity, and says that if Soviet officials are instructed to refrain from communist activities that they will do as instructed.[34] The note of Tchitcherin said "If the Russian Government promises to refrain from distributing communist literature all its representatives will observe this promise absolutely, and they are herewith instructed to categorically declare this. . . The Russian Government . . . trusts that very soon normal relations will be established between the United States and Soviet Russia, as well as between England and Soviet Russia, in spite of the divergencies of the respective régimes."[35] Secretary Colby's note is considered important as emphasizing the fact that no new government will receive

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[31] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 11, 1920, 2.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 472.
[35] *Ibid.*

recognition, from the United States, which ignores the international obligations of the state it pretends to represent.[36] This position was later elucidated by Secretary Hughes with great clearness, in his various statements concerning the Russian policy.

The policy of opposing the dismemberment of Russia expressed by Secretary Colby had already been adopted by America at the Peace Conference of 1919. The peoples occupying Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan possess each a unity of race, language, and blood which give them in more or less degree the character of district nationalities. The respective people had aspirations to be free, and independent states. Yet the United States has refused to recognize the rights of these inhabitants to determine for themselves the sovereignty under which they should live. America, however, declared for a "Great Russia" including the vast areas of the old Empire, excepting the territory of the resurrected Poland, and that of the Finnish Republic.[37] The anti-communist and liberal Russians who are interested in forming a Russian régime along the lines of the western democracies were gratified at the position taken by Secretary Colby. His position refusing to sanction the annexation of Bessarabia by Roumania is approved.[38] Their organ the "Volia Russii" (The Will of Russia) said in approval "Once more the voice of the great American Democracy has been raised about two months ago in defense of Russia." Hopes were entertained that Wilson's successor would equally serve Russia. The Russian Colony in London opposed any move to recognize the Bolshevist régime as the best means of weakening them. The American policy of addressing the Russian people, and opposing dismemberment was commended.[39]

In October 1920 Evan E. Young, American commissioner for the Baltic provinces at Riga, reported that a group of Pacific coast capitalists had received extensive concessions in northeastern Siberia. These concessions were believed to cover an

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[36] Hyde, C. C. International Law, Vol. 1, 74.
[37] Lansing, R. The Peace Negotiations, 99, 100.
[38] Bulletin of Russian Information Bureau, Dec. 4, 1920, 4.
[39] *Ibid.*, 5.

area of 400,000 square miles, the purpose being to exploit the mineral, oil, and fishery resources. Mr. Washington D. Vanderlip, who represented the western syndicate, was supposed to have made representations to Lenin at Moscow advising Lenin that he represented Senator Harding, and was authorized to make proposals regarding recognition. Senator Harding, then the Republican candidate for the Presidency, upon receiving news of the negotiations made a flat denial of any association with Vanderlip or Russia.[40] The rumor of these concessions was the occasion for the State Department to explain anew our attitude towards Russia. Secretary Colby issued a warning that "the Government of the United States has never recognized the Bolshevist régime. American business men and investors should bear in mind that any concessions from the Bolshevist authorities have no certainty of recognition by future Russian Governments." He stated that the Soviet régime should have no mental confusion concerning the attitude of the American Government upon "the question of political recognition, that attitude has been stated in unmistakable terms."[41] "American policy," Secretary Colby, said "has received the most careful, qualified, and explicit definition with respect to Soviet Russia."[42] The Secretary regarded the information received from Commissioner Young, and other sources, especially London, to be of serious character. The Secretary said that he felt justified in making public their import so they may be either "affirmed or repudiated."[43] Warning was given by him to such as were interested in Russian concessions. The Secretary said, "any such concessions with respect to the matter of the legality and future international standing will be wholly at the risk of the persons obtaining them."[44]

The existence of a Pacific coast syndicate organized for the purpose of exploiting Siberian resources was a known fact. The negotiations about concessions were utilized to promote

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[40] *N. Y. Times*, Oct. 27, 1920, 1.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*, 3.
[43] *Ibid.*
[44] *Ibid.*

pro-Bolshevist sentiment in America. The Soviet régime was apparently trying to create the impression that it was ready "to come to terms with foreign capitalists and do business on a large scale.[45] The reports of impending heavy orders from Russia, at this time, proved to be illusory.

President Wilson's note of January 1921 to Paul Heymans, President of the Assembly of the League, reiterated the principles enumerated by Secretary Colby. The President desired that the struggle against Bolshevism should not assume the form of an attack against the Russian nation. This position was approved by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in Paris which noted "with satisfaction the friendly policy of the United States of America towards Russia." The statement of President Wilson which elicited the above expression of approval was that no nation should be allowed to "take advantage of Russia's stricken condition, or to violate the territorial integrity of Russia, or to undertake themselves any further invasion of Russia, or to tolerate such invasions by others."[46]

President Harding in his inaugural address on March 4, 1921, refrained from mentioning anything directly or openly about the Russian question, and communistic activities in America. However, certain portions of his speech conveyed a decided implication against any doctrines of violence such as had been urged by the Soviet. He said "I wish for an America no less alert in guarding against dangers from within than it is watchful against enemies from without. Our fundamental law recognizes no class, no group, no section. There must be none in legislation, or administration. The supreme inspiration is the commonweal."[47] The advocates of revolution received no encouragement from him. He said, "If revolution insists upon over-

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[45] *N. Y. Times*, October 27, 1920, 3. The Soviet Bureau in New York professed to have received communications from Tchitcherin that confirmed grants whereby the syndicate would become the fiscal agent of the Soviets in America. The syndicate would finance purchases to the amount of $500,000,000 made through the Russian Bureau. The syndicate was, however, to be required to recognize Soviet sovereignty, and the laws regarding the protection of labor, and the democratic management of industry. A reasonable profit was to be permitted.

[46] Bulletin Russian Information Bureau, Feb. 5, 1921, 3.

[47] *N. Y. Times*, March 5, 1921, 4. President Harding's inaugural address as reported.

turning established order, let other peoples make the tragic experiment. There is no place for it in America. When world war threatened civilization we pledged our resources and our lives to its preservation, and when revolution threatens, we unfurl the flag of law and renew our consecration." The President emphasized the fact that "ours is a constitutional freedom, where the popular will is the law supreme and minorities are sacredly protected. Our revisions, reformations, and revolution reflect a deliberate judgment and an orderly progress, and we mean to cure our ills, but never destroy or permit destruction by force."[48]

With the inauguration of the Harding Administration Mr. Hughes began his distinguished services as Secretary of State. He is credited with having formulated the Russian policy of the Harding Administration. This policy differed in no respect from that of the preceding Administration, but was given a definiteness, and pronounced character, by the Secretary's various statements of policy, that left no doubts as to the reasons for the attitude pursued by the Harding Administration in regard to Soviet Russia. These definite statements of policy were usually made in response to some suggestion, or request for information relative to Russia by various societies and associations interested in the Russian question. American correspondence with the Soviet régime never was at any time so voluminous as in the case of certain European nations which accorded de jure recognition to the Moscow Government. Such communications as were made were contingent upon the receipt by the State Department of inquiries, usually short, made by Soviet officials regarding recognition, or that proposed the resumption of commercial relations.* A consideration of the correspondence of leading European nations with the Russian Government is considered in another part of this work.

With the advent of Harding the Soviet authorities thought the occasion propitious to sound the new Administration on the question of the renewal of relationships. Tchitcherin accord-

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[48] *N. Y. Times*, March 5, 1921, 4.

*See Chapter on English and French relations with Russia for the correspondence concerning Russia.

ingly in March 1921 sent a note that proposed to the United States the resumption of commercial relations. The Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs indicated what he regarded as the advantages to be obtained from such relationships especially in the way of exchanging Russian raw-materials for Amercan manufactured products. The reply of Secretary Hughes, on March 25, 1921, to these overtures showed that the spirit of the Wilson Russian policy remained unaltered. The Secretary refused the overtures to resume commercial relations with Soviet Russia. America he acknowledged was deeply interested in the Russian situation and would do what it could to restore conditions wherein commerce might be established. But, he conceived it "is manifest to this Government that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade as the supplies which Russia might be able to obtain would be wholly inadequate to meet her needs, and no lasting good can result so long as the present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate." He showed that the economic bases of production are dependent upon: (1) the safety of life; (2) the recognition by firm guarantee of private property; (3) the sanctity of contract; and (4) the rights of free labor, and that until these essential conditions were fulfilled, America was unable "to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations."[49] The Soviet Government has subsequently altered somewhat its communistic conceptions regarding property. These changes, however, thus far have proven ineffectual to modify the attitude of the State Department.[50]

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[49] Pamphlet Foreign Policy Association, No. 12, 2, 3. Contains Hughes' note of March 25, 1921. Tchitcherin's note is discussed in another connection.

[50] *Ibid.*, The question arises whether Russia has done anything to meet these four conditions. In regard to safety of life the Central Executive Committee issued a decree on February 8, 1922, which abolished the Che-ka, a special bureau with wide powers of detention, trial and execution. Its functions were transferred to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs. This Commissariat now supervises the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, banditry, espionage, protecting of railways and waterways, and the protection of the boundaries against illegal entry. No person can be arrested or seizures, or searches made without permission from the chairman of each political department. In case of arrest the person must be granted a trial, or freed within two months, unless the period of isolation is extended by the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee. In regard to firm guarantees of private property; the sanctity of contract; and the rights of labor the Associated Press on May

In September 1921 the Far Eastern Republic requested permission to be represented at the Armament Conference to be held in Washington in the month of November of the above year. Secretary Hughes stated in reply that since this Government was not recognized by America no formal answer could be given. That in the absence of Russian recognition their interests would "devolve as a moral trusteeship upon the whole Conference." That the Conference was sorry to be deprived of the advantages of Russian co-operation. That it would take no "decision prejudicial to legitimate Russian interests or which would in any manner, violate Russian rights." That the Government of the United States hopes that the Conference will take steps that will meet the approval of the people of Eastern Siberia and of "all Russia by reason of their justice and efficacy in the settlement of outstanding difficulties." It was understood that America would insist upon the territorial inviolability of Russian possessions, and the maintenance of

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22, 1922, reported the following Russian measures: The removal of the state monopoly on implements and seeds. These commodities could be purchased abroad with the permission of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Inheritance "by husbands or wives and direct descendants" was permitted to the amount of 5,000 gold rubles. The Petrograd municipality had decided to hand over small dwellings to the owners.

In a communication to the British, French, and Italian Governments at Genoa the Soviet Government summarized the measures taken in regard to labor. The laborers were now asserted to be freed from state mobilization. They were now privileged to select their own employment. The Soviet Government also guaranteed more completely the rights of citizens to retain their dwellings. In regard to foreign concessions it was decided that "the property of those holding concessions in Russia" shall be exempt from "any sort of nationalization, requisition, or confiscation."

Congressman James A. Friar, returning from an extended trip of observation in Russia, was impressed with the evident tendency towards resumption of private property. In the city of Kazan "one thousand, six hundred and eighty-nine industries, large and small were in operation, while of 995 stores doing business, 74 were government owned, and 56 co-operatives, all others were individually owned disproving at the outset a popular fallacy that all business is operated by the government." Cong. Record, Dec. 13, 1923, 2.

Congressman Friar also pointed out that "to the objection urged with communist leaders that this form of government does not recognize or respect rights to acquire and hold property as do other governments, they replied that many private interests were doing business for profit in every city in Russia. Ninety per cent of all small business places in Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities apparently are in private hands. Statistics gathered in some of these places, I believe, will verify the general statement. Large business interests like oil, coal, sugar, steel, banking, and other industries have been nationalized and property confiscated by the Government." Cong. Record, Dec. 13, 1923, 10.

the open door principle. These propositions were subsequently emphatically supported in the Conference by the United States.

A disastrous Russian famine occurred during the spring and summer of 1921. The famine situation presented a concrete occasion to America to demonstrate that friendly interest in the welfare of the Russian people so eloquently expressed by the Presidents, and Secretaries of State in their various protestations of a sincere friendship for the Russian people. Thus while no according political recognition to the Soviet Government the Administration hastened to answer the call for humanitarian service.[51]

The most active relief was rendered by the American Relief Organization. This organization, after the war, was instrumental in saving the lives of 2,000,000 undernourished children in the Baltic States, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary. It had therefore acquired much valuable experience that could be utilized in mitigating the famine conditions in Russia. Secretary Hoover, a member of Harding's cabinet, ably directed the relief work. When it was decided to extend operations to Russia, it was essential to secure the necessary permission from the Soviet authorities. The necessary power was secured by the agreement signed August 20, 1921, whereby transportation facilities, necessary premises, and other essentials were placed at the disposal of the Relief Organization.[52] The plan was to feed each child food amounting to 800 calories. The extent and growth of the organization's activities is shown by the following figures. By November 1, 1921, 202,000 children were being fed, and one month later the number reached 750,000. The limit set was 1,200,000 children by January 1922. Before the end of 1921, 35,000 tons of food had been sent from America to Russia. It now became imperative to feed the adult population.[53]

By December 6, 1921 the American Relief Organization had received 1,265 carloads of supplies from America. The Bolshevist Relief Committee also furnished 674 carloads, which showed

[51] *N. Y. Times*, September 20, 1921, 19.
[52] Miliukov, Paul N. Russia Today and Tomorrow, 250.
[53] *Ibid*, 251.

that the Soviet Government was making considerable effort to relieve the famine sufferers. However, the Americans were the most instrumental in rendering relief to the stricken populations.[54] The activities of the seventy-five Americans engaged in this work of humanity, has won the friendship of the Russian masses such as no other method could have achieved. Even the lawless and bandit elements, which usually arise in famine-stricken nations, respected the work of the relief workers, nor are there any reports of robberies of any of the organization's supplies.[55]

President Harding, in his annual message of December 6, 1921, made a genuine appeal to Congress to relieve the distressed conditions prevailing in the famine section along the Volga. He recommended the immediate appropriation of the necessary funds whereby the American Relief Administration could buy 10,000,000 bushels of corn and 1,000,000 bushels of seed grains. These purchases were to be used to stem the famine and supply seed where the seed grain was consumed to ward off starvation. The President said "We do not recognize the Government of Russia, nor tolerate the propaganda which emanates therefrom, but we do not forget the tradition of Russian friendship."[56] Governor James P. Goodrich, of Indiana, recommended that the appropriations must be doubled to relieve the situation. He advised that 20,000,000 bushels of corn, and 5,000,000 bushels of wheat be sent to Russia. Congress appropriated $20,000,000 on December 24, 1921, to cover the necessary purchases. Secretary Hoover had now all the supplies which he was able to ship from America to the famine area for a period covering six months. The success of the enterprise depended much upon the capacity

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[54] Miliukov, Paul N. Russia Today and Tomorrow, 257.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *N. Y. Times*, December 7, 1921, 7, 8. Message as reported. Many Soviet officials, especially Litvinov, ridiculed American efforts at relieving the famine suffering. Americans were regarded as sentimentalists, or probably her efforts at relief were dictated by some ulterior motive. The situation was urgent and demanded immediate attention. It was only the character of this urgency which induced the Soviet officials to sign the necessary agreements. These authorized the American Relief Commission to commence its service of humanity. However throughout American motives were suspected. Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies Soviet Russia, 454.

of the Russian railroads to carry the consignments to the famine area.[57]

The theory of the relief work from the beginning was that it was being conducted as a private enterprise despite the fact that the president of the relief commission happened to be one of President Harding's most prominent cabinet members. This was probably more than a coincidence. The private supplies soon began to diminish and became insufficient. Large amounts of medical and other supplies accumulated by the war were turned over to the Relief Organization, in addition to the funds voted by Congress. All this work was done necessarily in conjunction with Russian officials, who served the Russian interests, yet no formal recognition of any kind was extended to the Communist Government.[58]

The next incident which prompted a statement from Secretary Hughes about America's Russian policy occurred in the spring of 1922. At this time a delegation from the Women's International League for Peace paid a visit to Secretary Hughes and urged the recognition of Soviet Russia as a step in the direction of restoring normal political and economic relations throughout the world. Secretary Hughes, in reply to the delegation's suggestion, acknowledged our important concern for the welfare of Russia. The Secretary said that America was deeply interested in the "full restoration of the economic powers of the Russian people, and for their well being in every way." The rule of abstention from internal interference is held in America. However, its application was complicated "by the organized efforts of the Soviet régime to interfere with domestic affairs of other people." About the probabilities of trade resumption there has been much misapprehension, as the legal obstacles to such trade have been removed. Secretary Hughes said, "The obstacles that exist to trade with Russia are due to the situation in Russia, which is in the control of those who dominate the affairs in Russia."[59] Productivity was again

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[57] Miliukov, Paul N. Russia Today and Tomorrow, 251.
[58] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, March, 1923, 14, 15.
[59] *N. Y. Times*, May 2, 1922, 1.

emphasized as the basis of credit. "This basis which Russia so badly needs cannot," said Hughes, "'be supplied from without', but must come from the inside of Russia."[60] In regard to the recommendation that America grant recognition to Russia, Secretary Hughes said that "Political recognition is dependent upon the existence of a Government that is competent to discharge, and shows a disposition to discharge international obligation. The whole matter is in the hands of those who dominate the affairs of Russia. We are most desirous to do what we can to aid in Russia's recuperation, but they must establish the basis for such recuperation."[61]

During the course of an address, in May, 1922, to the Chamber of Commerce in Washington, Secretary Hughes reaffirmed our position in refusing to accord international intercourse to certain nations (presumably referring to Mexico and Russia). The reasons for the abstention of such intercourse were set forth with a clarity that left no doubt concerning the American position. In regard to the resumption of diplomatic intercourse and the duties following from it, he said, "International relations proceed upon the postulates of international morality, and the most important principle to be maintained at this time with respect to international relations is that no state is entitled to a place within the family of nations if it destroys the foundation of honorable intercourse by resorting to confiscation and repudiation and fails to maintain an adequate system of Government through which valid rights and valid engagements are recognized and enforced."[62]

Concerning the requirements and obligations incidental to acceptance into international fellowship, Secretary Hughes said, alluding to the unmentioned nations, that "if they seek international intercourse they must perform international obligations, when they have invited intercourse with other nations, have established their laws under which contracts have been made, and property rights validly acquired, they put themselves outside the pale of international intercourse if they

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[60] *N. Y. Times*, May 2, 1922, 1. Secretary Hughes quoted.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid*, May 19, 1922, 4.

enter upon a policy of confiscation." Secretary Hughes held to the doctrine of the power of a state over its own policies. He said "nations may adopt what policies they please for the future conduct of their local affairs, and if these policies are not enlightened the result will inevitably be that production will languish and trade will shrivel up, and they will look in vain for security and confidence; still they will be within their rights in determining their future policy in local matters."[63]

In August, 1922, a report was circulated that a New York corporation had negotiated a trade agreement with L. Krassin aiming at the exploitation of the petroleum resources of the Baku region. The State Department upon receiving this report, made known that its position was identical with the position taken by the Hague court. The court refused to consider valid any commissions of Soviet Russia to entrepreneurs which involved confiscated property rights acquired by the nationals of other nations, during preceding régimes. The State Department assumed that other nations would refuse to recognize similar concessions.[64] It said that "the Government of the United States does not countenance any arrangements by its citizens with the Soviet authorities that would jeopardize or prejudice the vested rights of the citizens of other countries in Russia, and that the United States has complete confidence that the other Governments concerned will adhere to the same policy."[65]

The American Ambassador to Germany, Mr. Houghton, was a careful student of Russian developments. In a communication to the Department in August, 1922, he recommended the advisability of selecting a commission to study Russia's internal condition with the purpose of observing her economic conditions. This commission was to consist entirely of technical experts. Secretary Hughes approved the idea of appointing a commission to study conditions in Russia. Such an investigation would serve to clarify the atmosphere regarding many phases of the Russian muddle and could do no harm. Earlier

[63] *N. Y. Times*, May, 2, 1922, 1.
[64] *Ibid.*, August 9, 1922, 20.
[65] *Ibid.*

in the spring when the United States was invited to attend the Genoa Conference, Secretary Hughes replied that America "views with the most eager and friendly interest every step taken towards the restoration of economic conditions which will permit Russia to regain her productive power, but these conditions, in the view of this Government, cannot be secured until adequate action is taken on the part of those chiefly responsible for Russia's present economic disorder."[66]

In response to the invitation to participate in the Hague Conference, to be held sometime in the summer of 1922 after the Genoa Conference had finished its work, Secretary Hughes still further expressed the Department's views regarding the industrial rehabilitation of Russia. He said, "the inescapable and ultimate question would appear to be the restoration of productivity in Russia, the essential conditions of which are still to be secured and must in the nature of things be provided within Russia herself." That no political significance could be attached to the appointment of such a commission as was advised by the Ambassador to Germany was made clear by the declaration that "such an inquiry would appropriately deal with economic prerequisites of that restoration of production in Russia, without which there would appear to be lacking any sound basis for credits.[67] The Department of State thus by definitive announcement, warned against interpreting its interest in Russia's economics recuperation as a first step in a policy leading to eventual recognition.

President Harding in his annual message to Congress on December 8, 1922, referred to the responsibilities associated with the privileges of American citizenship, and the means of discharging such obligations. The President said "there is a call to make the alien respect our institutions while he accepts our hospitality. There is need to magnify the American viewpoint to the alien who seeks a citizenship among us. There is need to magnify the national viewpoint to Americans throughout the land. More, there is a demand for every living being in the United States to respect and abide by the laws of the republic."[68]

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[66] *N. Y. Times*, August 31, 1922, 3.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*, December 9, 1922, 6.

The message did not refer to any particular party, and was a positive warning to agitators. It was a statement of the essential qualities that America desired in her citizens.

The next pronounced exposition of our Russian policy, was made by Secretary Hughes on March 21, 1923, when a delegation of the Women's International League for Peace paid the Secretary a second visit in the interests of Russian recognition. The League's spokeswoman referred to Secretary Hughes' statement made to the League in May 1922. The Secretary's statements that the security of life, the guarantee of private property, the sacredness of contracts, and the rights of free labor, labor, should be the conditioning factors in extending recognition to a state, were recalled. It was also stated, in urging the League's proposition, that there was considerable evidence available that the Soviet régime was qualified to conduct international relations.[69]

Secretary Hughes' answer to the League's suggestions was a notable exposition of America's attitude towards Soviet Russia. He referred to America's sincere wish to see Russia restored, and once more in a peaceful condition. He regarded the problem as far deeper than charity. The Secretary said "It is an economic problem and humanitarian interests, however keen they may be, cannot escape the underlying and controlling fact." He depreciated the efficacy of intervention since the Russians must develop their own institutions. He said "The salvation of Russia cannot be contrived outside and infected Russia's hope lies in Russia's action."[70] The principle basis for recognition of a Government is "whether it shows ability and a disposition to discharge international obligations." Stability is considered less important as even a stable Government might pursue a "policy of repudiation and confiscation." Good faith is essential for "of what avail is it to speak of assurances if valid obligations and rights are repudiated and property is confiscated."[71]

Secretary Hughes continued his answer to the League by

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[69] *N. Y. Times*, March 22, 1923.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] *Ibid.*, 2, and *Amer. Jl.*, Vol. 17, 297.

referring to the fact that America was the first nation to accord recognition to the Kerensky Government. A sum of about $187,000,000 was loaned to it. The Soviet régime, upon accession to power, decreed on January 21, 1918, that "Unconditionally, and without exceptions all foreign loans are annulled." The loan to Kerensky's Government was made from the proceeds of Liberty bond sales. America has no desire to be a "harsh creditor," but she expects the loan to be repaid.[72] Secretary Hughes continuing said "Not only would it be a mistaken policy to give encouragement to repudiation and confiscation, but it is also important to remember that there should be no encouragement to those efforts of the Soviet authorities to visit upon other peoples the disasters that have overwhelmed the Russian people."[73]

President Gompers in a letter to Secretary Hughes, on July 9, 1923, reviewed the arguments favoring recognition. He took into account the reports of improved economics and agricultural conditions, and the recommendation that on account of these conditions Russia should be recognized. The American Federation of Labor declared its opposition to recognizing Russia, while an autocracy was forced upon the people against their consent and maintained in like manner. President Gompers believed that improved economic conditions, and a desire to recognize financial obligations, was not an absolute reason for granting recognition. Recognition should not be given so long as the principles of tyranny remained unchanged.[74] He said, "there is here an unchanging position upon which, if I see the matter rightly, we are bound to hold without abatement, because of our very faith in democracy, and because of our determination that freedom is the heritage of every human being, the denial of which we cannot look upon anywhere with complacency."[75]

America before granting recognition to a new government likes to know that such government is upheld by popular approval. When any people submit for a long time, to any government, such submission is regarded as constituting an act

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[72] *N. Y. Times*, March 22, 1923, 2, also see Department of State Press Release, March 21.
[73] *Ibid.*, and *Amer. Jl.*, 1923, 1, 3. Vol. 17, 297.
[74] American Federationist, Vol., 31, 83, 84.

of popular approval. Secretary Hughes, in this respect, said "When there is a question as to the will of the foreign nation it has generally been regarded as a wise precaution to give sufficient time to enable a new régime to prove its stability and the apparent acquiescence of the people in the exercise of the authority it has assumed." This is a plain statement that governments subversive of the people's rights are not likely to receive the hand of fellowship from the United States.[75]

Americans who have suffered property losses of any kind from confiscation, remain without the prospect of indemnification. The confiscatory policy is by no means ended, for the evidence showed that with the extension of Moscow's power to Vladivostok the same measures were introduced as were used in Western Russia in 1917 and 1918.[77] Secretary Hughes said, regarding matters of international etiquette and respect, that "respect by the Moscow régime forthe liberties of other peoples will most likely be accompanied by appropriate respect for the essential rights and liberties of the Russian people themselves."[78]

While a régime may be firmly established and stable, receiving the acquiescence of the people, yet there remain other factors to be considered. In connection with these essential factors Secretary Hughes said, "Recognition is an invitation to intercourse" whereby the new government promises to discharge certain "obligations of intercourse." These include the protection of persons and property of persons doing lawful business in Russia and the "abstention from hostile propaganda by one nation in another nation's territory. American citizens in Russia were declared "for the moment free from harm," but "no assurance exists, however, against a repetition of the arbitrary detentions which some of them have suffered in the past.[79] The Soviet authorities contended that the remarks of Soviet officials expressed the opinions of individuals and not of the Moscow régime. In answer to this position, Secretary

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[75] American Federationist, Vol. 31, 83, 84.
[76] *Ibid.*, 85.
[77] *Ibid.*, 86.
[78] *Ibid*, 87.
[79] *N. Y. Times*, July 23, 1923, 3. Hughes' Letter to Gompers.

Hughes said, "We are unable, however, to find any reason for separating the régime and its purpose from those who animate it and control it, and direct it so as to further their aims."[80]

The Secretary, in discussing the spirit of disorder in Russia said, "While this spirit of destruction at home and abroad remains unaltered the question of recognition by our Government of the authorities at Moscow cannot be determined by mere economic considerations or by the establishment in some degree of a more prosperous condition, which, of course, we should be glad to note, or simply by the probable stability of the régime in question. There can be no intercourse among nations any more than among individuals except upon a general assumption of good faith." Continuing, the Secretary said, "the sentiment of our people is not deemed to be favorable to the acceptance into political fellowship of this régime so long as it denies the essential bases of intercourse, and cherishes, as an ultimate and definite aim, the destruction of the free institutions which we have laboriously built up containing as they do the necessary assurance of the freedom of labor upon which our propsperity most depends."[81] The Secretary thus dispels any misapprehension that might have existed concerning America's official attitude towards Russia.

President Harding in a speech prepared to be delivered in San Francisco said concerning matters of international intercourse that "International good faith forbids any sort of sanction of the Bolshevist policy. The property of American citizens in Russia, honestly acquired under the laws then existing has been taken without the color of compensation, without process of law, by the mere emission of countless decrees. Such a policy challenges the very groundwork of righteous intercourse among peoples and renders useless the basis of good faith everywhere in the world."[82]

President Coolidge during the course of his December message in 1923 reviews the salient facts of Russo-American relations, and acknowledged the "present notable difficulties" in these

[80] *N. Y. Times*, July 23, 1923, 3. Also published by the Department of State.
[81] *Ibid.*, Hughes' letter to Gompers.
[82] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 453.
This speech was never delivered due to President Harding's death.

relations. He cited the traditional American friendship with Russia, and referred to the efforts of American charitable organizations as evidence of a friendly disposition towards the Russian people. He said, "Our Government has no objection to the carrying on of commerce by our citizens with the people of Russia." Discussing the conditions essential to the resumption of relations he said, "Our Government does not propose, however, to enter into relations with another régime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations."[83] The President was unwilling to sacrifice "American principles" and the "cherished rights of humanity" for any commercial consideration to result from the resumption of relationships. The President was willing to help the people of Russia, who are revealing signs of returning to the "ancient ways of society."[84]

The President concluded his argumentation on Russia by the following statement of policy. He said "whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our citizens who were despoiled and to recognize that debt contracted with our Government, not by the Czar, but by the newly formed Republic of Russia; whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there appear works meet for repentance our country ought to be the first to go to the economic and moral rescue of Russia. We have every desire to help and no desire to injure. We hope the time is near at hand when we can act."[85] The loans having been made from a capitalist government the Soviet régime considered themselves justified in repudiating the debts.[86]

The United States apparently does not expect Soviet Russia to recognize the debt in full as a prerequisite to resuming relations. In regard to payment of the debt America desires that the debt be recognized in principle thereby giving intention, and evidence of good faith in international matters. American maintains the same attitude in regard to confiscated property. The Government of the United States does not insist upon full payment as a prerequisite, but it insists upon the payment by

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[83] *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 7, 1923, 4. Text of message as reported.
[84] *Ibid.*
[85] *Ibid.*
[86] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 73.

the Soviet Government of property seized, where the actual restoration of the property is impossible.[87]

In a communication to President Coolidge Tchitcherin pleads for the "resumption of friendly relations with the United S5ates of America based upon mutual trust," and a desire to adjust "differences between the countries."[88] The President instructed Secretary Hughes to reply to Tchitcherin's overtures for recognition. In reply Secretary Hughes said that there is "no reason for negotiation," and restated the President's conviction that the "American Government" has no intentions "to barter away its principles." The restoration of confiscated property and the revocation of the annulment decrees can be accomplished by the Soviet without negotiations. The Moscow efforts to overthrow our institutions must cease before negotiations are possible.[89] Secretary Hughes showed that at the time of the Tchitcherin overtures, G. Zinovief through the Pravda addressed American communists. He advised them to eliminate Gompers, and to establish "special mass newspapers" to be read by "hundreds and hundreds of thousands." The small farmer was to be converted and the "creation of the Labor-Farmers' Party" was commended.[90]

During the presidential campaign it was rumored that if the Republican Party was successful the President would alter his Russian policy. Upon receiving the report the President denied its contents, and announced that the policy stated in the December message remained unchanged. Before recognition will be considered Soviet Russia must meet three conditions:

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[87] Annals, Vol. 114, 73–74. Chapter 2 of the Soviet Constitution says concerning the Czarist debts "The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets regards the law repudiating the debts contracted by the Tsar, the landlords, and the bourgeoisie, as a first blow at international financial capitalism; and it expressed its entire confidence that the Soviet government will continue firmly in this direction, until the international revolt of the workers against the yoke of capitalism shall have secured a complete victory." *Annals*, Vol. 114, p. 73.

[88] *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 17, 1923, p. 6. Text Tchitcherin's note. The note expresses a desire by the Soviet régime for America's friendship. They desire to enter upon negotiations "based upon the principle of mutual non-intervention in internal affairs." Concerning claims he is willing to discuss these "on the assumption that the principle of reciprocity will be recognized all around." The Soviet's régime desires friendship witn America but not in a manner unworthy of their dignity. *Ibid.*

[89] *N. Y. Times*, Dec. 19, 1923, 1.

first, the recognition of Russian obligations to America; second, restoration and indemnification of Americans who have suffered property losses; and third, the cessation of propaganda. Recognition was professed to be more remote than before since indications existed that the Soviet régime was becoming increasingly more radical. Tchitcherin, later on, claimed that Soviet Russia had approached America about a debt settlement, and referred to the Anglo-Russian accord to indicate that beneficial agreements could be concluded with Soviet Russia.[92]

The announcement of the selection of Ambassador Kellogg to succeed Mr. Hughes was interpreted by many to imply that the President desired to pursue a more independent policy. It was alleged that with the change in the attitude maintained towards Soviet Russia, in accordance with plans advocated by Senator Borah favoring recognition. The White House denied that any change of policy had occurred as a result of changing secretaries. The policies inaugurated by Secretary Hughes were to guide the conduct of the next Administration. These policies expressed the sentiments of President Coolidge, who was convinced that an alteration in communistic principles must occur before relations can be resumed.[93] After the inauguration of the new Administration Secretary Kellogg sent communications to members of the American diplomatic corps advising them that no change of attitude regarding Russia had taken place in Washington.[94]

During the late summer of 1925 the State Department was confronted with a perplexing problem. Mr. Saklatvala, a communist member of the British Parliament, expressed his intentions to visit Washington, as a delegate to the sessions of the Interparliamentary Union to be held in that city in October 1925. The problem was complicated on account of the official connections of the party seeking entrance. There was, however, no hesitancy on the part of the Department as to what course to

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[90] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 4, 1924, 26, also Dept. of State Press Release, Jan. 3, 1924, 1, 5.
[91] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1924, 18.
[92] *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1924, 17.
[93] *Ibid.*, Jan. 14, 1925, 1.
[94] *Public Ledger*, April 22, 1925, 1.

pursue. The American Consul in London was instructed to revoke the visa granted Mr. Saklatvala, thereby cancelling his American trip. In justification of the Department's action Secretary Kellogg said, "It is the policy of this Government to exclude such persons. I do not believe in curbing free speech, nor do I believe in making this country the stamping ground for every revolutionary agitator of other countries. This is no place for them. Nobody, I believe, will object to any citizen of the United States advocating change of our form of government by legal and constitutional means, but I do not believe we should admit foreigners to this country to preach a revolutionary overthrow of government."[95] This definite stand accords with the previous statements of policy by the Department.

The Soviet assault upon the sancitity of private property was probably the main cause determining the policy adopted and pursued by every administration. It is almost certain that in future revolutions the authorities will be compelled to render an account of the private property held, if they desire to retain the respect of the external world. The debt of the Russian Government to the United States amounted to around $233,-000,000. The property owned by Americans in Russia, and seized or confiscated by the Soviet's régime, would swell the total of obligations due America to about $900,000,000. The American legal instinct requires that these obligations be paid, but if concessions are seen to be inevitable, they undoubtedly would be made in sufficient amounts.[96]

Maxim Gorky, in 1921, appealed to the American Relief Administration to enter Russia. The Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Hoover, accepted the invitation whereupon it was difficult for the communists to believe that America was actuated by no ulterior political motive. When this became apparent the communists were unable to understand why America refused Russia's hand when by accepting America could relieve the economic distress seeing she was willing to feed and clothe the hungry. The Russians believed that recognition should appeal to the

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[95] *Public Ledger* Sept. 17, 1925, 1.
[96] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 457.

imaginative characteristics of the Americans. They were convinced that such recognition would immediately confer immense benefits upon America both financially and industrially. Why America refused recognition was an enigma to the Soviet régime.[97]

The position and attitude of the United States presented a peculiar problem. As the wealthiest of the capitalistic states she formed precisely the kind of state which the communists consider it their primary function to destroy according to the sacred principles of Bolshevism. Another factor of great consequence, however, presented itself. America was the only nation rich enough to provide the capital Russia urgently needed for her economic rehabilitation, hence America's favor must be carefully cultivated.[98] America, during the famine period, had shown herself most generous in relieving distress. Yet America, which had no particular quarrel with Russia, such as existed between England, France and Russia due to Russia having broken the alliance, consistently refused to accord recognition to Russia, or to deal with her save in dispensing charity. The hopes held out to Russia by the Bullitt mission were soon dissipated. Mr. Hughes in inviting the nations to the Armament Conference where questions pertaining to the Far East and the Pacific were to be discussed failed to invite Russia disregarding the fact that Russia constitutes one of the Pacific powers.[99] Col. Haskell explains why the Soviet régime is so desirous of American recognition. He said, "It is because we have got the money and they know it. They may have wide-open relations with Germany. They have got now a German Ambassador in Moscow, and there is a Russian Ambassador in Berlin. But Germany has no money. Germany can not help them in the way of capital, and they are afraid of Germany. They are not afraid of Americans."[100]

Secretary Hughes' powerful advocacy of private property rights has evidently produced some results. Gov. Goodrich,

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[97] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 142.
[98] *Ibid.*, 143.
[99] *Ibid.*, 141.
[100] Russia The Obscure, 17. Pamphlet Foreign Policy Association.

of Indiana, visited Soviet Russia, and studied their property laws. He said "Whatever else is said, there can be no doubt that the law indicates a most important reversal of policy and shows a willingness on the part of the government to face the facts and break away from the domination of mere phrases. In view of the fact that the peasant today constitutes at least eighty-five per cent of Russia, it is most significant that a communist government dominated by the workers, as it is, should make concessions of such far reaching importance as to restore private property to the peasant in everything but the legal title to land with free trade, and appeal to individualistic and capitalistic sentiment by guaranteeing to everyone and to his children after him, the possession of a particular piece of land. It is a most striking proof of the rapid evolution of the communist government towards capitalism."[101] The Bolshevist leaders said before the Genoa Conference that the concessions to capitalism were over. They declared that there would be "no further surrender to capitalism." However while these declarations were being made the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet Congress were enacting laws designed to protect convicts, make restitution of property, regulate increased inheritances, grant continuous possession of land and erect a judicial system to enforce enacted laws.[102]

The proposition is frequently discussed whether the Russian monarchists, if they should regain power, would expropriate the lands now held in lease by the peasants. A survey of previous social and political eruptions would indicate the inadvisability of executing such a policy. Queen Mary was unable to restore to the monasteries lands confiscated and given away by Henry VIII. At the restoration of Louis XVIII, after the banishment of Napoleon, it was found impossible to restore the lands given the peasants to the nobility. It is thus probable, that the land disposition effected by the Bolsheviki may become permanent.[103] This, however, is an internal problem and does not effect Sec-

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[101] International Conciliation, No. 185, April 1923, 15.
[102] *Ibid.*, 28.
[103] Lowell, A. L., Public Opinion, 146

retary Hughes' position that American property seized and confiscated should be paid.

The public frequently is dissatisfied with the amount of information supplied by the State Department regarding our official attitude towards much-discussed questions. This is especially true of the attitude towards Soviet Russia. Defending the position of judicious secrecy, occasionally adopted by the Department, Secretary Hughes said, "There are complicated states of fact which cannot be understood without an intimate knowledge of historical background and a painstaking and discriminating analysis of material. There are situations of controlling importance which are wholly unknown to the general public, and which cannot be appreciated without the special information available only to officers of the Government. The people cannot judge wisely without being informed, and the problem is how to inform them."[104]

The evidence examined fully reveals the fact that the attitude of the various Administrations towards Soviet Russia has been established upon a substantial foundation of facts. It is not the result of any inexcusable or blind prejudice towards the Russian people, or any form of government which may be there established, but it is conditioned by the position which the Soviet Government has voluntarily assumed towards America. The attitude of the United States could not well have been otherwise in view of the known facts. This attitude is not a departure from America's historic policy of recognizing new governments, but a continuation and application of the same traditional policy to a new circumstance requiring the decision of the Executive. The argument that America has been inconsistent in the policy pursued towards Soviet Russia, in contrast to the policy followed in recognizing other governments past or present, is shown to have been based upon inadequate evidence, or probably dictated by other than patriotic motives.

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[104] *Amer. Jl.* of International Law, Vol. 16, 366.

VI

Congressional Attitude Towards Recognition

The congressional discussions in regard to the advisability of recognizing Soviet Russia is no new departure in American politics. Such discussion arises from the fact that the Constitution confers certain powers upon Congress, especially the Senate, relative to the disposition of foreign affairs. The Senate has always felt a peculiar sensability whenever there appeared an apparent disposition on the Executive's part to invade its privileges. Upon various occasions Senatorial initiative has been taken to advise the Executive regarding a proposed course of action. A resumé of the historic congressional attitude towards recognizing foreign nations will serve to clarify the background leading to the recent discussions over the recognition of Soviet Russia.

The first discussion in Congress under the Constitution arose in 1818 over an appropriation bill involved in the recognition of a South American power. The Executive had taken no initiative in this matter. Mr. Clay moved to appropriate $18,000 to cover the expenses of an American diplomatic representative to be accredited to the La Plata provinces. Attention was drawn to the fact that South American situation was favorable, and that recognition should no longer be withheld. He believed that whenever a sovereignty was firmly established receiving the allegiance of the people, it should be accorded recognition. No distinction was to be drawn between the sovereigns de facto and de jure where actual order was maintained and authority exercised.[1] This motion was lost by a large majority. In 1820 Clay again resumed his efforts and introduced a resolution to provide by law the necessary expenses for such agents as the President with the Senate's consent might appoint to represent the United States in South America. He maintained that the nations of South America had established

[1] *Annals* of Cong., 15 Cong, 1 sess., Vol. 2, 1468.

and were maintaining their independence and should accordingly be recognized. This resolution was carried by a narrow margin.[2] In 1821 Clay again moved that an additional sum of $18,000 be added to the General Appropriation Bill to cover the expense of diplomatic representation in South America. This motion was rejected.[3] Perceiving that his efforts favoring recognition were frustrated, Clay attempted to atone for his defeats by introducing a resolution which provided that the House "give its Constitutional support to the President of the United States, whenever he may deem it expedient to recognize the sovereignty and independence of any of the said provinces."[4]

In March 1822 President Monroe sent a special message to Congress urging the advisability of an immediate recognition of the South American states.[5] The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House to whom the message was referred on March 19th reported in favor of the expediency of recognizing the independence of the South American states regardless of the diversity in the forms of their several governments. The sentiments of the President were approved. The Committee of Ways and Means was to be instructed to provide adequate appropriations to cover the expenses of representation incident to recognition. In April a bill providing the necessary funds was passed, and was approved by the President in May.[6]

The next congressional comments relative to the recognition of foreign states, after the recognition of the Latin-American states, occurred in connection with efforts of Texas to have her independence acknowledged. Texas like Soviet Russia at the present maintained a body of commissioners who promoted her interests. Popular sentiment overwhelmingly favored recognition as was shown by the flood of petitions which came to Congress. Congressional discussion of the issue could no longer be postponed.[7] Henry Clay who was at this time chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate outlined

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[2] *Annals* of Cong., 16 Cong., 1 sess., 1781.
[3] *Ibid.*, 2 sess., 1071.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1081, 1091.
[5] Richardson's Messages, Vol. 2, 116, 117, 11[illegible].
[6] *Annals* of Cong., 17, 1 sess., 1382.
[7] Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 66, 149

the four possible ways whereby recognition may be conferred. These were first by treaty; second, by a law regulating commercial relations between two states; third, by sending a diplomatic agent to a nation seeking recognition; and fourth, by the Executive receiving an accredited agent from the nation desiring to have its independent status recognized. The concurrence of the Senate is required in the first and third methods as a result of its executive character, and in the second instance necessary from its legislative character. The President alone is authorized to exercise the last method. The Senate alone or even Congress itself is not competent to recognize the independent existence of a state. The initiative in acknowledging the independence of any new power remains with the President. Mr. Clay said "If in any instance, the President should be tardy, he may be quickened in the exercise of his power by the expression of the opinion or by other acts of one or both branches of Congress." In connection with his analysis of the recognizing power Mr. Clay presented a resolution that the independence of Texas should be recognized by the United States.[8]

The conclusion of the first session of the Twenty-fourth Congress found both branches highly favorable to the policy of recognizing Texas at some future time. The tendency was apparent to place the responsibility for such a move in the hands of the President. Congress was puzzled at the delay of the Administration in recognizing Texas. This was due to the insufficient nature of the credentials possessed by the Texas commissioners. The Texas Government did not very clearly reveal its de facto character hence recognition was postponed.[9]

Early in 1837 Senator Walker of Mississippi introduced a resolution that Texas ought to be recognized. He believed that Texas had established a firm government fully capable of executing the obligations incident to an independent nation. Since it was improbable that Mexico would be in a position to successfully prosecute the war against Texas he believed that

[8] Sen. Doc., 406, 24 Cong., 1 sess., 1, 2, 3.
[9] House Reports, No. 854, 24 Cong., 1 sess., also American Historical Association Reports, 1907, Vol., 2, 89. Texan Diplomatic Correspondence, pt. 1, 89, 90.
[10] Cong. Globe, Vol. 4, 83.

recognition was in order.[10] In February 1837 the discussion was continued in the House. The Howard resolution directed that the Committee on Ways and Means provide for an appropriation to cover the expenses of any agent the President might send to Texas. The necessary funds were provided by the Appropriation Bill. Congressional discussion over recognizing Texas now ceased.[11]

During the Civil War the President consistently refused to recognize the empire established by Napoleon 3rd. Maximilian was regarded as an intruder and illegal sovereign. On account of the internal situation America was unable to do anything except make ineffectual protests. The discussion taken up in Congress concerning conditions in Mexico. On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives unanimously resolved that "the Congress of the United States are unwilling by silence to have the nations of the world under the impression that they are indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now transpiring in the republic of Mexico, and that they therefore think fit to declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchial Government in America under the auspices of any European Power."[12] This resolution was referred to the Senate where it perished in the hands of the Foreign Relations Committee. The resolution, however, produced considerable anxiety in France as a change of attitude was considered imminent. Seward admitted to the American Minister at Paris that the resolution accurately reflected the sentiments of the American people. However, the United States would assume such an official attitude towards France as the Executive deemed proper. Seward reminded the Minister that such questions of policy were lodged by the Constitution in the President's hands exclusively.

This disregard by the Executive of what the House considered its prerogative caused a storm of discussion. A call was made for our diplomatic correspondence with France which Lincoln submitted in May 1864. A new resolution was presented to the

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[11] Cong. Globe, Vol. 4, 213.
[12] *Ibid*, 38 Cong., 1 sess., 1408.

House for consideration. The President was criticised for his position. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs regretted that a resolution of such a serious character should have been made the subject of diplomatic conversations. The act of the Executive which revealed the difference of opinion as regards legislative and executive competence was seriously deplored. In answer to the claim that the power of recognition is purely executive the resolution said, "This assumption is equally novel and inadmissible. No President has ever claimed such extensive authority. No Congress can ever permit its expression to pass without dissent. It is certain that the Constitution nowhere confers such authority on the President." The resolution maintained that recognition involved the concurrence of the executive and legislative departments. The previous authority of Congress was thought necessary before the President might undertake to recognize a new power or state. The resolution contended that Congress had an authoritative voice in forming America's foreign policy, and the President was constitutionally obligated to respect congressional sentiment. The discussions of foreign policy in Congress were not proper subjects for diplomatic explanation.[13] This exaggerated view of congressional competence revealed the heated atmosphere of war conditions.

In 1868 Cuba was engaged in a revolution against Spain. America concerns that had large interests were in favor that the immediate independent existence of Cuba should be recognized by the United States. Agitation favoring recognition was evident in Congress but nothing materialized. The administration itself was subjected to powerful pressure but refused to accord the coveted recognition.[14] With this exception it does not appear that Congress ever in the post-civil war period, attempted to impose its own conceptions regarding the feasibility of recognizing any aspiring new state. The Executives have apparently been free to exercise an untrammeled judgment in this respect. The various overturns in political authority that have occurred in Europe, Asia, and Latin-America were left to the discretionary

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[13] House Rep., 129, 38 Cong., 1 sess., 1.
[14] Foreign Relations, 1875, Vol. 1, 8. Grant's Message.

power of the Executive to determine what America's attitude should be in relation to the new status.

The question of recognizing Soviet Russia has again provided very considerable congressional comment. The Russian question is of such an unprecedented character that delay was considered by the Executive the most advisable expedient to adopt until desired requirements of intercourse were met. As was to be expected a question of this importance would incur the expression of congressional opinion. Efforts have again been made in the legislative chambers to influence the course of action to be adopted by the President Congress, while acquiescing in the Executive's disposition of foreign affairs, has never entirely relinquished its own claim to participation in the determination of our foreign relations. The question whether Congress can confer recognition on a nation by virtue of its law-making power over commerce is a widely controverted question. The House of Representatives by controlling appropriations may at times influence the direction of our foreign policy.[15] Senator Borah's recent efforts favoring the recognition of Soviet Russia are the latest attempt at senatorial interference with the Executive prerogative.

The congressional statements reveal a wide divergence of sentiment. This is but natural when the variegated character of the interests represented in Congress is considered. The Congressmen who favor recognition with few exceptions represent radical constituents, and merely follow the course upon which their own political fortunes depend. Others who probably are naturally more foreign than American in their viewpoint favor resumption of diplomatic intercourse with the Soviet régime. Recognition, it is also urged, should be granted since the Russian Government is one de facto, and has succeeded in restoring a remarkable degree of internal stability. These advocates would apparently subscribe to the thesis that internal stability is the only significant factor to be regarded in according recognition to a nation seeking international connections. Some doubtless, from honest conviction, based upon no particularly

[15] Lay, T. H. Foreign Service of The United States, 53, 56, 57.

careful investigation, believe that intercourse with the Bolshevist authorities should be established. Other reasons advanced in favor of recognition are that the important European nations have recognized Soviet Russia de jure, and that America would do well to emulate their example. American and European interests in the solution of the Russian confusion are thus conceived to be identical. This assumption is incorrect since Russia remains, and will probably remain always more of an European than an American problem. Russia moves within the political constitution of the European universe and her recognition by these nations was but natural. Finally the trade-argument has been much in evidence urging the renewal of relations lest the European nations absorb all the valuable Russian trade while America sleeps. The results obtained by other nations in their commercial intercourse with Russia, and the difficult restrictions placed upon foreign commerce by the Soviet authorities show clearly that this argument has received too much emphasis. The discussions on both sides have been confined to a relatively small number of Congressmen. The most exhaustive consideration of the question of recognizing Russia occurred in the Senate. An examination of these discussions shows that a decided majority were opposed to extending de jure recognition to the Soviet régime. The advocates of such recognition numbered only a few in each branch of Congress. Recently there have been indications evident that an increased number of Congressmen favor some type of trade arrangements with Russia involving no diplomatic intercourse. These are convinced that energetic action by America will result in capturing trade thought to be of very valuable proportions for the present and future. The actual facts of Russian commerce do not support this optimism. The majority of Congressmen have never expressed their conviction about Russia in Congress, and evidently acquiescence in the policy adopted by the President.

Already in 1918 the Russian policy was under consideration in the Senate. Senator Johnson desired to know what the policy was. He believed the nation was entitled to know the policy, and the reasons for maintaining American troops in northern

Russia.[16] The Senator wished more light on the policy and protested that the frequent reports regarding the downfall of Bolshevism never materialized.[17] The discussions in Congress at this time were of a particularly virulent nature in opposition to recognition. Senator Poindexter regarded Bolshevism as a close relative of Prussian militarism. He believed the leaders of the radical movement in America should be tried for treason. He said: "Their very doctrine leads to lawlessness, and when they are caught in the vengeance of the mob they cry out against it. The consequence of this lawlessness if not suppressed, will be general disorder, cold, hunger and vice. In a word, it will mean a return to primeval bestiality. The greatest responsibility that rests on the government today as a vital and component part of the war we are waging against a doctrine of lawlessness, and blood abroad is to put down with the strong hand of lawful authority the doctrine of unbridled force and lawlessness at home."[18]

Tchitcherin, on January 12, 1919, sent to the Department of State, a note and expressed the desire of the Bolshevist Government to resume normal diplomatic relations with America. He said the Soviet régime was "ready to eliminate every thing which may be an obstacle to such relationship." No answer to this overture was made by the Department. Senator Hitchcock, was chairman of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee at this time. In regard to the question of the American troops, adverted to by Tchitcherin, Senator Hitchcock, specifically replying to the Soviet Foreign Minister, stated that the troops were necessary to prevent the Germans from building submarine bases at Archangle. The way was also to be kept open for the traveling of diplomatic representatives to and from Russia. Such occupation would also prevent the arming of German and Austrian prisoners.[19] This reply, while not made in answer to Senator Johnson's questions, may be regarded as the answer of the Administration to those questions.

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[16] Cong. Rec., Dec. 12, 1918, 342. 65 Cong., Vol. 57, pt. 1, 3 sess.
[17] *Ibid.*, 345.
[18] Forum, June 1918, Vol. 59, 708.
[19] Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic, 180.

Senator Thomas referred to the fact that Russia under the Bolsheviki repudiated all debts owed the Allies, and the advance of $350,000,000 of obligations which were owed to America. The attempts of the Bolshevists to destroy and revolutionize in "a bloody pretense of universal brotherhood" were recalled.[20] Senator Sherman in analyzing the Soviet régime said: "the Bolshevists respect no obligation of civilized government. They carry their doctrine wherever they can abuse their hospitality. Whenever they sojourn they spread their poison like the guest whom you shelter under your roof who rises in the dead hour of night and places the torch to your dwelling. Their forbears were nihilists of the early days, the practical anarchists who believe all government is wrong. The period of universal destruction is their aim. They avow they will girdle the earth with fire and ruin."[21] These scathing indictments were at the time when Bolshevist propaganda in America was assuming very serious proportions.

Senator Nelson assumed a pronounced conviction in his views concerning the short duration of the Soviet régime. He believed that when the Soviet leaders were once deprived of German assistance their rule would collapse. The maintenance of the blockade and the policy of withholding recognition was intended to hasten this result. The Bolshevist régime was founded upon false economic conceptions and would not endure. The Senator said the Soviet régime was "a moral excrescence which will inevitably slough off." This prediction has thus far remained unfulfilled. He considered the Russians unqualified for democracy, and believed that a constitutional monarchy with a responsible ministry patterned after the English model would eventually supplant the Soviet régime. This result might be accomplished more speedily with Allied encouragement.[22] The inability of the Russian masses to operate successfully a democracy may be accepted as fully demonstrated by the experiences of the past decade. Senator Lenroot reviewed a speech by Lenin which outlined a program directed against the

[20] Cong. Rec., Jan. 14, 1919, 1390. 65 Cong., Vol. 57, pt. 2, 3 sess.
[21] *Ibid.*, Jan 24, 1919, 1968.
[22] *Ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1919, 1171. 65 Cong. Vol. 57, pt. 2, 3 sess.

overthrow of capitalist society. Lenin recognized that any transition from a capitalistic society based upon communistic principles would involve much difficulty. He also saw that his program demanded a dictatorship in order to conquer, destroy, and suppress what might be expected from the capitalist exploiters. The struggle would be protracted since the exploiters could not suddenly be deprived of their advantages in wealth, intelligence, and organizing capacity.[23] Senator Myers was convinced that the American attitude towards Bolshevism was too lenient. He recommended energetic measures to destroy its influence and to seek its extermination by the "iron hand of force."

At this juncture it should be noted that no evidence is available to show that the attitude of the senators in regard to Russia has been determined or even influenced by party considerations. The genuineness of their sincerity in their respective attitudes remains unquestioned. Democrats like Senator France, and Republicans like Borah favored recognition nor has the change of Administration affected an alteration in the Senators' position. Senator King still opposes de jure recognition of Soviet Russia. This was also true of Senator Lodge's position.

But to resume the issue Senator King discussed the activities of the Bolshevist bureau located in New York, and strongly advised against the proposition to recognize the Moscow régime. He submitted a resolution that the Secretary of Labor might be empowered to expel Mr. Martens and his co-laborers from the nation. Martens was deported as a result of his connection with radical organizations whose purposes were to destroy our scheme of government.

At this time the advisability of recognizing the anti-Soviet Government established at Omsk was considered. Senator King reviewed the similarities in the profession of principles by both the Governments of the United States and that of Omsk. He therefore submitted a resolution that the United States recognize the Omsk Government as the "de facto government

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[23] Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1919, 1860.

of Russia," and that all assistance possible be rendered to Omsk consistent with such recognition.[24]

Until the close of 1919 the discussions in Congress were strenuously opposed to the proposition of recognition for Moscow. America had been the scene of much propagandizing activity which was reflected in the character of congressional opinion. These sentiments were fully justified by the nature and gravity of the insidious dangers which confronted the nation in the immediate post-war period. Congressional conviction has scarcely altered in character from this period to the present, although some powerful advocates of recognition have arisen. The frequent predictions made during this time in regard to the probably short duration of the Moscow Government were doomed to disappointment. The character of Moscow's activities was the foundation upon which congressional conviction was established.

The first energetic support received by the Soviet régime in the Senate was given by Senator France. In February 1920, he introduced a resolution which recited the historic friendship that existed between America and Russia. The heroic exertions of Russia in behalf of the Allied cause were favorably mentioned. The unfriendly feelings of the Allies towards Russia during the latter stages of the war were condemned. The resolution authorized the President to instruct the Department of State to communicate with the Soviet régime and express the desire of the American people to enter into friendly relations with Russia. Among other provisions the State Department was to lift the embargo, and place no hindrances upon Moscow's obtaining credit so urgently required to restore her economic life. American troops were to be withdrawn, and damages paid due to American intervention. Russia was to be commended for having abolished the corrupt Tsarist government, and her efforts towards ordered liberty should be assisted.[25] These suggestions produced no favorable reaction in Congress. American friendship with the Tsars began during the War of 1812, and continued until the

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[24] Cong. Rec., May 23, 1919, 157. 66 Cong., Vol. 58, pt. 1, 1 sess.
[25] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1920, 3554. 66 Cong., Vol. 59, pt. 4, 3 sees.

World War. It is highly improbable that the Moscow authorities would request diplomatic relations and condition their argument upon the fact that America maintained friendly historic relations with the Tsars.

Senator King introduced a resolution intended to affect those local governments of Russia that have not been subdued by the Bolshevist power. Such as had demonstrated the ability to conduct and regulate their own affairs were to receive special treatment from the United States, until some central government might emerge that could be recognized as the true representative of Russia. Regarding such local governments the resolution said "it is the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States should recognize the de facto existence of separate local government in Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine provisionally, until such time as the relations of such countries to Russia or the other parts of Russia are determined by an All-Russian Constituent Assembly, or the authority of a federal republican government is established for the whole of Russia."[26]

Senator Myers in April 1920 in attacking Bolshevism assailed the activities of Mr. Martens the self-styled Russian Ambassador. Martens was accused of attempting to create sympathy for Bolshevism, and of disseminating propaganda intended eventually to undermine our system of government. The efforts of Martens to open negotiations with this Government were described as a maneuver to secure a better position from which communist activities might be more advantageously conducted. His activities had been previously investigated by a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. During the course of the testimony Martens, it was stated, had admitted that he was in close association with the American Communist Party, and had addressed several of their secret meetings.[27]

In December 1920 Senator King observed that in regard to recognition of any government by the United States, we have never prescribed the form or character of government a nation

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[26] Cong. Rec., March 22, 1920, 4678. 66 Cong., Vol. 59, pt. 5, 2 sess. Sen. Res., 328.

[27] *Ibid*, April 28, 1920, 6211. 66 Cong., Vol. 59, pt. 6, 2 sess.

should possess as a prerequisite to receiving our recognition. All that America desired was that each nation may enjoy peace, liberty, prosperity, and enlightened policies. Concerning America's historic policy of granting recognition to other nations he said: "We have insisted, as it was the right of this nation to do, that those with whom we have held diplomatic and official relations should observe the recognized principles of international law and that code of morals, and honor which should obtain between civilized sovereign nations." He expressed his conviction that even the Soviet Government might have been accorded recognition with all their undesirable theories of Government if they had acknowledged their obligations to other nations and to the United States

Another reason why recognition should be withheld according to Senator King was determined by the fact that America was considered the arch enemy of the principles represented by the Soviet Government. Therefore America was considered a particular object of enmity by the Russian régime. Continuing the Senator said: "A recognition of the Soviet Government of Russia would be a repudiation of our past policy and would give moral support to the bloody and brutal autocracy which is crushing the unfortunate people of Russia." Mr. Spargo was quoted as having remarked that the most important question of international policy for the incoming Administration (Harding Administration) would be its attitude towards Russia. The statement of Mr. Spargo regarding recognition of Russia was fully reciprocated by Senator King. Mr. Spargo said: "Concerning these demands I have only to say that in my judgment, anything more disastrous and more certain to lead to economic anarchy and ruin, imperiling the whole fabric of civilization, it would be difficult to conceive. That is not my opinion only, but I know it to be the conviction of the best minds of Europe, regardless of nationality or political partisanship." Senator King believed that the main purpose of Moscow was not to realize their program in America, but to destroy the political and economic systems of which America was an outstanding exponent.

After having reviewed the various reasons why the Soviet

régime was unworthy of recognition Senator King introduced a resolution opposed to recognition. It read "Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That it is the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States do not recognize the present Soviet socialist dictatorship in Russia as either a de facto or de jure government, and that the Government of the United States do not enter into political or diplomatic relations with said dictatorship or with any persons claiming authority under the same."[28]

On January 22, 1921 during the course of a running discussion in the Senate Senator France took up the issue in favor of some sort of relations with Soviet Russia. His former position was now somewhat modified. He avowed that he never favored open recognition of the Bolshevist régime. However, America might have entered the more friendly trade relations without even a de facto recognition of Russia. He believed that the Soviet Government could purchase materials from the United States, and pay for same in cash, as the agent of the Russian people. Such business trasactions need not involve America into recognizing Russia. Senator France maintained that it was the opinion of many Russians entirely out of sympathy with the communist régime, that such commercial relationship might be negotiated, and that such relations would serve to mitigate and modify the practices of Bolshevism. He also alleged that while America was waiting England was active in arranging trade relations. While British newspapers were condemning communism, and thereby influencing American sentiment, the British merchant was silently absorbing Russian trade with all their wonderful genius for trade acquisition.[29]

Senator King thought such action by American business would involve the United States Government in relationships with the Soviet régime since this régime declared that all commerce with Russia must be transacted with itself. Senator Moses opposed relations not so much on pure commercial ground as upon the fact that such relations would allow communist agitators to

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[28] Cong. Rec., Dec. 20, 1920, 567, 568. 66 Cong., 3 sess., Vol. 60, pt. 1.
[29] *Ibid.*, Jan 22, 1921, 1861, 1864. 66 Cong., 3 sess., Vol. 60, pt. 2.

enter the country and disseminate the virus of Bolshevism.[30] Senator France's allusion to the attempt of British trades to consummate a commercial agreement with Russia was correct. England at this time under the leadership of Lloyd George, was making efforts to establish commerical relations with Soviet Russia. Any senator naturally solicitious for the welfare of American commerce might easily have considered the English endeavors as a procedure to pre-empt a valuable commercial field for their exclusive benefit. Subsequent developments have demonstrated that the English expectations of an extensive Russian commerce were destined to disappointment.

On January 27, 1921, Representative Mason in the House spoke with evident approbation of the achievements of the Russian régime in such a short time. Regarding trade relations he said that the propaganda conducted in the United States directed against the "people's government in Russia" was designed to prevent America from participating in Russian trade. The accusation was advanced that American procrastination was encouraged in order that British merchants might profit The progress the Soviet régime had made in reviving popular education was warmly approved.[31] In regard to this allegation of reconstruction in Soviet Russia the recent reports of Lunacharisky, Commissar for Education, would make it appear that the program of primary education had, as a matter of fact, suffered a severe setback.

Senator Reed in April 1921, expressed himself as favorably disposed towards renewing trade relations with the Soviet régime. He accused the Secretary of State of having prohibited commercial intercourse with Russia. The reasons assigned were that Russia had no trade, and that America does not like her scheme of government. The Senator believed that with millions of men unemployed in America, and with Russia desiring American products commercial relations between the nations should be resumed at once. He also referred to the reported extensive commercial transactions occurring between England and Rus-

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[30] Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1921, 1861, 1864. 66 Cong., 3 sess., Vol. 60, pt. 2.
[31] *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1921, 2146.

sia.[32] On December 15, 1921, Senator France introduced a joint resolution which authorized the President to appoint an American commission to visit Russia and study conditions there. A Russian commission was also to to be invited to visit America for similar purposes. The object of this endeavor was to reach a common basis of understanding and adjustment of differences leading to an eventual recognition by the United States of the de facto government in Russia, and the resumption of commercial intercourse. This resolution met with severe resistance in the Senate and failed to pass.[33] On the 22nd Senator Calder evidenced an attitude in favor of close trade relations with Russia.[34] On May 15, 1922, Senator Borah submitted a resolution and requested that it might lie on the table. It read, "Resolved, That the Senate of the United States favors the recognition of the present Soviet government of Russia.[35]

The foregoing recommendations favoring the recognition of Soviet Russia in most instances strongly emphasized the commerical and other advantages to be derived from such action. At about this time Secretary Hoover discussed the prospects of trade with Russia, and the limitations to such trade that were supposed to exist. Concerning these matters he said, "During the last two years there has been no ban on any merchant sending his goods or any investor lending his savings for development of industry if he felt so inclined. No practical advantage has been taken of this situation, and the productivity and industrial machinery of Russia have continued to degenerate steadily." He said in regard to the extent of our pre-war trade with Russia that she consumed about one per cent of our annual exports or enough to keep 30,000 men employed. He contended that Russian trade never did nor ever would rise to any very important amounts.[36] These plain statements by an expert possessed of actual statistics revealed that the trade arguments for recognition during this period were not based upon substantial evidence.

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[32] Cong. Rec., April 29, 1921, 792, 793. 67 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 61, pt. 1.
[33] *Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1921, 398, 67 Cong., 2 sess, Vol. 62, pt. 1.
[34] *Ibid.*, Dec. 22, 1921, 674.
[35] *Ibid.*, May 15, 1922, 6945. 67 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 62, pt. 7.
[36] *Ibid.*, 7911, 67 Cong., 2 sess., Vol. 62, pt. 8.

Senator King in January 1921 explained the Administration's attitude in regard to the advisability of recognizing the Baltic nations carved out of old Russia. This position was "that nothing should be done which indicates a purpose upon the part of this nation to dismember Russia or to approve a policy which might be opposed to the wishes of the Russian people." Senator King declared that evidence was available to prove that supplies sent to the Allies upon the Murmansk coast had been given to the Germans. This was the reason that made necessary the expedition of American troops to Archangel.[37] He also gave a clear, forceful, and well-reasoned interpretation of the consequences involved in the recognition of any government, especially that of Russia. He said "Recognition is the assurance given to a new state that it will be permitted to hold its place and rank in the character of an independent political organism in the society of nations. If recognition were accorded Lenin's despotism, it would be retroactive and validate its crimes, usurpations and robbery. Its acts of spoliation, rapine and murder could not be challenged in our courts."[38] Later in the year he favored the plan of rendering every possible relief to the famine sufferers. Such assistance could be rendered without recognizing the Soviet régime either de facto or de jure "a brutal, murderous force which announces its purpose to destroy this and all other governments." He also opposed the proposition of advancing funds to Russia, as advocated by Senator France. The repudiation policy and the experiences of France and other nations were recalled as valuable object lessons for America.[39]

Senator Borah now emerged as the greatest, most persistent and eloquent proponent of recognizing Soviet Russia. His singular position at present as chairman of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate lends a peculiar importance to his utterances. On February 21, 1923, he made the most carefully reasoned plea for recognition thus far advanced in the Senate. He adverted to the fact that the United States with all

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[37] Cong. Rec., Jan. 29, 1921, 2200 2201. 66 Cong., 3 sess, Vol. 60, pt. 3.
[38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1921, 2221., 66 Cong, 3 sess., Vol. 60, pt. 3.
[39] *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1921, 4855. 67 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 61, pt. 5.

its possessions included an area somewhat less than half that of Russia which was considered an outlaw among the nations. Such a condition of affairs was unhealthful and if any possible way existed whereby it might be avoided it was our duty in the name of peace and the restoration of sane economic conditions to Europe to adopt such a course. He conceived that it was a dangerous menace to world peace that a "vast people" with unlimited natural resources and a great future were outlawed. Prior to the war Russia consisted of about one-sixth the total land surface of the earth and contained the greatest reserve of undeveloped resources in existence.[40] In regard to the Soviet form of government, he said, "So far, therefore, as the government from an internal standpoint is concerned, outside of the relationship which it may have with the governments of the earth in its foreign affairs, it is not the slightest concern of the people of the United States, or to the Government of the United States what kind of a government it is." According to Senator Borah the controlling factor that should govern our Government's stand was the fact that a Russian Government had been in existence for six years performing all the obligations incident to any government.[41] This government according to impartial reports received the support of the Russian people. It was a government which had maintained law and order throughout Russia; a government which has withstood all attacks from without and from within; a government which put down three powerful invasions financed by outside powers; a government which has stood alone six years in Europe. It is the only government which came out of the war which could stand alone.[42] No reference was made to Russia's repudiation and confiscatory program whereby the hard-earned accumulations of western Europe lent in sincerity to Tsarist Russia were repudiated absolutely. He was convinced that the communist activities designed to undermine our institutions would disappear or be greatly modified after recognition was granted. Recent

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[40] Cong. Rec., Feb. 21, 1923, 4184. 67 Cong., Vol. 64, pt. 4.
[41] *Ibid.*, 4185.
[42] *Ibid.*, 4186.

English experience has disproved this prediction. The British and French position in refusing or discouraging the extension of credits to America under the confederation was recalled. These nations were prerfectly justified in discouraging loans to a government whose legislature was unable to enforce financial measures among the states. England who had just recently lost these colonies naturally was not disposed to view too favorably credits destined for America. America, however, had no intentions of repudiating such loans as might have been obtained. The decisions of the European nations to discourage advances to America during the critical period does not appear to contain any convincing arguments why America should recognize Soviet Russia, or encourage loans in the face of a possible future repudiation.

Senator Lodge, who was at this time chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in supporting the Administration's attitude explained the nature of recognition. No nation had the right to determine the internal character of government for another nation. That was a matter for their own determination. However, the nation which grants recognition has rights of its own. Senator Lodge said: "it is the exclusive right of the recognizing power to determine when they shall recognize the country seeking or desiring recognition, or recognize another country whether it seeks it or desires it or not. It rests entirely with the recognizing country itself to decide whether there are other questions affecting recognition besides the internal character of the Government." Certain conditions are necessary in according recognition to any government. The most important of these are the ability of the nation seeking recognition to maintain proper international relations, and give security and safety to the persons and property of other nationals.[43]

Senator Wheeler in an article (published in the *Locomotive Engineers Journal* for December 1923) admitted there was yet some economic disorganization in Russia. The conception of a reign of terror and assaults upon religion, as foreigners were led to believe was unfounded. Religion was not persecuted,

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[43] Cong. Rec., Feb. 21, 1923, 4190. 67 Cong., Vol. 64, pt. 4.

commerce and industry were gradually reviving, and the people were contented. The Government realized that the economics of the Soviet system were unworkable. They were gradually re-adopting capitalistic technic as rapidly as the extremists permitted. The Government appeared entirely stable having successfully resisted external invasion, and internal revolution, and was apparently better than that of the Tsar. The efforts of the other nations to force Russia's hand had apparently strengthened the position of the Soviet leaders, since the people repose entire confidence in them.[44]

On January 7, 1924, Senator Borah resumed his efforts in favor of Russian recognition. In regard to the disastrous effects of the armament race among the nations, he said: "To fail to adjust the Russian problem is to foment and keep alive the spirit of distrust and war, and to justify the piling up of armaments and the increasing of taxes upon the people without limit."[45] He stated that Russia was now ready to take up the question of compensation and payment of her debt to the United States. Russia also asserted that she had counter-claims against America due to the presence of our soldiers in Russia at a time when we were not at war with Russia. Senator Borah said: "In other words the Russian Government stands ready to accept the president's message, appoint commissioners to adjust all differences, and where there are accusations involving good faith between the Governments to submit the question to arbitration.[46]

Representative Beedy who investigated conditions in Russia alleged on January 8, 1924, that life in the Russian cities was as well ordered and regulated as in any country. Law and order now prevail in Russia. Travelling was entirely safe at practically any time of day or night. The policing of cities, and the handling of traffic was as efficient as anywhere. The Soviet officials were exceedingly courteous in their deportment.[47] Concerning religion he observed that the Greek church was part and parcel of the Tsarist régime. Some of their priests were

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[44] Cong. Rec., Dec. 10, 1923, 142. 68 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 65, pt. 1.
[45] *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1924, 583.
[46] *Ibid.*, 584. President's message of Dec. 1923 mentioned in another chapter.
[47] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1924, 709. 68 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 65, pt. 1.

punished for revolutionary activities, but most of them were released upon promise to refrain from future anti-government activities. Russia does not encourage religion, but religion and the practice thereof, was merely tolerated. The members of the Communist Party were atheistic. Representative Beedy opposed recognition on the ground that such action by America would approve of the irreligious conduct of the Soviet leaders.[48]

Further, Russia had adopted free trade as an internal policy. She should permit and allow individuals to buy and sell upon the markets of the world independently. When this attitude is taken by Russia then America can appoint a representative commission to investigate trade possibilities. America should make an effort to have Russia modify her trade policy, and in other respects, assist in adjusting the commerce of the world. He contended that Russia was not entitled to recognition until she recognized her debts, and returned property taken from Americans. When he (Representative Beedy) placed this question squarely before M. Tchitcherin, the foreign commissar replied thus: "We can not do that. We came into power on a platform which did not recognize private property, and the moment we make unconditional return of American property we must accord the same treatment to other foreign nationals. Such a policy would forfeit us the support of those who now maintain us in power."[49] This statement by a highly placed Soviet official contains little solace for those who expect their property to be returned. It also showed that the Soviet policy remained unchanged.

On January 7, 1924, Senator Lodge returned to the attack and in a lengthy exposition and analysis of the Soviet Government fortified by a mass of documentary evidence, opposed its recognition. He said: "What I desire to show is that the so-called Russian Soviet Republic should not be recognized at this time by the Government of the United States, because the Russian Government directly or indirectly, in one form or another, is making efforts to cause disorder and dissention among the American people and advocating actions and agitation which

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[48] Cong. Rec., Jan. 8, 1924. 709. 68 Cong. 1 sess. Vol. 65, pt. 1,

if successful, would result ultimately in the radical alteration and perhaps the destruction of our present form of constitutional government, their immediate purpose being to get possession of the labor unions of the United States."[50]

Following the same line of argument, Senator King in April 1924, continued his discussion of Russian conditions. The question still persisted and was widely discussed, "Shall the the Government of the United States recognize Russia in some form de facto or de jure?" Again, "shall there be concluded some informal trade convention permitting the peoples of the two nations to engage in closer commercial intercourse." Such an agreement it was maintained would draw the peoples of the two nations into closer relations. Many students of the Russian situation now believe that America should accord recognition of some description to Soviet Russia. If this proved to be beyond realization then some commercial arrangements equally beneficial to both nations, should be consummated. Senator King made clear the importance of knowing that the Government of the United States has placed no obstacles to commercial dealings between the American and Russian peoples. The Soviet Government might buy and sell without hindrance in our markets. American citizens so disposed, so far as the American Government was concerned, might freely trade with the Soviet Government or the Russian people. The impediments to such intercourse between the two countries were found in the laws and regulations of the Soviet Government regulating trade.[51]

Americans who entered Russia for the purpose of purchasing Russian products to be exported to America, or to sell American goods to Russia must deal only with the foreign trade department of the Soviet Government, both for the purpose of exportation and importation. American traders are required to submit to heavy exactions imposed by the Soviet régime, and in addition to procure licenses. Senator King remarked that the few companies actually having special concessions to engage in foreign trade find themselves face to face with restrictions which many

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[49] Cong. Rec., Jan. 8, 1924,.....68 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 65, pt. 1, 710.
[50] *Ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1924, 592. 68 Cong., 1 sess., Vol. 65, pt. 1.
[51] Sen. Doc., 126. 68 Cong., 1 sess., 115.

corporations have no desire to encounter. These special privileged companies are required to pay from 17 to 25 per cent of the invoiced costs of all articles exported or imported, in addition to 10 per cent of the net profits to the Soviet Government. After these requirements are satisfied the balance of the profits are divided equally between the company and the Government. Where the profits exceed 40 per cent of the amount invested by the Government an additional share is taken by the Government. The Soviet régime maintains a representative on the board of these companies. By regulating the amount of capital it invests in a company the Soviet Government can make certain of securing the additional profits.[52]

Within the last few years many enterprising foreign business men have entered Russia upon commercial errands. They desired to buy for exports and to sell foreign products to the Russians. Most of these have come away without having attained any definite results. The needs of the Russians are considerable but the impoverished condition of the country will not permit purchases to the extent required for their recuperation. Russia has provided little for export, hence so long as this situation continues foreign trade will be definitely hindered, even though all governmental restrictions were removed. Neither recognition nor trade agreements can avail anything where the economic conditions for trade do not exist. Neither recognition nor any other type of agreement is necessary to trade where the natural conditions of commercial intercourse prevail. This is illustrated by the fact that a flourishing trade was negotiated with Mexico during the years when the Obregon Government remained unrecognized by America.[53] Many complaints have been made by the nations that have recognized Russia, or have concluded trade agreements with her. The protests grew out of violations of conventions entered into with Soviet Russia. It is known that nations having accorded de jure recognition to Russia find it necessary to maintain a constant correspondence with Moscow about infractions of diplomatic etiquette.[54]

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[52] Sen. Doc., 126. 68 Cong., 1 sess., 116, 117.
[53] *Ibid.*, 117.
[54] *Ibid.*, 118.

Senator King continued his discussion of the economic situation by referring to the fact that a British trade mission had been sent to Russia to investigate trade possibilities with a view to increase the commerce between the two nations. Great Britain has been considerably disappointed at the small amount of trade that has materialized from the commercial contact between the two nations. The conviction was also entertained that but slight benefits have accrued from the trade agreement. There exists much misapprehension as to the volume of trade to be transacted with Russia even under the most favorable circumstances. Russia's entire foreign trade for 1913 was 2,910,000,000 gold rubles. Germany exported 453,600,000 gold rubles worth of commodities to Russia, and imported products valued at 652,000,000 gold rubles. England's entire trade with Russia for this year amounted to 440,000,000 gold rubles. The entire volume of trade between the United States and Russia in 1913 was 92,000,000 gold rubles or approximately $41,000,000.[55]

There is very little reason to suppose that American trade with Soviet Russia under normal conditions would be proportionately greater than before the war. The governmental foreign-trade monopoly, in connection with the tariff duties form an almost insuperable obstacle to American export trade to Russia. The Soviet policy is to develop Russia industries. This requires the maintenance of a tariff policy and other restrictions unfavorable to American export trade to Russia.

Only commodities imperatively needed are allowed to be imported. The policy of the Soviet régime in attempting to revive Russian industries is designed to provide a wider market for her agricultural products, which can be excluded by high tariff barriers. If Russia can obtain credits abroad enabling her to revive her agriculture and her industries she may become an exporting nation, and considerable trade might develop between Russia and America. However, Russia's present fiscal condition, and the geographical nearness of Germany and Czecho-Slovakia with their cheap labor have the

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[55] Sen. Doc., 126. 68 Cong., 1 sess., 122.
[56] *Ibid.*, 123.

advantage over America in securing Russian trade. America will scarcely be able to compete with these nations which before the war enjoyed an extensive Russian commerce.[56]

Senator King reviewed the experiences of other nations which had established official contact with Soviet Russia of some kind. On August 25, 1921, Finland protested to Moscow against the non-performance of a treaty signed by both nations. In May 1922, the Esthonian Government punished a criminal who was harbored in the Soviet legation. This act brought about Russian reprisals. In August 1922, Latvia protested against the dangerous propaganda that was disseminated in her country. In the same month Poland also protested that the provisions of the treaty of Riga signed on March 18, 1921 were not being executed by the Moscow Government. These provisions were contained in article eleven of the treaty and stipulated for the return of property mostly locomotives and machinery, taken during the Polish Bolshevist war of 1920 by the Russians. In September 1922 the Berlin police confiscated stores of arms which an attache of the Soviet Embassy was supplying to the German communists. Here we have a flagrant violation of the purpose of diplomatic immunity. In Feburary 1923, the Czecho-Slovakia Government expelled a Soviet representative for alleged interference in internal affairs. In May 1923 a similar fate was visited upon Soviet agents residing in Turkey.[57] Is there any reason to assume that America would be immune from the operation of this virus, or that the Soviet diplomatic agents would behave in America in a manner differently from their conduct in other nations?

Among the latest expressions of Senatorial conviction are those of Senator Edge, who refutes the argument that the debts were a legacy from the old régime. Even if true, the Soviet Government has also inherited all the assets of the old régime "confiscated or otherwise." So long as this condition continues, the Soviet régime cannot expect to create a favorable sentiment here. The fact that Russia has made some economic progress is

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[57] Sen. Doc., 126., 68., Cong., 1 sess., 119, also League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 6, 4., 1921, 139, 141, 143, 145. Also Soviet Russia, Vol. 4, 478.

in itself a strong reason for them to admit the validity of their debts. The Senator was of the opinion that possibly the Russian revolution was as much justified on the basis of oppression as the French or American revolutions. Moreover, these countries repudiated no obligations, but on the contrary, made every effort to satisfy their obligations on the basis of integrity.[58]

This survey of congressional opinion, especially that of the Senate, conveys the immediate impression that sentiment in favor of de jure recognition of the Soviet Government has made little progress. Only one Senator appears to have openly championed the establishment of de jure relations with Russia. Most of the radical senators were on record as being opposed to regular diplomatic relations with Russia, but usually favored some closer relations than those at present existing between the two nations. They favored some form of intercourse permitting commercial relations as would be embodied in a trade agreement. Some of them were not favorably disposed towards de facto recognition. The trade agreement proposition received the support of several conservative Senators. The majority, as already observed, were, and remain strongly opposed to regular diplomatic recognition of Bolshevism. Party considerations have apparently played a very minor if any part at all, in the convictions held by the different Senators. Their judgment is evidently formed form careful independent study of the Russian question. Under the circumstances it is difficult to perceive how they could have arrived at any other conclusion.

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[58] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 629.

VII

Public Sentiment Regarding Recognition

The question of the advisability of recognizing the Soviet régime is one that has been much discussed by individuals, showing varying degrees of popular conviction. In this chapter are presented the arguments of sections of public opinion favoring and opposing recognition. Previously there existed quite an eager, and from indications, an increasing group who favored recognizing the Soviet régime in some form. Some of these advocates were apparently possessed of liberal opinions, and were convinced that such a course would save American interests. Others have been chiefly animated by a desire to oppose the policy of the past and present Administration. Some favored recognition since they conceived that certain commercial advantages might be derived from the act. The movement favoring recognition appears recently to have become quiescent, but while it lasted it was important. At times after a Presidential interview regarding Russia the illusion that a change of policy was impending took possession of some minds but it was mere illusion.[1]

The revolution of March 1917 was approved in America, but the revolution of November 1917 was not favored by Americans. American diplomatic representatives remained in Russia for an extra year and a half. Though refusing to recognize the new régime we were obliged nevertheless to deal with them in some matters. Wilson even went to the extent of directly addressing Lenin strongly urging him not to conclude peace with Germany. There apparently was considerable reason and justification for the stand taken by the Harding Administration like its predecessor on both moral and practical political considerations. The belief that the withholding of recognition had exercised a salutary effect upon the Soviet leaders cannot altogether be ignored. At any rate it was foolish to maintain that by refusing recognition we were outlawing one hundred and thirty millions of people.

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[1] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 454, 484.

The accusation of outlawry was peculiarly strange in view of the fact that America had for many months fed and sustained the famine-stricken upon a scale unparalleled in history.[2] America refused to recognize the November revolution since she perceived the operation of incompatible principles which if accorded diplomatic acceptance might have occasioned serious political disturbances. The policy of caution was therefore the most advisable.

Many discerning citizens had wondered how much longer this American policy towards Russia would continue. It was contended that sooner or later the policy must come to an end, even if the present rulers of Russia failed to make an alteration in their scheme of government. It was argued that Russia was too large a portion of the globe to be permanently ignored. Russia existed as a political fact and must, consequently, be taken into account. Certain inconveniences occur in not having Russia seated in the councils of nations, adding her approval to international understandings. She probably must be dealt with later and paid to obtain her approval of agreements entered into by other nations without her consent.[3]

Dr. Davis, one of America's most prominent students of the Russian problem writing in the Annals for July 1924, contended that recognition should be conferred upon Russia as a matter of course. Americans it was claimed usually regard Russia from the viewpoint of their own social heritage, and the bias of their own experience. To judge Russian institutions by American conceptions of Government is to misrepresent the situation. Americans were alleged to be too critical of the imperfections in other régimes while paying no attention to corruption in their midst.[4] But governments are jealous institutions and they do not always conform their actions to the rules of logic. They are instinctively sensitive to anything, right or wrong, that would imperil their own supremacy, and act accordingly. The Soviet Government in crushing opposition to its own sovereignty, has shown that it is no exception to this rule, and therefore cannot

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[2] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, March 1923, 14. By K.
[3] *Ibid.*, 15, 16.
[4] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 76.

legitimately take offense when other nations adopt protective measures against communism.

Refusal to accord recognition has been consistently based upon opposition to Russian confiscatory measures as a prime factor in determining the American attitude. America was accused of having resorted to the sovereign right of confiscation. The grants of land given by the king to his favorite generals were declared confiscated. During the World War we confiscated German private property.[5] It is inconsistent to maintain that the colonies, upon establishing their sovereign independence, should have legalized and confirmed the grants to the generals during the war when these were at the time employing all their energies to suppress the aspirations of the colonists. German property was retained for the satisfaction of losses incurred by American citizens as a result of her refusal to abide by the rules of law governing the conduct of war. In the field of international relations America has always paid strict attention to the discharge of her honorable obligations.

Mr. Samuel Untermeyer favored recognizing the present Soviet Government. He said that pressure ought to be exerted upon the representatives in favor of recognizing the Soviet régime, and that American provincialism would be swept away. The stability of the present Russian Government was asserted to be superior to many other governments, while their form of social and economic organization were declared to be none of our concern. He said, "We have always recognized monarchies and despotisms, however revolting they were to our own institutions, or our conceptions of government." America was reminded that she also has under her control subject races. The contention that America refused recognition because the Soviet Government failed to pay their debts, was attacked. He makes the accusation that America had recognized governments which had refused to assume the obligations of preceding régimes but no specific instances are mentioned. Hence America to be consistent ought to withdraw recognition from such states.[6]

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[5] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 76, 77.
[6] *N. Y. Times*, May 26, 1924, 3.

America has repeatedly recognized nations whose governmental conceptions differed from her own. However, if these systems of government were satisfactory to their nationals, and if they met the conditions of honor set by the international community no valid reasons remained for withholding recognition.

Colonel Haskell urged resumption of relations upon economic grounds. He claimed that production in the United States was exceeding domestic consumption, hence an outlet must be secured. Russia with her vast population, and low standard of living might be converted into a vast consuming area of American products, and become a decisive element in our industrial welfare.[7]

In an interview regarding an address at the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, Massachusetts, he expressed himself to seek an adjustment. He believed that the Russians would accept the conditions set by President Coolidge as the irreducible minimum of recognition, and that America should not reduce these conditions. A Conference would clarify the atmosphere and show at least how far the Soviet delegates would go to meet the American conditions. An agreement with Russia could be more quickly effected than in the case of England or France, since the amounts involved in the debts due to these two nations are larger. Also Russia had counter claims against these two nations for exciting counter-revolutionary activities. America's intervention in Russia was undertaken for the protection of American property only. Hence an agreement could be more easily consummated between Russia and ourselves. Such an understanding would not appear improbable since Russia earnestly desires to resume relations.

Concerning the material advantages to be derived from such recognition, he said: "Recognition will not create purchasing power in Russia, but it will be a beginning, and it will install a United States official in Moscow from whom we can learn the truth about what transpires, and who can look after such American interests as exist."[8]

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[7] *N. Y. Times*, May 26, 1924, 3. Aug. 22, 1924, 15.
[8] *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1924., Sec. 2, 2.

Stanley High, a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, investigated conditions in Russia and arrived at the conclusion that some form of recognition was advisable. He says, "that Communism was based upon certain wrong ideas about non-communist people. The way to destroy the illusion is to bring Russia into contact with other nations, and that America departed from a policy of isolation when she sent $50,000,000 for famine relief. That work helped more to modify extreme Communism than the years of isolation. He said a capitalist nation did those things that the Russians were told it would never do." Mr. High said: "Some day we may realize that continued isolation only gives comfort to the extreme Communist and prevents the development of Russia towards a sane national organization."[9]

Miss Marguerite E. Harrison, who has studied Russia at short range, claims that many individuals belonging to the upper elements of Russian society acquiesce in the Soviet rule. She does not advise the use of force to overthrow Communism. Such action would destroy the efforts of this upper class to improve conditions. The present governmental apparatus may be sufficient for reform purposes when operated by non-Communist parties. They believe that recognition would hasten the end of the dictatorship, nor can they understand why America is so slow to recognize this conviction.[10]

The following opinions if not against recognition are not in favor of it. Early in 1919 the United States conducted an inquiry into Bolshevism and its activities in this country. Some of the opinions rendered at the time are probably not so effective at present. The causes provoking them might have disappeared in the meantime. Nevertheless these are valuable as a means of recording what the sentiment against recognition has been. They may contain valuable information for the future attitude of the Government.

Ambassador Francis was definite and explicit in his attitude towards Bolshevism. He said: "I have never had any rela-

[9] *N. Y. Times.* March 1, Sec. 2, 1, Pamphlet No. 34, Series 1924-25, July 1925 ,18 .F. P. A.

[10] Fair Play for Russia, pt. 6, F. P. A. publication.

tions whatever with it, and have always recommended against the recognition of it."[11] He opposed the idea of recognition, or even of entering into commercial relations with them. He condemned the reign of terror and the attitude taken towards persons in the higher scales of employment. Continuing, he said: "I have been consistent and persistent in my attitude of non-recognition. They are against all government. Their decrees call for the disruption of family life. Their policies are such as will lead back into barbarism."[12] Mr. Francis believed Bolshevism even worse than anarchism, the latter advocating only the destruction of property. The former condoned the destruction of both life and property.[13]

Colonel Robins, an unofficial representative of the American Government associated with the relief work, testified that Russia should be permitted to evolve its own salvation, and opposed intervention. He advocated neither recognition nor internal interference, but urged that a special commission be established to study conditions in Russia. He believed that in recognition the question to be considered was not the character of the Government but whether it represented the people. Concerning Russia he said: "we are dealing with a disease" whose nature should be ascertained. He was convinced that the vast mass of peasants were not in accord with Bolshevism. They desire its abolition, and a government instituted fashioned after the American pattern.[14]

Prof. Miliukov says, concerning Soviet integrity, that while the Bolsheviks are consistent in pursuing their aims, they do not at all claim to be consistent in their methods. They would change their plans and break an engagement entered upon when, in their estimation, it was advisable to do so. They are never embarrassed in altering their agreements, or in employing contradictory arguments in their diplomatic documents, and their pieces of propaganda.[15]

The philosophy of Bolshevism is that "the end justifies the means." It is impossible to reconcile the principles of democ-

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[11] *Current History*, Vol. 10, 140.
[12] *Ibia.*, 143, 144.
[13] *Ibid.*, 274.

racy with this doctrine. The breach between ourselves and Bolshevism is as great as between ourselves and Kaiserism. Karl Radek in discussing the issue of relations with America said in a newspaper article that since the contest between Wilson and the Kaiser was decided in Wilson's favor the struggle was now on between Lenin and Wilson. Tchitcherin was reported as saying that the church and home stood in the way of progress and must be swept away. These statements show the incompatibility of our conceptions.[16]

Apart from purely ethical reasons there are other reasons why America refuses recognition to Moscow. Among these exists a doubt as to the duration of the present régime, and what may succeed it. This involves no mere change of personnel such as occurs occasionally in Latin-America, but of other fundamental factors already discussed.[17]

A large group oppose the resumption of relations with Russia. These base their contention upon propaganda considerations. The Bolsheviki are responsible for the unfavorable opinion in which they are held by other nations. They failed adequately to distinguish the essential, and non-essential parts of their program.[18]

The following policy was recommended by General Colby towards Russia as a result of Russia's confiscatory policy applied to rights acquired before November 1917. Recognition was to be refused until compensation was given for the property confiscated. However the actual restoration of the physical property should not be insisted upon. Should this policy fail it was recommended as a final resort that force be employed to protect the losers. This latter eventuality is now no longer practicable. Likewise recognition should be refused until the Soviet régime decides to recognize the pre-Bolshevik governmental debt. It was advised to grant a period of ten years or thereabouts, and then, if they still retained their repudiatory attitude,

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[14] *Current History*, Vol. 10, 137, 138.
[15] Miliukov, P. N., Russia Today and Tomorrow, 96, 97.
[16] *Annals*, Vol. 84, 96, 97.
[17] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 154.
[18] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia, 454.

adopt such methods as each creditor might deem expedient.[19] The Soviet régime appears desirous of entering into treaties with other nations pledging non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign governments. To execute such treaties would appear unwise until the Bolshevist Government had made positive promises to recant every trace of influence or association with such revolutionary organizations at the Third International.[20]

Proponents of recognition by England of the Soviet régime, contended that if such recognition was withheld the peace of the world would be endangered resulting in universal wars of destruction. This argument was of importance to Americans. Even if such a war was below the horizon how could it have been prevented from occurring even if the Bolshevists were recognized? For the Soviet leaders acknowledged and made no secret of the fact of their desire to smash the present system of civilization and Christianity, which it despises as hypocrisy and rubbish. Can any thoughtful person entertain the conviction that by assisting a nation of such motives, we would be aiding the cause of peace or of Christian civilization?[21]

While the interests of commercialism and finance are not to be ignored in politics, the recognition of the Soviet régime also involves considerations of honor and rectitude. Mr. Irvin T. Bush, President of the New York Terminal and a deep student of the Russian controversy, believes that the moral element is of prime importance in considering the Russian question. He said, "I believe that Secretary Hughes is entirely right when he says that it is a moral issue, and that until the people of Russia and the Government of Russia which now represents them, put themselves right with the world, return the foreign property which was owned in Russia, and recognize that portion of the Russian debt at least which is just and proper to be recognized. I believe that we cannot deal with a nation who does not respect ordinary economic contracts and obligations."[22] The American attitude is regarded by some eminent European publicists as

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[19] *Annals*, Vol. 108–110, 16.
[20] *Ibid.*, 17.
[21] Foreign Affairs, Dec. 1924, 313, 314.
[22] Pamphlet, F. P. A., No. 22, Series 1923–24, 10.

"by far the most intellectual, the most progressive, and the noblest that has been taken by any nation."[23]

Lord Bryce was mystified at the apparent receptivity accorded to Soviet ideals and doctrines in both England and America, and his expressed conviction should be carefully pondered by all interested in the Russian situation.[24] Dr. Benes, the brilliant Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, has made statements regarding policies to be pursued towards Soviet Russia that merit careful attention.[25]

The Reverend Father E. A. Welsh, former Director General of the Papal Relief Mission to Russia, made this observation on Russia. He said that the penal and labor code of the present Russian Constitution, and other promulgated laws are hostile to the rights of men. Until the Soviet régime rectifies these arbitrary measures, there can be no basis for the recognition of the present Russian Government.[26]

The attitude of the Republican Party towards Russia, has been and remains singularly clear. It insists that the sacredness of contracts and property rights be maintained. There cannot be relations with a nation which proclaims its rights to abrogate or violate agreements at will, if to their interest so to do. Such issues are above politics. The principles upon which a governing body in any nation is recognized, cannot weigh against moral and political precepts. This causes a nation to look with con-

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[23] Foreign Affairs, Dec. 1924, 315, 316.

[24] Lord Bryce said: "The Bolsheviki are a set of bloodthirsty ruffians, worse than the worst men of the French Revolution. Many people here are taken in by their empty professions of a desire to improve the world. Is this so in America also? *N. Y. Times*, Mar. 8, 1925. Sec. 7, 12.

[25] Dr. Benes said, "the system tried in Russia is only possible in Russia. Other states must continue to defend themselves against the influence and effects of the Soviet system. . . . It is a clash between two worlds." About policy he said, "No other policy than that pursued today is wise or possible. The other nations must be on the defensive. They must guard themselves against Communist propaganda. They must show that the Russians have gained nothing as a result of their experiment." About propaganda. "They will not stop carrying on propaganda of revolution in other States. They live on revolution. The problem of the Russian revolution will occupy the world for years. It has become a problem of evolution." *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1925.

tempt upon a government which violates the principles of constitutional government, and repudiates solemn obligations.[27]

Opposition to the recognition of Russia was evidenced recently by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. Messages were sent to President Coolidge and Secretary Kellogg opposing such a move. These expressions of disapproval were provoked by the bill of Senator Borah before the Senate relative to the recognition of Russia. The removal of the Communist Party from power was to be a condition precedent to recognition by America. William L. De Bost, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chamber said regarding Borah's bill, that the Russian Government had entered into agreements with other nations to cease the movement to subvert their governments, but that the agreement has been "more honored in the breach than in the observance."[28] He mentioned the fact, already observed, that Secretary Kellogg knew of several European nations that now regret the fact of having renewed relations with Moscow, which enables her to expedite revolutionary schemes. The executive Committee was convinced that no change of heart occurred in the Communist Party. If any profitable advantage would be gained by recognition, it is at least plausible to assume that it would not escape the cognizance of those whose primary purpose is the promotion of commerce. Count Leo M. Tolstoy, son of the novelist, said, "that the main aim of the Russian leaders was to acquire credits. They were no longer so much interested in party principles.[29]

Mr. Bush was convinced that the proper conditions antecedent to recognition, had not been met. Appeals for recognition should should be thus negatived. This view was taken with a desire to assist and not retard the welfare of the Russian people.[30] He believed it unwise for America to have intercourse with a nation whose conceptions of international equity contrast so strongly with our own. Russia's act in confiscating the property of other nations was condemned as an act of robbery. America's

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[27] Foreign Affairs, Sept. 1925, 41.
[28] *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 10, 1926.
[29] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1926, Sec. 2, 4.
[30] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 630.

interest in maintaining honest standards is great. Without these morals chaos would result.[31]

The position of the American Federation of Labor on the question of recognition of Soviet Russia was formulated in 1920, and reaffirmed in 1921 and 1922, is "that the American Federation of Labor is not justified in taking any action which could be construed as an assistance to, or approval of, the Soviet government of Russia as long as that government is based upon authority which has not been vested in it by a popular representative national assemblage of the Russian people; so long as it endeavors to create revolution in the well established civilized nations of the world; or so long as it advocates and applies the militarization of labor and prevents the organizing and functioning of trade unions and the maintenance of a free press and free public assemblages."[32]

Mr. Gompers condemned Senator Borah's position. He said: "Any compromise with the Soviet terrorism is a victory, for the Soviets cannot compromise on fundamentals unless they intend to violate their agreement." He said: "The world has had enough scraps of paper." The world is also familiar with statements made by responsible Soviet officials that faith with the bourgeois would not be kept. Any organization which accepts the leadership of individuals professing such principles cannot be trusted. All declarations to keep the faith are thus discounted in advance.[33]

The Soviet régime should also admit that her policies have constituted a grievous wrong to the United States. All constitutional, legal and party rules hostile to the United States, would then have to be withdrawn. The Communist International would have to be disbanded, and no secret organization formed in its place. When these conditions are met, then in Mr. Gomper's view, America might negotiate with Soviet Russia. The Soviet Government, Communist International, The Red Labor International, and the various bureaus are all

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[31] Current History Feb. 1926, 630 631.
[32] American Federationist, Vol. 31, 155, 156.
[33] *Ibid.*, 89, Dec. 18, 1923.

one fabric inseparable in fact.[34] Mr. Gompers believes that the Soviet régime must remain at war with institutions so long as it endures. Its hostility to free governments is inherent, and cannot be eliminated except by the decay of the entire Soviet structure. In words of rare merit he concludes: "To offer by our voluntary action, any hope or any opportunity to those who are sworn to destroy freedom, and who must by virtue of their very philosophy, continue in that course until the end, would be to cast aside our faith and the faith of our fathers in the institution of human freedom. We believe authority must be based upon the freely expressed will of the people who are to be governed before it can properly ask or rightly receive our recognition and mutual intercourse."[35] Recognition would enable those now operating in the dark to come out and conduct their activities in the open. The rights of consulates could be appropriated to subversive ends without incurring open responsibility.[36]

While persons of prominence have at times expressed themselves as favoring recognition of Russia as the most advisable solution of the issues, yet the public at large is apparently uninterested, or non-commital, willing to acquiesce in any policy the President may adopt. The declaration in regard to Russia, made by President Coolidge on December 9, 1923, to which the Administration is still committed was evidently accepted by the Press as a satisfactory statement of what our policy should be regarding Russia. Press reports from over the nation representing all degrees of substantial conviction in politics were satisfied with the contents of the message. As no single criticism was uttered in regard to the President's foreign policy it is correct to assume that the Press tacitly approved of the President's sentiments in regard to Russia.

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[34] *American Federationist*, Vol. 31, 89. Dec. 18, 1923.
[35] *Ibid.*, 90.
[36] Sen. Doc., No. 14, 68 Cong., 1 sess., 37.
[37] *Literary Digest*, Vol. 79, Dec. 15. 1923, 5, 6, 7, containing a survey of national sentiment on the President's message.

VIII

The Versailles and Genoa Conferences

At the Peace Conference President Wilson and Lloyd George were earnestly desirous of reaching some understanding with Soviet Russia. They perceived that a grave danger was confronting Europe and the world. This constituted a forceful argument for some adjustment with Russia before the chances of success became more remote or vanished entirely. These two statesmen believed that by informal discussions with the Russians agreements could be reached that would have beneficial effects upon Europe. The French and Italians opposed any such negotiations with Russia. A perceptible division in regards to the Russian policy to be pursued, arose between England and France that with few alterations persists to the present, making it difficult to reach a common agreement on Russia. The difference between these two groups in the Conference was not so much in the result desired as in the tactics to be adopted to obtain this result. Wilson and Lloyd George believed in the efficacy of conversations to settle the issue while the French and Italians recommended the employment of armed force.

The Russian question was, therefore, a perplexing problem confronting the Peace Conference. The revolutionary régime had already maintained itself for over a year. The emancipated peoples of the border provinces were hostile to Moscow. Counter-revolutions were organized by Kotlchak, Denikin and others. The French advised open war on Bolshevist Russia, but were unable to furnish any troops. This plan was discounted by America and England.[1]

Lloyd George explained the position of the British Government. He stated that the French Government had a false conception as to the purposes of the British Government. The British Government did not contemplate the recognition of the

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[1]Gooch, G. P. History Modern Europe, 670.

Bolshevik Government, nor that it should be invited to attend the conference.

The British proposal was to invite the different waring factions, in the former Russian Empire "to a truce of God, to stop reprisals and to send men here to give, so to speak, an account of themselves." The powers would then try to devise some means to restore order in Russia. Such representatives were not to be considered as delegates to the Conference. He agreed with the French that they should not be made members of the Conference.[2]

The reasons assigned for this attitude of the British Government were three. Lloyd George said that firstly, the actual facts were not known; secondly, as it was impossible to obtain the facts, the only way left was to adjudicate the question; and thirdly, the conditions in Russia were very bad. He stated that the Bolshevik Government had become stronger and that the peasants had begun to support the Government. He said that three avenues of action remained. First: military intervention, but this was unthinkable since public opinion would not sanction it. Bolshevism could not be crushed by a military force. Second: a cordon or economic blockade was impracticable and would increase Russia's misery. Third: Russian representatives were to come and having been heard, the Powers might impose their terms.[3] The British Foreign Office acknowledged its perplexity. Therefore, to secure better information about the Russian question, the Russians were to come to Paris.

The French position was defended by a high official. He said: "If France is for action against the Bolsheviks it is not because France is not as advanced as England or America. It is because she has a clearly reasoned point of view and is logical enough to endeavor to express that point of view in action.

"If a Socialist Republic had been set up in Russia, based upon democratic ideals, France would have been ready to welcome it. But something much more deadly, something which menaces

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[2] Sen Doc., 106, 1235, 66 Cong., 1 sess.
[3] *Ibid.*, 1235, 1236, 1237. Parl. Debates, Vol. 112, 194, 198.

civilization itself, has come into being, and it is necessary to combat these evil forces to the full extent of our power."[4]

The French attitude towards Russia has been determined largely by the following assertions. First, a group of unscrupulous men maintained themselves in power by undemocratic methods. Secondly, They ill-treated foreigners in Russia, who were pursuing legitimate ends. Thirdly, Their scheme of government could only survive by constantly extending its influence. Fourthly, Russian success in Poland and the Baltic would bring her under the influence of Germany. Fifthly, They conducted a propaganda campaign intended to disintegrate the Allied Nations.[5] These French contentions against recognition ran parallel with expressions which have come at times from the State Department at Washington.

M. Pichon suggested that the French Ambassador, M. Noulens, to Russia, who had returned very recently, should be called to appear before the Council and render his views. President Wilson said that he did not see that it was possible to contradict Lloyd George's statement. President Wilson also believed that the reluctance of American and English troops to fight the Bolsheviki was probably due to the fact that if the Bolsheviki were defeated, there was no promise that the old order would not be reintroduced.

He believed also that Russia should be granted an opportunity to find "herself along the lines of utter freedom." He accordingly supported Lloyd George's third recommendation. He thought that if the Russians were assured that no intervention would occur, the Bolsheviki would lose power since they stood between Russia and Foreign military control.[6]

Buckler, an American attaché to the American Embassy in London, and of known liberal views, went to the Scandinavia to confer with Litvinov. He discussed the matter of withdrawing the American troops with him. Litvinov stated that the Bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the Archangel front.

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[4] Huddleston, S. Peace Making at Paris, 60, 61.
[5] *Ibid.*, 62, 63.
[6] Sen. Doc., 106, 1237, 66 Cong., 1 sess. Dennis, 77.

They also pledged themselves not to injure those Russians who had assisted the Allies. Those who were afraid might retire with the troops. Many telegrams had been received by the Conference from British and American Commanders regarding the gravity of the situation at Archangel. There were 12,000 Allied troops on this front, 6,000 British, 4,000 Americans, and 2,000 French troops respectively.[7]

On January 21, 1919, President Wilson favored a modification of the British proposal made by Lloyd George, who now himself saw the need of modification. President Wilson desired that the various Russian groups should send representatives not to Paris, but to some convenient place like Salonika.

At such a place the Allied Representatives could meet the Russians and see whether some agreement could not be reached. Lloyd George thought this a great advantage since the Russian delegates could reach Salonika by way of the Black Sea. M. Sonnino did not favor this proposal. President Wilson wanted the Russians to meet together preferably in a single room so comparisons might be made. The new proposal was also in deference to Clemenceau's views. He believed that it was possible to bring the Bolshevist representatives to Salonika or even Lemnos. President Wilson explained that to oppose Russia with arms gave a powerful argument to the Bolsheviki. They could go before the peasant and claim that the capitalistic Governments had opposed Russia in order to restore the land to the landowners.[8] The proposal was an attempt to affect a reconciliation between the various factions.[9]

M. Clemenceau was opposed to conversing with the Bolsheviki on grounds of principle, not because they were criminals. Conversation would raise them to the rank of Allies. He observed that Bolshevism had spread over eastern Europe, and was menacing western Europe. He said that if Bolshevism reached Italy, a very critical condition would exist. He offered no solution, but said that the Allies could make no further exertions

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[7] Sen. Doc., 106, 1238, 1239, Gooch, G. P. History Modern Europe 671.
[8] *Ibid.*, 1241, 66 Cong., 1 sess. Gooch, 670.
[9] Huddleston, S. Peace Making at Paris, 50.

after what they had undergone, and that Russia also needed peace. He, however, deferred to his colleagues, and wished it to be emphatically stated that there was no intention to interfere in Russian internal matters, nor to restore Tsardom.[10]

M. Sonnino pointed out that for France and Italy it was, in reality, a question of defense. He was convinced that even partial recognition of the Bolshevists would strengthen their position. Bolshevism was regarded as a serious danger to Italy. He favored effective measures against Bolshevism. Lloyd George said in reply that 150,000 soldiers would be needed to keep the anti-Bolshevist Governments from dissolution. That Canada had decided to withdraw her droops, and England would hardly tolerate any further exertions. M. Orlando stated that Italy could make no further contributions. Lloyd George wanted to know from where these troops could be secured? He said that the Bolshevists had an army of 300,000 men who would make good soldiers, and that at least 400,000 would be needed to fight them. M. Orlando admitted that the situation was very complex, and agreed that Lloyd Goerge's proposal held a possible solution.[11]

President Wilson expressed the view that the Allied emissaries should not be authorized to adopt any definite attitude towards Bolshevism. That they should merely report back to their governments the conditions that they had found. M. Balfour wanted the Bolshevists to promise to abstain from hostile action against their neighbors as a condition of admission to the meeting. President Wilson agreed, Clemenceau advised that the manifesto to the Russian groups should be based on humanitarian grounds.[12]

On January 22, 1919, President Wilson was instructed to draft a "proclamation for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as Salonika, or Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the Allied and

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[10] Sen. Doc., 106, 1241, 66, Cong., 1 sess.
[11] *Ibid.*, 1242, 1243. *Times*, Jan. 25, 1919, 10. Parl. Debates, Vol. 112, 194, 195, 196.
[12] *Ibid.*, 1243, 66 Cong., 1 sess.

associated great powers, the means of restoring order and peace n Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities."[13] The Powers recognized the right of Russia to direct her own affairs, and no counter-revolution was to be encouraged. The various groups were to send delegates, not to exceed three, to Princess Island in the Sea of Mamora to meet the Allied representatives. In the meantime the factions were to establish a truce.[14] The decision of the Conference was the object of severe criticism. The invitation to the Russians came as a surprise to many. It was accepted as showing that the Conference wished to restore a spirit of peace to Russia, and that in this work prejudice could have no place.[15]

The Bolsheviki, though never officially informed of the plan, gave their acceptance to the proposal. They said they were willing to assume the debts owing to Allied subjects, and requested that the Allies abstain from interference in the internal affairs of Russia.

Tchitcherin recognized American friendship saying, "America is most of all countries, interested in preserving one undivided Russian economic organization and is by no means interested in weakening Russia."

England was also veering towards the American viewpoint. iUnder these conditions Russia had no objection to participation in the proposed Conference.[17] The meeting was set for February 15, 1919. Allied representatives were selected. The Esthonians, Letts, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians accepted the invitation. The other Russian elements failed to accept the invitation. The other Russian elements failed to accept the invitation. The proposition died in the meantime. Nothing else was attempted to solve the Russian question.[19] Lloyd George also became involved in a Cabinet crisis.

At the time the Prinkipo proposal was under consideration,

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[13] Sen. Doc., 106, 1243.
[14] *Times*, Jan. 23, 1919, 11, Jan. 24, 1919, 9, Gooch, 670.
[15] Huddelston, S. Peace Making at Paris, 49.
[16] Gooch, 670.
[17] Dennis, A. L. P., 79, Tchitcherin quoted.
[18] Gooch, GP., History Modern Europe, 670.
[19] Huddleston, S. Peace Making at Paris, 57, 58, *Times*, Jan. 28, 1919, 10.

the French Press expressed misgivings about the plan adopted. Some believed it was a compromise between the Quai d'Orsay and Lloyd George. It was thought peculiar that representatives should be invited to Prinkipo, when representatives of various Russian Governments in Paris remained unconsulted. M. Sazonoff, and M. Savinkoff, represented the governments of Omsk and Ekaterinodar. The Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Esthonians had agents in Paris. These were not heard by the Conference. M. Sazonoff refused to accept the invitation.[20] The Powers thought that Poland should be the recipient of special courtesies. Some of the non-stable governments in Russia tried to win special favors from the Conference.[21] Some of the border states were convinced that the Bolshevists would employ the proposal to scatter propaganda.[22] The Archangel Government categorically refused the proposal, while Admiral Koltchak viewed the matter with coldness.[23]

Tchitcherin addressed a wireless message to their agent in Sweden. This was a reply to the decision of the Conference. He claimed that stability internally was restored to Russia, requiring no further settlement. He wanted the proposal confirmed. He thought the place of meeting too far away, and that the Allies would have the advantage.[24]

The Soviet Government, after discussing the question of the Prinkipo meeting, unanimously arrived at the following conclusions: "If the Governments of the Entente will permit the debates to take place in full publicity, then the delegates of the Soviets will repair to Prinkipo to declare solemnly before the whole world their programme and the principle aims of the Communism, continuing at the same time the struggle against the counter-revolution and our war preparations." Lunacharski, Minister of Public Instruction, acknowledged that the Soviet Government accepted the proposal merely to expose the "diabolical programme of our enemies." Zinoviev accused the Allied leaders with insincerity in making the proposal. He,

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[20] *Times*, Jan. 24, 1919, 9.
[21] *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 10.
[22] *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1919, 10.
[23] *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1919, 10.

however, favored the acceptance of the proposal. He said, "Nevertheless it will be useful to send our delegates to the Prinkipo Conference, in order to unmask the plans of the English, American, and French brigands, who seem at the moment to be in an embarrassing position."[25] The Allied motives, in making the proposal, were undoubtedly sincere. Europe was in need of peace and economic recovery. The participation of Russia towards this end was deemed essential to an European Adjustment. The statements, therefore, of responsible Russian officials that the proposal would be accepted merely for the purpose of putting forth their own program, and for exposing the hypocrisy of the other nations, shows the difficulty in dealing with these officials.

Lunacharski, Tchitcherin and Fritche, Foreign Commissar of the local Soviets at Moscow, were appointed to attend the proposed Conference, if the military situation permitted Trotzky to go instead of the third delegate. As a condition of their acceptance they demanded full publicity for all discussions, and direct communications with Moscow. The Conference was looked upon as an arena of struggle between the Communism of Soviets and bourgeoisie reaction. No effort would be made the to compromise with the counter-revolution.[26] The representatives of other Russian groups in Paris denied the right of the Bolshevists to speak for Russia. Their acceptance was characterized as a propaganda manouver. American delegates were appointed but the possibility of the Conference now began to vanish. The Russian delegates were expert logicians.[27]

The Russian note of February 4, 1919, was conciliatory in tone. It made several proposals in regard to the loans owed to the Allies "to guarantee the payment of interest on its loans by a certain amount of raw materials." The Soviets were willing to grant "concessions in mines, forests and other resources." The Allies were requested to withdraw their troops, and the success of the Bolshevist was also emphasized.

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[24] *Times*, Jan. 27, 1919, 10.
[25] *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1919, 12.
[26] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1919, 10.
[27] *Ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1919, 10

Concerning the Allied fear of Soviet propaganda within their own borders, the Soviet authorities promised "not to interfere in the internal affairs" of the Allies, but were unable to give guarantees to limit the activities of the revolutionary press. The Soviet leaders expressed themselves as ready to enter negotiations, intended to stop all hostilities between them and the Allies.[28] The conciliatory tone pervading this note can scarcely be reconciled with the bellicose character of the above resolution, or the statements of their responsible officials.[28]

The apathy to the acceptance of the proposal by the various Russian groups, was probably encouraged by the French Foreign Office. This office had communicated to the Ukrainian Government, and other anti-Soviet Governments that they would receive French support if they rejected the proposal. The Foreign Office was opposed to any agreement with Soviet Russia. The Conference was of the conviction that the use of force was fruitless. Lloyd George believed that the Prinkipo proposal, which had died in the meantime, should be renewed, and made arrangements to meet Colonel House to discuss the matter even against known French opposition.[29]

The Russian situation had disturbed the tenor of the Conference and until some definite understanding was reached it would continue to do so. Lloyd George pressed for an agreement. It was also evident that Germany was trying to use Russia to upset the Paris Discussions.

Le Temps saw the possibility of Germany forming with Russia an anti-League with prospects of satellites, if they were denied entrance to the League. The object of the Prinkipo proposal was to restore a truce among the Russian Governments. None of those, which had originally accepted the invitation to Prinkipo, showed a desire to accept the proposed truce.[30]

The Prinkipo proposal having definitely failed other suggestions were considered, but none definitely accepted. A proposition was advanced that an Allied military mission should proceed

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[28] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies, 79. Ross, E. A. Russia Soviet Republic, 182, 183.
[29] Sen. Doc., 106, 1245, 66 Cong., 1 sess.
[30] *Times*, Feb. 17, 1919, 12.

to Russia and study facts on the spot. The original proposal of supporting with arms the border states, and thereby establish a safety cordon around Russia, was again considered. A delegation from the Berne Socialist Conference told Clemenceau of the Conference's decision to send a mission to Russia. He appeared much interested and suggested that the mission should get in contact with some committee interested in Russian questions, as many points of the Berne mission and Peace Conference were similar.[31] *The Times* in an editorial statement remarked that they had no desire to invade Russia, or dictate the form of government, yet Bolshevism as an agressive force, must be crushed. It must be restricted to the territorial limits prescribed by the Peace Conference. England was determined to reduce "Imperialism to a nullity" no matter from what direction it emerged.[32]

It was decided that Mr. Bullitt should go at once to Russia to obtain an exact statement from the Soviet Government on what terms they were willing to cease fighting. Colonel House thought that a statement by the Russians recognizing their debts would make a very favorable impression upon French sentiment.[33]

Previous to the dispatch of Mr. Bullitt, Mr. Buckler had conferred with Litvinov, who had been the unrecognized Soviet Ambassador to London. He reported his conversations to the President who regarded them as very important, and they were instrumental in provoking the Prinkipo proposal.[34] Mr. Bullitt in his testimony before the Senate Committee, said he was ordered on February 18, 1919, to go to Russia, by Secretary Lansing for the "purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein for the benefit of the American commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace." Diplomatic and Consular agents were instructed to accord him proper courtesies and facilities.[35]

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[31] *Times* Feb. 18, 8.
[32] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1919, 8.
[33] Sen. Doc., 106, 1246, 66 Cong., 1 sess. Gooch, 671 Dennis, 81.
[34] *Ibid.*, 1235.
[35] *Ibid.*, 1234.

After receiving the Russian terms the Allies could then make more definite proposals. The British and American delegations knew that such definite terms would prevent a failure similar to that of the Prinkipo proposal.

The Soviet Government expressed itself favorably to the acceptance of the following terms from the Allies, if made not later than April 10, 1919, namely that "the Allied and associated governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia in its note of February 4, in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the Soviet Government, and the other governments which had been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland, shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire to foreign states, parties to this agreement, and to the nationals of such states."[36] (2) The blockade was to be lifted and commercial relations resumed. (3) The Soviet Government was to have the use of all railways and parts which belonged to the former Russian Empire, and to Finland. (4) The Soviet Government was to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full immunity to the Allied countries. This right was to be reciprocal. (5) General amnesty was to be accorded political prisoners. (6) All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers were to be repatriated. (7) The Allied troops were to leave after the signing of the agreement.[37]

Mr. Bullitt upon his return handed copies of his report to various members of the American mission. Secretary Lansing sent a copy to President Wilson.

Colonel House was evidently in favor of making peace. Others of the Commissioners were also apparently in favor of Peace on the basis of the report. Lloyd George and General Smuts studied the report. The Premier claimed he could do nothing about Russia on account of the power wielded by the British press. He wanted the report made public in order that conditions in Russia might be known. The disposition of the report was left to Colonel House by Lloyd George and President Wilson.

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[36] Cong. Rec., Vol. 65, pt. 1, 68 Cong., 1 sess., 622, Jan. 7, 1924.
[37] Sen. Doc., 106, 1249, 66 Cong., 1 sess. Gooch, 671.

A statement was prepared by Mr. Bullitt but was never published as no members of the commission wanted to assume responsibility for its publicity. The matter was referred to the President. The President received it but decided that he did not want it given out. He thought it best to keep the report secret, and consequently it was never made public.[38] Colonel House recognized the importance of making peace with Russia, and urged the necessity upon the President. The President, however, was fully occupied with Germany and could give no time to Russia. This phase of the Russian problem was now lodged with Colonel House.[39]

The reasons for the President's inaction remain secret. The terms suggested by the Bolshevists on the surface at least appeared reasonable. The Allies and America were not yet prepared to accept Soviet delegates officially, and accord to them full diplomatic immunity. Such action would have involved virtual de jure recognition of the Soviet régime. It would have made it possible to conduct radical agitation with more pronounced success. This was also at the time when propaganda was being directed with great energy by the Moscow régime. The risks of dealing with the Soviet régime then were known to President Wilson and doubtless influenced his judgment. Whatever the President's reasons were for ignoring the Bullitt report it seems clear that he acted in what he considered the best interests of all under the circumstances.

Mr. Bullitt himself believed that some socialistic government was inevitable for Russia. He opposed foreign intervention. He said: "No real peace can be established in Europe or the world until peace is made with the revolution. This proposal of the Soviet Government presents an opportunity to make peace with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis—perhaps a unique opportunity." The President evidently saw nothing unique about the opportunity, and refused to act as already noted. Bullitt reported the social life of Russia has being satisfactory, and advised some form of recognition.[40]

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[38] Sen. Doc., 106, 1260, 1261, 66 Cong., 1 sess. Dennis, 82.
[39] *Ibid.*, 1264.
[40] *Current History*, Vol. 11, pt. 2, 121, 122.

Lloyd George, in a Parliamentary speech, denied any knowledge of the Bullitt mission, and the Soviet proposals. He said that if the President had attached any value to the report he would have brought the matter to the attention of the Conference. This declaration was made for political purposes as the Prime Minister knew the nature of the proposals.[41]

President Wilson and his European Colleagues were evidently not impressed with the nature of the Bullitt report since it was allowed to lapse.

About a month later some indirect correspondence was resumed wherein the greatly modified Allied proposals were conveyed to Russia. The Conference was occupied with other tasks, and failed to give any further serious consideration to the Russian question. On April 3, 1919, Dr. Nansen, the Arctic explorer, wrote President Wilson about starvation in Russia. He recommended that a "humanitarian commission for the provisioning of Russia" should be created. This commission might be administered by members of Dutch, Swedish, Swiss, Danish and Norwegian nationalities. By this expedient no question of political recognition was raised. Colonel House thought that by this plan of rationing Russia, the Allies could deal with her in a most effective manner.[42] A letter on April 17, 1919, sent to Dr. Nansen by Orlando, Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau, contained the proposals which the Allies were willing to make. These made no mention of the proposals which Moscow had expected to receive from the Allies.[43] The Kolchak forces were especially active at this time having achieved some considerable successes. The overthrow of Bolshevism appeared favorable. This possibility apparently affected the action of the Conference in regard to Russia.[44] Kolchak was subsequently suppressed and executed.

It is apparent that America and England were sympathetically disposed to reach some workable solution. The problem, how-

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[41] Sen. Doc., 106, 1272, 66 Cong., 1 sess. Gibbons, H. A., Europe Since, 1918, see chapter on Russia.
[42] *Ibid.*, 1264, 66 Cong., 1 sess
[43] *Ibid.*, 1269.
[44] *Ibid.*, 1270.

ever, was greatly complicated by the fact that many groups, each claiming to be the legitimate government of Russia, occupied the field and claimed precedence of treatment. Had the Bolshevist Government been in complete and undivided control of Russia then as afterwards the negotiations might have resulted more successfully.

Bolshevism was fully recognized as a universal menace, but it was considered more expedient to deal with it, and possibly control it, in its earlier stages than after full maturity. Russia with her size, population, and resources was regarded as necessary to the polity of Europe. It was not a question of extending political recognition to Russia, but, admittedly, one of how best to deal with the growth of an increasing meance, and danger. The Italians and French, on account of their geographical and financial interests, were frequently at cross-purposes with America and England as to the policy to be adopted towards Russia. As a result of this division and other factors the Conference was unable to adopt any definite Russian program.

Russia not having been received back into the comity of nations by the time of the Washington Arms Conference was not invited to participate in its proceedings. The omission of Russia was not conditioned by a belief that Russia would build a large navy as no such plans were entertained. Russia remains a factor in the Far East that cannot be ignored. Engagements concerning this section of the globe should take into account Russian interests. The Russians have already declared any decision concerning this region without their participation therein to be null and void so far as they are concerned.[45]

The Soviet Government became convinced that it must secure recognition in some form in order to secure the finances requisite for her reconstruction, even if coveted principals must for the immediate present be submerged. The necessity for cash was imperative, and means must be inaugurated to obtain funds. Accordingly, on October 29, 1921, Tchitcherin made the overtures to the powers on behalf of the Soviets. He claimed that Russia was under no legal obligation to acknowledge the debts

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[45] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 12.

of the former régime. However, in view of her urgent need she would be willing to assume those debts. In turn she proposed an international congress which should recognize the Soviet régime and devise some method whereby the recuperation of Russia might be accomplished.[46]

Things were evidently proceeding rather favorably for the Soviet régime during the winter of 1921–1922. The Allied Conference at Cannes in January 1922, invited the Russians to a future conference to be held at Genoa. This was precisely what the Russians desired, as they were once more admitted to the councils of Europe, also their expectation of procuring financial assistance was much increased by the invitation. The atmosphere was apparently favorable to carry their (Russian) program into full fruition. However, at the crucial moment an unfavorable event of very significant importance occurred.[47]

Much speculation prevailed in Washington as to the attitude the American Government would assume in regard to the proposed Genoa Conference. All doubts were dispelled when on March 8, 1922, Secretary Hughes in a note refused to participate in the Conference. The Government was anxious to assist the welfare of the Russian people, and viewed steps taken for her economic recovery with favor. However, nothing could be done until those responsible for her "economic disorder" took "adequate action." Nothing should be done to secure an unfair "economic" advantage in Russia. Fair and equal opportunities should be preserved for all nations.[48]

This refusal had disastrous effects upon Russian aspirations. What Russian wanted was money and recognition. America was the only nation with sufficient financial reserves to extend sums to Russia in sufficient amounts. The Abstention of America from the Conference blasted Russian hopes. When America's refusal became known the Russians thereafter were not so meticulous about their conduct during the Conference.[49] America was accused of being chiefly responsible for the distress prevailing in Russia, by leading Soviet officials.

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[46] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 143.
[47] *Ibid.*, 144.
[48] Dennis, A. L. P., 476. Secretary Hughes' note quoted.

On March 21, 1922, the Russian Trade Delegation in London handed to the Foreign Office, Russia's official acceptance of the Allied invitation to Genoa. Russia expressed satisfaction at the action of the Allies in making the invitation. She felt that the Allies perceived fully by that time the futility of maintaining further the blockade. Russia also considered herself essential to the peace and progress of Europe.[50] The differences in political systems was recognized, but this should not operate against "fruitful collaboration" between them.[51] No distinction should be made between small and large nations, victors or vanquished. The Russians believed all should work together for the "economic renaissance" of Europe.[52]

The Russian acceptance called attention to the fact that the Western Press was conducting an anti-Soviet campaign of "extreme ferocity." These accused the Russians of insincerity in their attempt to resume relations with other powers, and alleged that their main purpose in going to Genoa was to scatter propaganda.[53] The fact remains that during the actual course of the proceedings of the Conference intrigue and chicanery were secretly employed by the Russians to play one nation against another. The Allies were advised that they were mistaken if they regarded Russia as impotent to refuse any injurious conditions they might desire to impose.[54] Russia was also willing to conditions favoring "private initiative" in the fields of "industry, agriculture, transport and commerce."[55] Promises were also given that all extraordinary legal procedure was abolished. The ordinary courts were empowered to deal with cases of crime both criminal and political.[56] The new legal disposition in Russia was to be communicated to all "Foreign Governments."[57] Russia was willing to enter the Conference

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[49] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 144.
[50] Miscellaneous, No. 2 (1922). 2, British Foreign Office Publications.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid.*
[53] *Ibid.*, 3.
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Ibid.*, 4.
[57] *Ibid.*

providing all parties conformed to the first "article of the conditions laid down for the Conference." These concerned reciprocal guarantees to abstain from propaganda activities.[58]

After the Conference had for some time been in session the difficulties of treating with Russia became apparent. Lloyd George, the most ardent advocate of the necessity for the Conference, soon discovered that he was unable to make any impression upon the Russian Front. He, in connection with the British, French, Italian and Belgian delegates, held a private conversation with the Russian delegates at his villa. These were described as technical in character. The Russian delegation declared they were unable to accept the findings of the London Conference Experts about Russia. The Allied representatives were unanimous in their conviction. Lloyd George declared that if the Russians failed to accept the London report the Conference was at an end so far as the Russians were concerned.[59]

At the villa d' Albertis conversations the Premier supported M. Barthou on the question of Russian debts. He told the Russians that "If you are decent people you must pay your debts." M. Tchitcherin argued that there were two kinds of debts, pre-war and war. They could not return to Russia saddled with debts unless they received something in return. He also advanced Russian counter-claims against the Allies for damages done in Russia by the Civil War. Lloyd George flatly refused this contention, but recognized that some rebate might be granted Russia in view of her economic condition. Signor Schanzer, Italian Foreign Minister, suggested an appointment of a permanent commission to develop some principles of agreement. They were to be located apparently in Stockholm. The French and Belgians rejected the Commission idea. The Allies claimed $2,600,000,000 from Russia, while M. Litvinoff presented Russia's counter-claims amounting to $5,000,000,000. By this claim the Allies were alleged to be indebted $2,400,000,000 to Russia. However the Russians condescendingly indicated that concessions

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[58] Miscellaneous, No. 2 (1922) 3.
[59] *Times*, April 15, 1922, 14.

might be made to the Allies if they showed themselves reasonable.[60]

The Russian delegation was of the conviction that under the economic conditions in Russia they were justified in making a complete remission of all debts. In seeking an adjustment of differences they proposed two schemes. First, the scaling down of the principal and interest of the war debt, and second, the granting of financial assistance to Russia. Subject to these conditions the Russians were willing to restore property nationalized belonging to Aliens, or render satisfaction in accordance with a plan adopted by the Conference. Credits were absolutely essential. If not granted they were unable to see the advantage of acknowledging a debt which they were unable to acquit themselves of. They would not assume the debts of their predecessors until accorded de jure recognition by the interested Powers.[61]

The British view of the Russian situation was favorable. They regarded it as "very helpful." They thought the time had arrived for appointing experts to consider the question in detail. The Powers agreed to appoint each an expert, while Holland and Czecho-Slovakia each appointed a delegate to represent neutrals and the Little Entente respectively. The attitude of the French delegation towards the Russian reply was clouded in uncertainty.[62] The withdrawal of M. Seejdoux from the Commission of experts caused much consternation among the Allied delegations. Mr. Lloyd George declared that if France wrecked the Conference an European war was inevitable. However, if the Allies maintained a unified front they might be able to detach Germany from Russia.[63] The recent achievements at Locarno would appear to fulfill this political prophecy.

By the latter part of April, 1922, the possibility of negotiating successfully with the Russians had practically disappeared. The British delegation was trying to discover some means of avoiding the sending of an ultimatum, or a memorandum to the Russian

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[60] *Times*, April 17, 1922, 12. Parl. Debates, Vol. 154, 1462.
[61] *Ibid.*, April 22, 1922, 11.
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *Ibid.*, April 24, 1922, 14.

delegation. M. Tchitcherin now held the view that since the Bolshevists cannot alter their position on the private debts; while other states were unable to make any concessions, an unfavorable outcome of the Conference was possible. This stiffening was attributed to advice received from Moscow that the Russian delegation make no further concessions of principle even if the Conference broke up.[64]

Tchitcherin explained Russia's attitude at the Conference. He said, "Russia does not capitulate, she will not capitulate. She desires conciliation but she is not vanquished." Again, in reference to Russia's condition at the time of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, he said, "At Brest-Litovsk we were on the ground, we had the knife at our throat. Here it is no longer like that. We have become a powerful state on new basis, by new methods, while the Allies suppose that our situation resembles what it was at Brest-Litovsk." He admitted that critical questions requiring much study could not be solved in a few days, or by issuing ultimatums.[65] This belligerent attitude almost disrupted the Conference.

On May 3, 1922, the Allies sent a memorandum to the Russian delegation which revived the conditions in Russia, and made constructive suggestions for their correction. Russia was told that she cannot be reviewed without the "capital and the commercial experience" of the west. As soon as a feeling of security was restored to Russia ensuring the safety of foreign enterprise, foreign capital, skill and technical knowledge would again return to Russia. Russia was not only in need of food, clothing and medical supplies, but also of economic machinery such as wagons, tools, machinery and port appliances.[67] These commodities can be secured in the Allied nations as soon as security was re-established, and the debts recognized.[68] When the "first pioneers" have succeeded then others will follow.[69]

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[64] *Times*, April 28, 1922, 14.
[65] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1922, 11.
[66] Memorandum 3, May 3, 1922. Published by H. M. Stationery Office.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*

The British government under the Trade Facilities Act was authorized to invest $25,000,000 in the reconstruction of Russia. This amount might be increased under certain conditions. The Soviet government must however, take steps necessary to "encourage enterprise." Under the export credits Scheme the British government might even extend more credit.[70] France, on account of her devastated regions, was unable to grant any financial assistance to Russia. She would be willing to assist in the form of granting seeds, and farm machinery, in addition to technical advice.[71] Italy had contributed 20 per cent of the capital to be used by the International Corporation. She would also assist in the industrial and agricultural recovery of Russia.[72] The Japanese also indicated their desire to assist Russia in her efforts at recovery.[73]

In connection with the Allied offer of assistance there were several conditions attached which Russia was required to meet before the offer of assistance became effective. Clause I required her to abstain from all propaganda that might disturb the "territorial and political status quo in other states."[74] Clause II provided for the payment of the debts contracted by the Imperial and Provisional Governments.[75] The Allies could not admit any "liability" for any damages resulting to Russia as a result of the revolution. With Russian recognition of the debts the Allies would take up the question with the Parliaments of reducting the amounts due.[76] By Clause VI Russia was to have begun payment of interest on the debt. In event of difficulty in reaching terms an Arbitration Commission was to be appointed to decide all questions of interest, and the payments of "capital and interest," while taking into account Russia's "economic and financial" condition.[77] Clause VII, provides for the restoration, or compensation of property confiscated. In event of a

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[70] Memorandum, 3 May 3, 1922 4.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] *Ibid.*
[73] *Ibid.* 5.
[74] *Ibid*, 5, 6.
[75] *Ibid*, 6.
[76] *Ibid.*
[77] *Ibid.*, 7, 8.

dispute occurring regarding the amount of compensation due a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal was to decide the controversy.[78] Clause VIII, holds Russia responsible for any lack of payment due to negligence.[79] Clause XI, advises the Soviet Government to make proper provisions for the protection of the persons, property, and labor of foreigners.[80] These conditions were evidently reasonable and should have, at least, provided the basis upon which an agreement might have been founded.

A Swedish observer stated that England's attitude towards Russia was dictated by a desire to relieve the economic situation. England was inclined to assist Germany and Russia. France and Belgium were correct in contending that the Soviet régime recognize the state debts, and that private claims be indemnified. On the other hand, the Russians demanded de jure recognition and as much money as possible.[81] Lloyd George's rather tolerant attitude towards the Russians was the object of a severe assault from the *Temps*. It accused the British Government of trying to secure for British interests certain foreign properties which seemed desirable. By these methods they would cost less than if acquired under more correct methods.[82]

Rakovsky replying to the Allied memorandum, mentioned the fact that most of the Powers assembled had their own revolutions. Violent revolutions are ruptures of the past and introduce a new juridicial status at home and in foreign nations. Revolutionary Governments were under no obligations to respect the debts of the old Government. The French convention proclaimed in 1792 that "The sovereignty of peoples is not bound by the treaties of tyrants." He alleged that America repudiated treaties of her predecessors England and Spain. The Governments of states victorious in war seized the debts of nationals of the defeated states in their jurisdiction. Under these conditions he argued Russia cannot be blamed for cancelling the debts and confiscating private property.[83] Rakovsky here intro-

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[78] Memorandum, 8.
[79] *Ibid.*, 9.
[80] *Ibid.*, 10.
[81] *Times*, May 4, 1922, 9.
[82] *Ibid.*
[83] *Ibid.*, May 12, 1922, 18. See Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, 32.

duced a new interpretation of international law different from that universally accepted. According to the law as generally understood a succession of states inherit the liabilities of the deposed régime.

Russia was willing to accept the Cannes resolution providing it was made reciprocal. Every Government ought to compensate losses caused by its negligence. Great Britain paid America 15.5 millions of dollars for damages done by the *Alabama*. Russia thus had a valid claim for damages caused by the blockade and counter-revolutionary activities incited by the Allies. However, these counter-claims would be dropped providing concessions were granted and "real credits" given. The Allied memorandum failed to approve of the cancellation of debts. This, Rakovsky remarked, was one of the Russian conditions. The memorandum merely proposed that an arbitral tribunal be appointed to consider this question. Hence the villa conversations were vain so far as Russia was concerned. He also alleged that the Allied Powers were interested in securing consideration for a small group of powerful capitalists, to the exclusion or disadvantage of smaller capitalists.[84] Tchitcherin deplored the Allied memorandum. He said that it was a withdrawal from the position taken by the Allies at the conversations at the Villa d' Albertis. He deplored the absence of a loan proposal.[85]

The opinion prevailed that so far as France was concerned the Conference was dead. The French having refused to sign the memorandum can speak frankly, and without irritation. The Russians refused to abandon Communism within and revolutionary action without. This was proven by their attitude on the restoration of property, and refusal to abandon propaganda. When the desired credits were not in evidence there was no reason to conceal principles. Cash was the important factor. *Le Temps* failed to see that any Government responsible to taxpayers could help Russia so long as she antagonized capital and desired "to spread revolution to other countries."[86]

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[84] *Times*, May 12, 1922, 18.
[85] *Ibid.*, May 5, 1922, 18.
[86] *Ibid.*, May 13, 1922, 7.

The British Premier, M. Barthou, and Signor Schanzer met and exchanged views on the Bolshevist reply. The opinion apparently prevailed that further general discussions with the Soviet delegates were impossible or very difficult. The British delegation found some value in the suggestion to study the question of granting credits but aside from that there was nothing to improve relationships. The Belgians and French favored the selection of an unmixed commission to study the credit question. The British and Italians believed the Bolshevists ought to be represented on the Commission. The Italians who had expected a conciliatory reply were surprised at its character.[87]

On May 25, 1922, Lloyd George explained the position of the British delegation at Genoa. The Russians realized that financial help was unobtainable if they persisted in revolutionary activity. Terms could not be made with the capitalist nations without a sacrifice of principle. They fully realized Russia's need.[88] He told the Commons of Russia's counter-claim of $5,000,000,000, which was not seriously regarded. He reviewed the Allied document of April 15, 1922, to Russia concerning her economic restoration. England, France and Italy were willing to "write down" the amounts to sums within Russia's capacity. Russia's right to dispose of internal property was admitted but if credits are sought externally, she "must either restore property or give compensation."[89]

The opposition under Mr. Asquith described the results of the Genoa Conference such as the restoration of normal life to Europe, and the regulation of international relations on the basis of friendship and peace were commendable aims.[90] The question was propounded whether as a result of the Conference any step in advance has been made? The important problems were all relegated to the Hague Conference, to be held later, for solution. Mr. Asquith said: "Thirty-four Powers spent five weeks in Genoa, and when the Conference rose, it was in exactly the same position as when it begun."[91]

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[87] *Times*, May 13, 1922, 8.
[88] Parl. Debates, Vol. 154, 1459.
[89] *Ibid.*, 1462.
[90] *Ibid.*, 1469.
[91] *Ibid.*, 1471.

The difficulties and risks of dealing with the Soviet régime have been amply revealed by the barren results obtained by the Genoa Conference. This Conference was convened for the purpose of restoring Europe, and more specifically of endeavoring to restore Russia, or find a solution for her trouble. Every evidence exists that the Allies were sincere in trying to help Russia. The Allied attitude was conciliatory, nor were their conditions to Russia harsh. The Russian counter-claims were unreasonable, and were doubtless made for political effect. The liberties taken, and the manner in which every divergence of opinion among the Allies was immediately turned to possible account showed the futility of reaching any satisfactory agreement with the Russians. The attitude of victors which they assumed at the Conference, while not without some minor justification, was not conducive to producing that cordial atmosphere so essential to the success of any negotiations. The behavior of the Russians at this Conference should indicate the dangers, that are involved in any negotiations with Soviet representatives.

IX

English and French Relations With Soviet Russia

After the cessation of hostilities during the course of the Peace Conference, and subsequently, no nation appeared to be so favorably disposed towards bringing Russia back into the European concert as England. This attitude was based upon two major contentions: first, that no stable European peace was possible without Russia; second, Russia trade might relieve the distressed economic situation in England. Having these objects in view, England under the leadership of Lloyd George pursued a tolerant attitude toward Russia. Conflicting theories of government were not to interfere with the resumption of relations which might prove profitable to each party. In pursuance of this purpose commerical relations were resumed, involving *de facto* recognition, and later on, under the MacDonald Government, diplomatic relations were renewed. The attitude of the French government will be considered in connection with the British position. Italy, also, conducted some important negotiations with Moscow. The present purpose is to determine what advantage, if any, these governments have derived from the resumption of diplomatic relations with Moscow, and if any lesson can be derived therefrom for the guidance of the American State Department.

England's first introduction to Russian diplomacy of the revolution was not under the Bolsheviki, but under Kerensky. He informed the British and French representatives that the Revolutionary Government was not interested in the Tsarist policy of conquest. Such policy was contrary to the aims of the revolution. Russia also waived all benefits to be derived from the execution of the secret treaty clauses.[1]

In the autumn of 1917, the Kerensky régime began to totter. The British ambassador fully comprehended that the political illness of Russia was due to the presence of Bolshevism. He told

[1] Gibbons, H. A. Introduction to World Politics, 459.

Kerensky that if he (Kerensky) could subdue Bolshevism he would go down in history as the leading figure of the revolution, and as the savior of his country. Kerensky acknowledged this, but claimed that the government could not act unless an armed uprising was provoked by the Bolsheviks.[2] Ambassador Buchanan, in a communication to the British Foreign Office, conveyed his impression about the Bolshevists. He said: "The Bolsheviks, who form a compact minority, have alone a definite political programme. They are more active and better organized than any other group, and until they and the ideas which they represent, are finally squashed, the country will remain a prey to anarchy and disorder." Continuing, he said: "If the Government is not strong encugh to put down the Bolsheviks by force, at the risk of a breaking altogether without the Soviet, the only alternative will be a Bolshevik Government."[3] The germs of the destruction wrought by the November revolution were already observed by the Ambassador's penetrative analysis.

On November 20, 1917, Ambassador Buchanan discussed the question of the attitude the Allied representatives should take towards the Soviet régime, with the representatives of the Allied nations. They all agreed on one recognition but were divided on the question of entering into unofficial relations with the new Government. Ambassador Buchanan favored some sort of contact for the conduct of "certain current affairs." Mr. Balfour also took this view. British consuls were to serve as the means of communication between England and the Soviet Government.[4] Diplomatic intercourse was thus avoided.

During the course of the Peace Conference, Lloyd George was attacked in the Commons by Colonel Guinness. A speech by Lloyd George, delivered on December 13, 1918, was quoted. In this speech the Premier said: "In Russia you have now got a scheme of government entirely in the hands of one class. They will not even allow other classes to vote, and the result is chaos, anarchy and confusion." After having made this speech the

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[2] Buchanan, Sir George. Diplomatic Memoirs, Vol, 2, 196.
[3] *Ibid.*, 189.
[4] *Ibid.*, 220.

Prime Minister was accused of inviting delegates from the Russian government to the Peace Conference. This effort was frustrated by the French Government, who, according to Mr. Pichon "refused to dally with crime." Having been unsuccessful in this venture, the Premier was charged with having invited the Bolshevists to participate in the proposed Prinkipo Conference. This proposal put the Russian Government on the defensive.[5]

On the same date, February 12, 1919, Colonel Hoare also attacked the Government's Russian policy. The English delegates to the Peace Conference were accused of having no definitive policy. He said: "Looking back it seems to me that the fault of our policy with Russia has been that we have never made up our minds as to which side to back. . . I say that we have gone on the principle of backing one horse one day and another horse another day." The Prinkipo proposal was characterized as one of "uncertainty and hesitation." The French Foreign Minister had declared that no relations with the Bolshevist Government must be resumed at all. The English Government was accused of having attempted at Paris to enter into some relations with the Soviet Government.[6]

The Prime Minister in response to this accusation denied any effort to resume relations with Russia. He said: "Let me say at once that there has never been any proposal put forward to recognize the Bolsheviks. Never. There has never been a suggestion that they should attend the Peace Conference. That was not the proposal. For better or for worse, that was not the proposal."[7] The Premier, however, believed that some solution must be found for the Russian problem before a normal state of affairs could be returned to Europe. He said, in defense of his course at the Peace Conference: "The first fact I want to get into the mind of every Member and the British public is this, that unless there is peace in Russia, it is no good, the Peace Conference separating and saying, 'You have made the peace of the world' because you have not. Russia represents an area not far short of half the size of Europe, and it is also very nearly

[5] Parl. Debates, Vol. 112, 183, Feb. 12, 1919.
[6] *Ibid.*, 187.
[7] *Ibid.*, 193.

half the size of Asia, and if you do not make peace there you will have the whole immense territories surging with anarchy, with disorder, and with bloodshed. You may not be able to do it, but until it is done by some means or other there will be no peace in the world. That is the first fact to be recognized. How are you to do it?"[8]

There were several ways of dealing with the Russian situation, namely intervention, occupation, supporting counter-revolutionary forces, and allowing the revolution to burn itself out. These were all carefully considered by the Premier. The failure of the intervention as a remedy was demonstrated by the experience of Sweden and Napoleon. The scheme of supporting the counter-revolutionary factions also proved unsuccessful. He said: "There is no idea of recognizing Bolshevism. It would have been quite impossible to do so unless they abolished their present course of action; but we are anxious that when peace comes to the world, it should be real peace. All this about promise of repayment of loans, their promise of concessions to Br tain and to France, their promise of concessions of territory—all that was for consumption in Russia, and we knew that."[9]

Lloyd George's view regarding the restoration of Russia met with criticism from members of his own party. It is wrong to assume that the British government opposed the Revolution in the first place. The Governments of Lvoff and Kerensky were recognized by England. The British Cabinet was desirous of recognizing any government that would recognize its engagements, and conduct war against Germany. When the Bolsheviki repudiated their debts and instituted a world-wide propaganda campaign diplomatic relations became impossible.[10] At a conference in London, in February, 1920, attended by M. Millerand and Signor Nitti, it was decided to open up trade relations with Russia. The conservative members of the Commons opposed this move. The presence of M. Krassin in London was also resented. Lloyd George ignored the arguments that Russia had committed atrocities. He mentioned the fact of the Turkish

[8] Parl. Debates, Vol. 112, 194, Feb. 12, 1919.
[9] *Ibid.*, 196, 197.
[10] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 76, March 15, 1923.

massacres of the Armenians, and conditions in Mexico. Yet England traded with these nations. England needed the grain, flax, hemp, and timber which Russia could supply. Why should England deny herself these commodities?"[11]

The Premier, on July 26, 1920, in the House of Commons, confirmed the report that the Soviet Government had accepted the British Government's suggestion for a peace conference. As a result of such acceptance the Soviet trade delegation was permitted to proceed to London. Great Britain was anxious for peace between Russia and Poland, and to this end was conferring with the Allies. In reply to questions concerning Russia the Premier remarked: "I am very hopeful of peace and that is what the world wants."[12]

While attending the Boulogne Conference the Prime Minister favored the idea of inviting the Allied nations to negotiate with Soviet Russia. This manouver increased somewhat the prospects of recognition for Soviet Russia. The British note to Moscow informed the Soviet Government that the French Premier was opposed to any settlement which failed to mention the question of Polish peace. The note approved of the French attitude, and proposed that other questions might be introduced after the conference was in session. Premier Millerand, while not committing himself, saw in Soviet acceptance and opportunity to introduce and discuss the debt question. The wish of the British Government to reach some working agreement with Bolsheviki was very evident. This was in strong contrast to the French attitude.[13]

The Soviet reply to the Allied note of late July was rigid regarding the granting of concessions. The Allied note requested information about "the nature, extent, etc., of concessions of mines, forests, etc." To this inquiry the Soviet Government replied that it "deems it possible to accord to foreigners concessions for the exploitation of natural resources, mines, forests, etc., as well as fisheries and the preparation of all sorts of raw material on condition that the recipient of the

[11] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, March 15, 1923, 77.
[12] *New York Times*, July 27, 1920, p. 1.
[13] *Ibid.*, July 23, 1920, 1, 11.

concession with his own funds, and with the co-operation of the Soviet Government constructs factories, provides tools and installation, and that he pays in kind, by means of products obtained, or manufactured under the concession, the sums due according to the concessions accorded him."[14] The concessionaire must also respect all Soviet laws, and decrees regulating labor, and housing. He should observe all the regulations in regard to forests and natural resources. All concessions must be ratified by the Soviet Commissionaries of the people.[15] These severe conditions were not conducive to the resumption of commercial relations with Soviet Russia.

The inability of the British and French to reach a common course of action concerning Russia was due to almost irreconcilable differences of interest. The British must of necessity think of her sea-power, and her oriental empire. The French were mainly interested in obtaining payment of Russia's obligation to France, and in the character of the future Russo-German relations. These differences of interest produced different national policies.[16] In pursuance of her policy of opening up the Russian market England received two Soviet trade delegates. Kameneff and Krassin had arrived in London for a Conference looking towards the resumption of commercial relations and a settlement of outstanding claims. The advisability of resuming negotiations was seriously questioned. The British Government made the resumption of negotiations dependent upon the conclusion by Russia of an Armistice with Poland. So long as the Polish war continued there did not appear any disposition in official circles to resume discussions with Soviet delegates.[17] M. Kameneff, head of the Soviet delegation, in a letter to Mr. Balfour expressed the hope that commercial relations might be resumed between the two nations. He also hoped that political relations might also be resumed.[18]

The Soviet note, in answer to the communication of the British

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[14] *New York Times*, Aug. 2, 1920, 2. Text of Soviet reply to the Allies.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] *Ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1920, 1.
[17] *Ibid*, 2.
[18] *Times*, Aug. 27, 1920, 9.

and Italian Governments, manifested the elements of triumphant revolutionary ardour. The governments were half responsible for postponing "permanent good relations" so essential to world stability. The note accused these governments with engineering propaganda to cause the ruin of the Soviet régime. The Soviet Government expressed surprise that the terms of peace with Poland should be made a subject of controversy. An army of fifty thousand was established by the treaty in addition to the formation of civic militia, which constituted a supplementary armed force. The terms were regarded as just by the British Government. Hence no issue ought to be raised on this point. However, in the interest of peace, the contentions of the British and Italians could be conceded "in order to establish a full understanding between the above governments as the terms of peace with Poland."[19] The second portion of the note was devoted to refuting the insinuation that Soviet Russia was an oligarchy. Tchitcherni marshals facts intended to prove that these Governments are more oligarchic in character than Russia. A vigorous defense was made of Soviet political science, where democratic control was professed to be exercised by the various systems of Soviets in their several jurisdictions. Government officials were held responsible to the Soviets.[20]

Mr. Balfour in replying to Tchitcherin, claimed that the British never admitted that the reduction of the Polish army to fifty thousand was a just term of peace. Nor did the British people think that the peace terms constituted sufficient grounds for active intervention by Russia. Both the Government and the House of Commons wished to avoid any warlike operations against Soviet Russia. The British Government must insist, however, that the independence of Poland's military establishment to fifty thousand men, in addition to civic militia.[21] The British government protested when it found that the civic militia were to be selected from among a certain class of the population selected by the victorious enemy. This fact was

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[19] *London Times*, August 27, 1920, 9.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1920, 9.

very carefully withheld from the British in the Russian note. This fact, if carried into execution would have limited Polish independence. The British contended that they were not opposed to workmen in the militia as such, but opposed to the idea of the militia being composed of one class to the exclusion of all other classes.[22] The operation of Soviet purposes was very manifest in the peculiar terms imposed upon Poland.

When Ethonia concluded peace with Soviet Russia at Reval a breach opened in the Allied blockade. Mr. Lloyd George now began to initiate a movement for the resumption of trade, and France was apparently the only irreconcilable enemy. The British Empire, now anxious for trade, was preparing for peace with Soviet Russia.[23] Late in the autumn of 1920 there occurred some diplomatic correspondence between the British and French Foreign Offices relative to the rumored intention of England to establish trade relations with Russia. The French desired to know the British position, and very frankly expressed their own program in regard to Russia.[24] The French Government maintained that the repudiation of the debts; the change in the territorial status of Eastern Europe; and the economic situation in Europe should be taken into account by any investigation aiming at the adjustment of the varying viewpoints of the two Governments.[25] The French expressed themselves as not opposed to commercial relations between individuals under certain conditions. The French questioned the policy of resuming commercial relations with Russia whereby the assets of creditors would be consumed without compensation for their losses.[26]

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[22] *London Times*, Sept. 3, 1920, 9.
[23] Brailsford, H. N. The Russian Worker's Republic, 183, 184.
[24] Russia, No. 2, 1921, 7.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*, The French note reads: "En tenant compte a la fois de la repudiation de la dette par le Pouvoir des Soviets, des changements apportes au statut territorial de l'Europe orientale et, enfin, de la situation economique actuelle de ces regiones, les echanges de vues et la cooperation deja preconisee devraient prendre pour but de confronter les eludes qui se sont pur suivies dans chacun des deux pays et de preparer, dans toute la mesure du possible, l'adjustment des points de vue respectifs des deux Gouvernements." Russia, No. 2, 1921, 3.

The French Government insisted with great emphasis upon the common action of all governments interested in Russia. This was considered the only way of obtaining the desired results.[27] The entire charge of the Russian debt must not lie on Soviet Russia alone, but must be borne by other states, part of the former Russian Empire, in proportion to their wealth. An organization of some kind was recommended to supervise the execution of the plans adopted, otherwise all assurances might remain unfulfilled.[28] The French recognized that the internal situation of Russia was deplorable, and that Russia's capacity to pay was materially reduced. Efforts should be discovered to secure respect for rights, while reducing the burden as much as possible.[29] Compensation could be obtained by developing the resources of the country, through the assignments of assets, securing of concessions, and proper working conditions. The French were willing to discuss the problem with English representatives.[30]

The proposition to resume commercial relations continued to be agitated during the winter of 1920–21. The question relative to the nature of the proposed trade agreement was raised by members of the Commons. Mr. W. Graham claimed that British labor always favored trade relations with Russia. The position was taken that the attitude pursued by the Government not only strengthened the Bolshevist régime, but hin-

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"Comment pourrait on justifier, en effet, que la reprise projetee du trafic commercial, si Meme elle devait reellement ameliorer la situation economique du pays, put s'exercer directment ou indirectment au detriment de ces derniers, en absorbant, par example, les actifs qui prevent gager leurs droits ou compenser les subies?" *Ibid.*

[27] Russia, No. 2, 1921, 9.

[28] *Ibid.*, The note reads: "Toute la charge de la dette russe et de l'indemnisation des dommages ne doit pas etre assumee par le seul Etat russe. Tout les Etats constitutes, en totalite ou partiellement, sur les territories de l'ancien Empire Puss edoivent s'engager a assumer, chacun dans une proportion equitable, correspondant a l'etendue et a la valeur des territories acquis, les reparations et les paiements correspondants." *Ibid.*, 5.

[29] *Ibid.*, 10.

[30] *Ibid.*, 11. The note reads: "La situation si penible de la Russie a tous les egards, ne devra jamais etre perdue de vue. La difficulte d'exiger des paiements d'un pays dont les facultes sont momentanement reduites devra etre pleinement mesurree et tous les efforts devront porter sur la recherche des moyens propres a assurer le respect des droits aquis en attendant, dans toute la mesure du possible, les charges a supporter. *Ibid.*, 7.

dered the economic recovery of Europe. While favoring trade with Russia the nation was cautioned against entertaining too sanguine expectations from such trade considering the "social and economic chaos" in Russia. However, a beginning could be made that would lead finally to greater volume, and to the restoration of economic conditions in Europe.[31] On the same date, March 9, 1921, Lieutenant-Commander Kentworthy also favored the conclusion of the proposed trade agreement. He said: "Trade with Russia is only one of the means of opening up badly-needed markets for British goods, and we cannot afford to neglect any market that can produce goods for us."[32] Mr. Hopkinson did not share the optimism of Mr. Graham over the value of resuming trade with Soviet Russia. He said it was an "utter impossibility under any circumstance" to deal with Russia. Attention was called to the fact that "it is of the essence of Communism that trade becomes impossible." Communism, if properly carried out would, it was asserted, destroy capital instead of creating it.[33]

Sir R. Horne recognized the obstacles to resuming Russian trade relations where all the trade, especially the external trade, must be conducted through the Central Government.[34] The question about the seizure of Russian gold sent to England, for commercial purposes to pay Russian creditors, was apparently resolved in favor of the Russians. The law officers were of the opinion that if Russia was accorded de facto recognition, then the gold would be exempt from seizures. Sir H. Horne, however, favored renewal of trade relations. He said: "I am all for trading with Russia. I detest as much as anyone the crime committed by the Soviet Government, but is no good saying you can cut yourself off forever from a country which has gone through such experiences." He admitted that not much would at first be realized, but he believed a beginning should be made to help Russia and restore Europe.[35] All England appeared to

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[31] Parl. Debates, Vol. 139, 498, March 9, 1921.
[32] *Ibid.*, 504.
[33] *Ibid.*, 511, 512.
[34] *Ibid.*, 536.
[35] *Ibid.*, 537, 538, March 9, 1921.

have entertained at this optimistic hope regarding the value of Russian commerce. Russian trade, before the war, consumed 3.45 per cent of British exports. The exports to Russia during 1920 were £4,000,000. The trade with Poland, Lithuania and Finland, formerly part of Russia, amounted to £16,000,000, or more than 1 per cent of British exports. These figures show that the trade in this region was relatively small.[36] Recently there has been some improvement. The question of indebtedness to English citizens was to have been settled by a conference between the two nations.[37]

The trade agreement was finally signed on March 16, 1921. The Prime Minister was anxious to restore peace along the Russo-Polish frontier. He had suggested a conference for this purpose, but Moscow rejected it, wishing to treat directly with Poland.[38] The Trade-Agreement provided that, pending the negotiation of a formal general peace treaty, the British and Russian nations agreed to arrive at some preliminary arrangement. The economic and political arrangements were to be left to a later understanding.[39] The blockade maintained by the British was to be lifted, while all obstacles and hindrances to the resumption of trade relations were to be removed. Arrangements were also made for the extension of credit.[40] Persons engaged upon trade missions were to be exempted from all compulsory services of whatever character. Contributions were not be levied.[41] Agreement was reached that the "official agents" of one country accredited to the other shall enjoy the same immunities as representatives of other nations.[42] Sec. 9 provides that "The British Government declares that it will not initiate any steps with a view to attack or take possession of any gold funds, securities or commodities not being articles identifiable as the property of the British Government which may be exported from Russia in payment for imports, or as securities for such payment,

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[36] Parl. Debates, Vol. 139, 539.
[37] *Ibid.*, 540.
[38] Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 78.
[39] League of Nations Treaty Series, 1921, Vol. 4, 128.
[40] *Ibid.*, 129.
[41] *Ibid.*, 131.
[42] *Ibid.*, 132.

or of any movable, or immovable property, which may be acquired by the Russian Soviet Government within the United Kingdom."[43] This section became the object of an energetic protest from France. This protest applied also to Sec. 11, which provided that "Merchandise, the product or manufacture of one country imported into the other in pursuance of this agreement, shall not be subjected therein to compulsory requisition on the part of the Government, or of any local authority."[44] The Treaty also stipulated for the cessation of propaganda in the two nations. Russia promised to cease propaganda along the Indian border directly against British authority in India and Afghanistan. England promised to cease propaganda in the states which were a former part of the Russian Empire. Subjects of the one in the country of the other were permitted to return to their respective homes.[45]

Grave doubts were expressed as to the wisdom of resuming commercial relations with Russia. Sir Robert Horne remarked in the House of Commons that "they would never get far in trading with a communist community." Russia, not possessing an exportable surplus was considered unable to resume international trade. The business interests requested that recognition of the debts be included in the proposed treaty. The question of a loan was considered to be contingent upon recognition of the indebtedness of the former régime. Russia possessed a store of gold but the export of it, to pay for purchased goods, was regulated by license. There was also apprehension that if gold would be exported to England it would be seized despite the de facto recognition conferred by treaty.[46]

The French note of May 24, 1921, protested against the terms of the Treaty whereby the property of other nationals might be imported into England from Russia to the loss of the original owner.[47] The original owners would undoubtedly resort to the

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[43] League of Nations, Treaty Series, 1921, Vol. 4, 133.
[45] Bulletin, No. 6, June 30, 1925, 15. American Reference Library in Paris.
[44] *Ibid.*, 134.
[46] *London Times*, March 6, 1921, 12.
[47] Russia, No. 2, 1921, 17. The note says: "Une telle interpretation posait la question, vraiment tres sirieuse, de savoir si les valeurs de cette sorti, mime identifiables en tant que propriete de ressortissants etrangers pouvaient etre librement importies et liquidees en Angleterre au profit du Gouvernement des Commissires." *Ibid.*, 15.

law courts if Soviet should export confiscated property to England without compensation.[48] In consequence of the Treaty the English courts were of the opinion that the same legality attached to the acts of the Soviet régime as if recognized in due form.[49] The note contended that if the House of Lords confirmed this judgment the Soviet Government might export with impunity confiscated goods to England.[50] The French Government could not look with indifference on the rights of its nationals.[51] It believed that the application to Russia of the regular rules governing commercial intercourse among nations would do most to restore normal conditions to the world.[52] There could be no hope for improvement so long as the policy of repudiation was pursued, and the regular rules of legislation, among civilized states, ignored.[53]

On June 14, 1921, the British Government answered the French note. In regard to appointing a commission to adjust and distribute the Russian debt, the British Government agreed in principle. This body, however, in the English estimation should be appointed from among nations that acknowledged the validity of the "first general treaty with the Soviet Government of Russia."[54] The operation of this rule would have excluded France from a seat on such a commission. Concerning the courts it was explained that if the French had any reason to suspect any illicit negotiations the courts were open to them to secure legal redress.[55] The Treaty provided, not for restoration of goods seized by the Soviet Government belonging to British

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[48] Russia, No. 2, 1921, 15. "Les proprietaries etrangers ainsi leses ne pouvaient magnuer d'invoquer leurs droits devant la jurisdiction des autres pays quand les representants des Soviets pretendraiant utileser a l'exterieur, et sans acune compensation, les biens confisques de la sorte."

[49] *Ibid.*, 15.

[50] *Ibid.*, "Au cas once fugement se trouverait confirme par la Chambre des Lords, l'accord commercial pourait entrer pratiquement en viqueur et les Soviets conformement au sens litteral de l'article 9, auraient le droit d'importer librement en Angleterre toutes marchandises on valeurs, mim si elles etaient identifiables en tant que propriete de ressortissants etrangers." *Ibid.*, 16.

[51] *Ibid.*, 18.

[52] *Ibid.*, 18.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*, 19.

[55] *Ibid.*,

[56] *Ibid.*

subjects, but for compensation.[56] The note assured the French that if any Englishman received a concession from the Moscow Government which the French had reasons to believe involved confiscated French property the claim might be taken into the English "local courts." A concessionaire was instructed that he accepted property in Russia "at his own risk."[57] If any imported French property was sold in England by the Russian Trade Delegation the remedy of the courts was open to them in the same manner as to British subjects.[58] The British Government also had purposely refrained from requesting any preferential treatment for its subjects.[59] The correspondence clearly revealed the acute difference in the Russian policy of each nation. The French insisted upon compensation and the recognition of the Tsarist debts. The English were willing to try Russian commercial possibilities.

Despite the promises given in the Trade agreement to refrain from propaganda, it soon became apparent that much of it was unloosed in the East. The evidences of unrest among the British possessions throughout the East were charged to communist propaganda. The agitation continued unabated, which caused Sir Robert Horne to state that these activities "must at once be brought to an end, if the good faith of the Agreement is to be observed."[60] The British Government complained that the Soviet authorities had flagrantly violated the trade agreement signed in March, 1921. The British note said: "His Majesty's Government are, moreover, in possession of indisputable evidence that objectionable activities are due to the direct instigation of the Soviet Government."[61]

The Third International was accused of directing activities of the propaganda campaign. Their purpose was to undermine the authority, and prestige of British institutions in the East. Indian revolutionists in Europe were designated as receiving encouragement, and financial assistance from Moscow. Soviet

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[57] Russia No. 2, 1921, 20.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*
[60] *London Times*, Sept. 21, 1921, 10.
[61] *Ibid.*, 12. Text of Curzon's note to Russia on propaganda.

influence was also manifest in Teheran, where schemes, hostile to Great Britain, were being conceived. The inability to reach a peaceful settlement with Angora was attributed to Soviet prestige with the Angoran Government. The Soviet consulates established in Afghanistan were being utilized as centers for scattering propaganda. The Afghan Government reluctantly granted permission to establish these consulates.[62]

The British argued that the conditions upon which they undertook to renew relations with Moscow remained unfulfilled. The Soviet régime was accused of maintaining unabated hostility towards Great Britain. The note said: "Even apart from specific considerations to which it is pledged. It seems utterly to have failed to grasp the elementary principles which ordinarily underlie the relations between Governments professedly at enmity with one another and naturally jealous of an attack on their own peculiar institution."[63]

The Russian Trade Delegation in London issued the reply of M. Litvinoff to Lord Curzon's note of September 7, 1921. The Russian note denied the accusations that the Soviet Government was unfaithful to its commitments entered into on March 16, 1921. The note maintained that the presence of the Third International in Russia cannot make the Soviet régime responsible for the activities of this organization. The accusation that the Soviet Government was encouraging seditious activities in India and Persia was denied. They also disclaimed any complicity in the obstinancy which the Angora Government revealed in negotiating with Foreign powers. The note said: "The Soviet Government feels sure that the British Foreign Office has been misled by a gang of professional forgers, and swindlers, and that had it known the real dubious sources of its information the note of September 7 would never have been produced."[64]

M. Tchitcherin, when informed of the position of the Brussels Conference on debts, stated that this attitude within limits

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[62] *London Times*, Sept. 21, 1921, 12.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*, Oct. 8, 1921, p. 7. Text of Russian reply.

agreed with the position of the Soviet Government. He admitted that Russia was in need of economic reconstruction. Inducements of sufficient character would be given, provided their funds were invested in Russia. The peace and prosperity of the world could not be fully attained if Russia, a nation of 130,000,000 was not considered.[65] He admitted that Russia, while not renouncing her principles of government, was ready and willing to reach agreements with other nations in regard to concessions. It was also prepared to meet the claims of small holders of Russian bonds. This was evidently a gesture to France.[66] The Russian government under these conditions was willing to recognize the debts owing to other governments up to 1914 on condition that sufficient time be granted in order that Russia could fulfill these obligations. The Allied Governments, in their turn were to prevent any action being taken injurious to the safety of the Soviet Government. Recognition of the Soviet Government was to follow as a matter of course. Tchitcherin also proposed an international conference to discuss current international problems.[67] The English reply of November 1, 1921, was conciliatory in character and acknowledged that the position taken by the Soviet Foreign Minister was the only logical one that could lead to results likely to benefit Russia.[68] The note also inquired whether it was the intention to satisfy the claims of holders of Tsarist obligations entered into since 1914. The Soviet government was informed that they were mistaken if they thought the validity of an obligation diminished with the lapse of time.[69]

The French Government expressed its disapproval of the Soviet note promising recognition of debts in return for recogni-

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[65] Russia No. 3, 1921, 4. Correspondence with M. Krassin on Russia's foreign indebtedness; also, *London Times*, Oct. 30, 1921, 1. "Il a toujours declare son intention de fournir un suffisant benefice aux capitalistes etrangers qui l'aidersient a mettre en ocuvre les richesses naturelles de la Russia et a retabler son appareil economique . . . Il est absolument evident qu'il est impossible de penser a retablir la paix complete sans la Russie avec ses 130,000,000 d'havitants." *Ibid.*, 2.

[66] *Ibid.*, 4. *Times*, Oct. 30, 1921, 1, 3.

[67] *Ibid.*, 4, 5. *Times*, Oct. 30, 1921, 1, 3.

[68] *Ibid.*, 5. Text given.

[69] *Ibid.*, 6.

tion. M. Tchitcherin represented the Soviet offer as a distinct concession in return for recognition. The French Government declared its position to be the same as that of America. The French note said: "Now it is a question not of a concession which might be an object of bargain, but of the application of a principle of common law which has never been contested by any government. It is then indispensable that the Soviet Government should proclaim without reticence its intention to conform henceforth to the principle which up to now it has denied. Discussion can only be permitted to take place on means and guarantees of payment."[70] The French reply was an emphatic rejection of the Russian overtures.

M. Tchitcherin's offer was considered to be too limited. No mention was made of war debts, municipal loans, or indemnification for property losses. Before the French Government could pay serious attention to the Russian proposals, all subversive, internal, communistic propaganda must cease. Guarantees should be given against the continuance of such activities. Until these conditions were met the French Government could not seriously consider entering into negotiations with Soviet Russia. To do otherwise would sacrifice the foreign creditors "who have up to now no guarantee of the sincere and continuous execution of a still illusory programme."[71]

Despite the unsatisfactory experiences of England with Soviet Russia, Italy on December 26, 1921, concluded a trade agreement with Soviet Russia. The parties mutually pledged themselves to refrain from injuring each other, and to abstain from conducting propaganda among themselves. Propaganda was defined as the rendering of "assistance or encouragement given by either party" to activities "conducted outside its own boundaries." The agents of each nation were notified in order that immediate attention might be given to these conditions.[72]

In defense of his position at Genoa in regard to Russia, Lloyd George, on May 25, 1922, made a spirited defense of his actions,

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[70] *Times*, Nov. 17, 1921, 9.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] Soviet Russia, Vol. 6, 58. Cong. Rec., Vol. 65, pt. 1, 622. 68 Cong., 1 sess. Text.

and that of the British delegation. The Russians in the Conference represented misery and despair. The question was how could she "extricate herself"?[73] The Russians at the Conference were the only representatives of the "millions of Russians," and business could only be done with them. No other agency existed. Whether Russia would set 1,500,000 or 4,000,000 men on foot was a thing to be considered in dealing with Russia.[74] The avenues of dealing with Russia were open; first, the use of force; second, waiting until Russia became conciliatory; and third, that her principles precluded relations with her.[75] The first two of these alternatives were discarded as impracticable. The Prime Minister, disgusted with the Russo-German Agreement, which was depicted as an "error of judgment."[76] The danger of having two of the greatest nations in the world, from the viewpoint of "potential power and resources," out of accord with the "society of nations" was emphasized.[77] Germany could not re-equip Russia economically, but with her techincal skill she might convert Russian resources into a repository of armaments. Far-seeing statesmanship was required to deal with the situation. The English delegation came to the conclusion that in the interests of trade, and the "security of Europe" some agreement must be reached with Russia.[78] British statesmanship here revealed itself very amicable towards receiving Russia into international fellowship.

However, in regard to Russia's request for credits, the Prime Minister was more pronounced in his attitude. He said: "Russia with her repudiation, Russia with her confiscation, is coming to the very people whose claims she refuses to pay, and whose property she has confiscated, and she says, 'Lend me more.' They are practically asking for credits from these same peoples, and they can only get it on the conditions which have been laid down—the restoration of the confidence upon which credit is based."[79] Where the prospects of trade appeared promising

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[73] Parliament Debates, Vol. 154, 1453–54, May 25, 1922.
[74] *Ibid.*, 1454.
[75] *Ibid.*, 1454, 1455.
[76] *Ibid.*, 1455.
[77] *Ibid.*, 1455, 1456.
[78] *Ibid.*, 1457.
[79] *Ibid.*, 1458.

the Premier was conciliatory towards the Russians. Where the Russians requested credits which might involve a future possible repudiation the Premier was an entirely different personality.

The Hague Conference of 1922, following Genoa, was intended to be an economic meeting where experts would examine international economic problems with a view of reaching an ultimate adjustment. The Russian problem was of great importance and presented an aspect of great difficulty. In regard to the restitution of property the Russian Commission refused to make any such restitution. Concerning the question of compensation they were equally obdurate. The Soviet Government refused to admit any liability for compensation. Any concessions which they would make would be contingent upon the receipt of credits.[80]

The Commons were told that it was a delusion to suppose that propaganda had ceased, or that promises given by the Russian that Government had stopped it. Many declarations were made propaganda would cease, but these have not materialized. The Under Secretary, Mr. McNeil, said: "We know perfectly well it is going on in many parts of the world and that is only one of the several efforts." The English Government could not grant recognition other than the de facto so long as Soviet policies remained unaltered.[81]

A note protesting against the seizure of ships and mistreatment of British citizens was sent to Moscow. The note did not definitely threaten to break off relations, but reminded Russia of her duty to observe the rules of international law. This attitude evidently represented a compromise between the two elements in the Cabinet. One element wished to terminate relations, while the other favored resuming trade relations.[82] The British note called attention to the peculiar character of the relations existing between the two Governments since the signing of the Trade Agreement.[83] The advisability of terminating trade relations was considered. Many instances of Soviet aggressiveness and faithlessness were enumerated. The question was asked

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[80] Parl. Debates, Vol. 162, 844, 845, March 29, 1923.
[81] *Ibid.*, 843.
[82] *New York Times*, May 8, 1923. Note to Moscow.

whether "His Majesty's Government can, with self-respect, continue to ignore the repeated challenges which the Soviet Government has thought fit with apparent deliberation to throw down?" A definite statement of Soviet views was therefore desired.[84]

The purpose of the Trade Agreement was to promote commercial relations. The question of resuming political relations was postponed until commercial relations should have been tested, and other desired conditions met by the Soviet Government. This action by Britain was in advance of any like action by any other Government. His Majesty's Government considered the conclusion of such relations as "a material contribution to the stability and prosperity of the Russian State." The British Government acknowledged that immediately after the signing of the Trade Agreement a slight curtailment of propaganda activities occurred, only to be resumed later with renewed intensity. The Government rests the evidence of their charges upon communications passing between the Soviet Government and its agents.[85]

The Government claimed to know the exact amounts of money sent to the Russian Minister at Teheran to be used for "Anti-British intrigue." The activities in the region of Iraq, and Kermanshah were attributed to emanate from the above source. In a communication to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in February, 1922, M. Shumiatsky said: "Our mission in carrying out the instructions which your telegram amplifies had decided on this political line of action, especially in North Persia and Teheran; a good group of workers has been organized who can act in an anti-British direction with real activity. . . If the Commissary for Foreign Affairs will agree to the plan of the Mission, for the first expenditure 300,000 tomans will be necessary as a credit to enable us to work."[86]

The Soviet representative in Afghanistan was described as a man of "exceptional zeal." On February 17, 1923, the Soviet authorities in Tashkend were informed that every possible means should be employed "to aggravate the undoubted existing

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[83] Russia, No. 2, 1923, 6. *Times*, May 9, 1923, 11. Text of note.
[84] *Ibid.*, *Times*, May 9, 1923, 11. Text.
[85] *Ibid.*
[86] *Ibid.*, 7. Text of British note.

crisis by making a breach between Afghanistan and the English," and that "the immediate delivery of arms would have an immense significance." The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was told of having received a communication from the Soviet representative at Kabul. The representative stated that instruction regarding the spread of intelligence work were being executed. The funds appropriated for the purpose were deemed insufficient, limitting the amount for effective effort.[87]

M. Raskolnikov communicating to M. Karakhan (now Soviet Ambassador to China) urged the advisability of maintaining connection with the Indian revolutionaries, and encouraging their effort. A contribution of 15,000 rupees was recommended for a continuance of the work. The Soviet repudiation of any connection with the Third International was considered unreliable. The Soviet Commissar for Finance was also a member of the International, who approved the allotment of £80,000 and £120,000 for work among the British and Communist parties. About £75,000 had arrived in England by the beginning of January, 1923. The Soviet Government was accused of having trained, in propaganda schools, sixty-two students for work in India. These were sent to their respective fields of labor.[88]

In regard to the reputed faithlessness of the Soviet authorities the note said: "It is clearly impossible that an arrangement should be perpetuated which is faithfully observed by one party and as systematically violated by the other. Unless such acts are repudiated and apologized for, and unless the officials who have been responsible for them are disowned and recalled from the scene of the maleficent labours it is manifestly impossible to persevere with an agreement which is so one-sided in its operations."[89] The note demanded complete satisfaction for the execution of Mr. C. F. Davison in the form of making compensation for his widow. Mrs. Stan Harding, who was injured in 1920, must also be granted satisfactory payment. The plan

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[87] Russia, No. 2, 1923, 7, 8.
[88] *Ibid.*, 8, 9.
[89] *Ibid.*, Correspondence, H. M. Government, and Soviet Government, on relations. Curzon to Mrs. Hodgson, May 2, 1923.

was suggested of each Government selecting an arbitrator to determine upon equitable compensation. In event of this proposal being unacceptable, it was further proposed to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, or to some other party of impartial standing.[90]

Satisfaction was also demanded for treatment accorded to British Trawlers, which was in contravention of accepted principles of international law. The steam Trawler *Magneta*, while fishing about nine miles from the Murman coast in January, 1922, was wrecked, losing ten men drowned. The *St. Hubert*, while fishing more than twelve miles from shore, was confiscated by the Soviet authorities. The Trawler, *James Johnson*, was seized, and its catch confiscated. Its master was sentenced to forced labor. The Government insisted upon compensation to the owners of the destroyed trawlers and for the death of the crew, the restoration of other trawlers detained with adequate compensation, and freedom from interference outside the three-mile limit for fishing vessels.[91]

The note protested against the execution of ecclesiastics occupying high positions in the Greek Orthodox Church. The Soviet Government was accused of being hostile to religion. The note said: "No attempt, however, is made in Russia itself to deny these prosecutions, and executions are part of a delicate campaign undertaken by the Soviet Government, with the definite object of destroying all religion in Russia and authorizing the image of goddesses in its place."[92] The note, after demanding complete satisfaction and adjustment of the outstanding controversies hinted at a possible severance of relations. It was suggested that if within ten days of the receipt of the note the Soviet Foreign Ministry did not comply with its terms the relations might be suspended.[93]

The Soviet reply to Lord Curzon's note was lengthy and pacific in character. The Soviet Government expressed surprise at the decisive attitude contained in the British note. The

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[90] Russia, No. 2, 1923, 10.
[91] *Ibid.*
[92] *Ibid.*, 11.
[93] *Ibid.*, 13.

British note was asserted to have been garbed in the form of an ultimatum, to secure satisfaction for, as the Russians said, a "secondary misunderstanding." Such methods were not conducive towards the restoration of "satisfactory relations" between the two countries. The Russian people appreciated the fact that the English were the first to conclude trade agreements with Russia. However, it should be remembered that the benefits accruing from such agreement were by no means one-sided. Attention was drawn to the fact that Russian raw materials released had produced a favorable effect on Europe's economic situation.[94]

The abnormality of relations mentioned in the British memorandum was admitted by the Russians. The note said: "The Russian Government has always striven for complete clearing up of relations, for a frank discussion of all the questions at issue between the two states, and for the establishment of a firmer basis of understanding, which would eliminate as far as possible, all friction and conflicts." The British Government was accused of having "avoided a businesslike discussion" of the issue and of having made a settlement more difficult.[95]

The Soviet Government claimed to be in possession of sufficiently incriminating documents proving that British agents were active in arousing opposition to the Russian Government. This activity was especially pronounced in the regions of the republics in the Caucasus, and in Soviet possessions located in Central Asia. However, in the interest of a friendly understanding between the two nations, these facts were withheld. Again, the authenticity of some documents intercepted may have been of questionable value. The Russian Government regretted that the British Governmen placed such reliance upon "such doubtful material." The telegrams contained in the British memorandum were characterized as "invented, falsified, altered, and arbitrarily supplemented extracts from deciphered telegrams."[95]

The Russian Government did not deny that it sent money to its agents in the East. This money, however, was employed

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[94] Russia No. 3, 1923, 2. Reply of Soviet Govt. to H. M. Govt. on relations.
[95] *Ibid.*, 2, 3. *New York Times*, May 15, 1923, 3. Text.

for other purposes than propaganda. Russian agents had other purposes than propaganda where funds could be used. The principle of the Soviet régime was to cultivate the friendship of eastern nations, but they were unable to understand why such friendships could inspire Britain. The Russian note observed that "In the opinion of the British Government the Russian republic should not have any policy of its own in the East at all, but should everywhere support the policy of Great Britain." The Russian Government would be unable to assume any commitments of this character.[97]

The Russian Government was willing to indemnify the family of Mr. Davison, and Mrs. Stan Harding. Mr. Davison was executed after being found guilty of escaping at a time when England still maintained the blockade, and was actively intervening on Russian soil. The execution took place sixteen months prior to the conclusion of the Trade Agreement. The British were reminded that they executed twenty-six Commissars in Baku, and held others for years in prison without trial. Therefore, if the principle of compensation was to apply it should be made reciprocal.[98]

While questions of religion do not enter into the relations between the two Governments, yet for the correct information of public opinion, it may be necessary to make mention of it. The Russian reply said: "The Russian Government considers it necessary to repudiate in the most categorical fashion in the baseless assertions that it has persecuted any religion whatsoever. Soviet justice punishes only those ecclesiastics who abuse their position as officials of the Church for political activity against the internal or external safety of the Soviet republics."[99]

The Soviet Government expressed its sincere desire for a restoration of friendly relations with England. In spite of past misunderstandings, peace and friendship with England were desirable in the interest of universal peace and the economic

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[96] Russia No. 3, 1923, 2, 3, 4.
[97] *Ibid.*, 5, 6. *New York Times*, May 15, 1923, 3.
[98] *Ibid.*, 5, 6.
[99] *Ibid.*

restoration of Europe. Russia was ready to settle upon a peaceful basis any disputes between the two peoples.[100]

The Russian reply to the British note was considered unsatisfactory. The reply briefly discussed the four British propositions. The Soviet Government expressed itself willing to pay for damages to British fishing whatever an international Conference concluded was just, and to leave fishing unmolested outside the three-mile limit. The Soviet Government was willing to make compensation for the death of Mr. Davison, and injuries to Mrs. Harding. This was regarded as a concession and was not to be considered as a retraction of the equity of the punishments inflicted. The Weinstein letters were to be recalled. It was evident the Soviet Government contended that the issues over the proper observance of the trade agreement could best be adjusted by delegates selected by each Government. The Soviet Government was ready to consider any specific infringement of the trade agreement and make proper satisfaction, provided reciprocity was observed.[101] The *Times* was of the conviction that trade with Russia could best be negotiated by following the course adopted in America, of having no trade agreement, or Soviet delegation.[102]

The text of the British memorandum for May 29, showed a conciliatory attitude without abrogating any of the essential British demands. The spirit of concession adopted by the Soviet Government to meet the British conditions was duly acknowledged. The resumption of the most friendly intercourse under the Trade Agreement was still hindered by propaganda against certain British dominions. Upon the cessation of same cordial relations ought to occur.[103]

The British Government notes with gratification that three of its demands have been admitted. The Government was entirely amenable to the suggestion of selecting an international commission to determine the extent of damage inflicted on British

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[100] Russia, No. 3, 1923, 7.
[101] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1923, 2, 3. Further correspondence between H. M. Government and Soviet Russia.
[102] *Times*, May 24, 1923, 11.
[103] *Ibid.*, June 14, 1923, 16. Text.

fishing, and for the consideration of adequate compensation. British fishing was not to be interrupted outside the three-mile limit by the Soviet authorities. The determination of the extent of territory, by a commission, also met with British approval. The conciliatory position indicated by the Soviet authorities in expressing a willingness to make proper compensation to Mrs. Davison for the death of her husband, and to Mrs. Harding for injuries sustained, was fully acknowledged. The British Government entertained the proposition that a payment of £10,000 and £3,000 respectively to the respective claimants would render the necessary amends.[104]

Concerning the all-important consideration of propaganda directed against British institutions, the promise of the Soviet Government was unsatisfactory. The note remarks: "His Majesty's Government cannot conceal their surprise and disappointment that on this point the Russian note gives no satisfaction whatever." Yet the continuance of the Trade Agreement was made contingent upon the Soviet Government faithfully observing the conditions of the agreement. The quotations from the telegraphic communications between Soviet officials was regarded as authentic by the British Government, and therefore not subject to inquiry by any commission. If the Soviet Government gives assurance that the officials responsible for the obnoxious telegrams will be removed to other regions persistence in the original demands will cease. The British Government also promised to cease encouraging any movement having for its purpose the "overthrow of existing institutions in Russia."[105]

The Soviet answer in the Memorandum of June 4, 1923, expressed satisfaction that their concessions regarding (a) Mr. Weinstein, (b) compensation for measures against two British subjects, (c) fisheries and trawlers, satisfied the British conditions. The British contention of the international legal aspects of the fishing dispute was accepted. The amount of compensation

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[104] Russia, No. 4, 1923, 5, 6. *Times*, June 14, 1923, 16. Text.
[105] *Ibid.*, 6, 8.

requested by the British Government for injuries to her subjects was conceded.[106]

The Soviet Government also called the attention of the British Government to the fact that an execution of the Trade Agreement was a reciprocal obligation. They claimed that an exact observance of the text would prevent "any assistance by the British Government or by the Government of its colonies, dominions, protectorates, etc., to any monarchic, white guard, or other hostile design against the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and Allies." The Russians admitted the necessity for a businesslike settlement of disputes regarding the charges preferred against their representatives at Kabul and Teheran. If, after careful investigation, the charges were substantiated, the Soviet Government expressed their willingness to recall the offending officials.[107]

The Soviet Government was unable to admit the claims of other British subjects who claimed to have suffered injuries inflicted by the Russian authorities. Attention was called to the fact that their claims were insignificant when compared with "the terrible calamities which have befallen millions of the population of the Soviet Republic through the blockade and intervention of the Entente countries." The spirit that has actuated the Soviet Government in making such extensive concessions is professed to be their desire to avert economic disaster in Europe.[108]

The British Government in their memorandum of June 13, 1923, expressed almost complete approval of the conciliatory manner in which the Soviet Government met British conditions. The concessions in regard to the limits of territorial waters; the compensation of injured parties; and the cessation of propaganda, have met essential British demands. The British Government also undertakes to refrain from encouraging any counter-revolutionary movement designed to overthrow the Soviet Government. The essential conditions having been met, the British Government regards the correspondence as brought to a conclusion.[109]

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[106] Russia, No. 4, 1923, 10, 11.
[107] *Ibid.*, 10, 11. *Times*, June 14, 1923, 16. Text Soviet note.
[108] *Ibid.*, 11.
[109] *Ibid.*, 13, 14.

Litvinoff, assistant commissioner for Foreign Affairs, sent a note to the French Government, stating that the Soviet Government knew exactly the number of ships General Wrangel transferred to the French Government. It was also reported that the sale of these ships to the Roumanian Government was being negotiated. He protested emphatically that such action was contrary to the profession of friendship for the Russian people made by France. The consequence for refusing to hand over the fleet to Soviet Russia would remain with France.[110]

The Soviet Government remained unsatisfied with M. Poincaré's explanation for the sale of Russian vessels. Poincaré recognized the ships to be Russian property, but contended that no restoration could be executed until a legal government was established in Russia. He stated that France as a creditor nation, was justified in detaining Russian property.[111] Tchitcherin protested, in his answer, that such detention was an unfriendly act towards the Russian people. France, it was indicated, would not recognize similar claims by England and America. Regarding the French contention that Soviet Russia repudiated her debts, Tchitcherin stated that at Genoa Russia expressed her willingness to recognize the Tsarist debts provided Russia's counter-claims were also admitted.[112] These counter-claims are discussed elsewhere.

With the installation of the Labor Government under the leadership of Premier MacDonald, the recognition of Soviet Russia became a practical certainty. Such recognition occurred about a month after his assumption of the Premiership. On the night of February 1, 1924, an official statement was issued containing the text of a Note sent to the British representative for presentation to the Soviet authorities. The Note accorded recognition to the Soviet Government. They were invited to send plenipotentiaries to London to discuss the question of existing treaties and claims between both individuals and Governments. The settlement of these questions was considered necessary to

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[110] *Times*, June 16, 1923, 12.
[111] *Ibid.*, July 11, 1923, 11.
[112] *Ibid.*

complete the friendly relations and to restore full commercial intercourse.[113]

The Soviet régime was recognized as "the de jure rulers of those territories of the old Russian Empire which acknowledged their authority." However, in order to restore normal commercial relations, it was necessary "to conclude definite practical agreements on a variety of matters" which concerned intimately or remotely the question of recognition. Commercial relations was such a question. The British Government was advised that according to the accepted principles of international law the treaties concluded between the two countries previous to the Revolution except where these have been denounced, or have otherwise judiciously lapsed" would come automatically into force. The settlement of "existing claims" on either side and the "restoration of Russia's credit" were of prime importance. Propaganda on either side was to be abandoned. No full restoration of friendship could be accomplished so long as one party had reason "to suspect the other of carrying on propaganda, in its interests, and directed to the overthrow of its institutions." The Soviet Government was urged to send representatives "armed with full power" to discuss all outstanding differences between the two countries.[114]

The Soviet Government acknowledged the receipt of de jure recognition from England in a communication to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated February 8, 1924. They expressed their willingness to settle all claims at issue arising out of the "fact of recognition." They were also desirous of reaching an understanding on the treaties which have lapsed or lost their force. The Soviet representatives were to be sent to London to discuss methods of restoring Russian credit. Promise was also given to abstain from interference in the internal affairs of England. A Russian envoy to Great Britain was also appointed.[115]

At the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian conversa-

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[113] *Times*, Feb. 2, 1924, 10.
[114] *Ibid.*, Text of British Note.
[115] Bulletin, No. 6, June 30, 1925, 7, 8. American Library in Paris, and *Times*, February 9, 1924, 10.

tions the Italian Government was also in correspondence with Moscow over the question of recognition. These conversations were, however, in serious danger of disruption. Pessimism prevailed as to ultimate success. Under Premier Mussolini's leadership an agreement was reached upon the outstanding difficulties. These were confirmed in a treaty between the two states, which also provided for de jure recognition of Moscow. The right to possess and to bequeath property was to be granted to the nationals of either nation. Italian shipping was to receive special treatment, and the tariff on Italian goods was to be reduced. No specific commercial concessions were granted to the Italians.[116] The *Messagero* asserted that the Treaty had been signed "after it has been found opportune to propose and accept on both sides certain modifications, and above all, after the clearing up of some points on which doubt was felt in view of the new negotiations proposed by Mr. MacDonald."[117]

The Russian policy of the MacDonald Government was attacked by the opposition in the Commons. Premier MacDonald in justifying his policy of recognizing Soviet Russia, in a speech to the Commons, said: "As Foreign Minister I recognize Russia without delay, and with full approval of the Government. The point of view I took was this: I want to settle all the outstanding points between Russia and ourselves. It is a big job, certainly it is a job that somebody sooner or later had to face, and I made up my mind to face it, and to tackle it." Mr. MacDonald thought that questions of debt, propaganda, foreign relations, doubtful treaties, and threatened war could not be settled so long as Russia was not diplomatically represented in London. Recognition was thus considered as a preliminary settlement. This course was recommended to, and was adopted by the Cabinet.[118]

Mr. MacDonald denies that there was any delay by Moscow in making proper return acknowledgments. The All-Russian Soviet to whom the message of recognition was sent was re-

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[116] *Times*, Feb. 2, 1924, 10.
[117] *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1924, 9.
[118] Parliament Debates, Vol. 169, 768, Feb. 12, 1924.

garded by the Prime Minister as the supreme authority in Russia. Its membership at the time consisted of 2000 representatives gathered from all over the Russian realm. The Premier said: "I made up my mind that the message of recognition should go there. It went there and within an hour of its receipt a message of the most cordial character was on its way to the Foreign Office here."[119] The Soviet Government also agreed to appoint members to an Anglo-Russian commission which should consider all the details regarding a settlement of the debts. Other differences from among the catalogue of outstanding differences, would be referred to this commission for settlement, with the approval of the Russian and British representatives.[120]

The New Statesman was of the opinion that the Prime Minister did well in the Russian question. The recognition of Russia was believed to have met the approval of the majority of people. A small section still appeared to have favored Tsardom. Many problems still remained to be adjusted, but with a common will to settlement on both sides, there did not appear to be any difficulty in reaching an adjustment. Such at least were the sanguine hopes entertained by certain persons at the time of Russian recognition.[121]

In the spring of 1924, the question of recognizing Russia was again agitated in France. M. Poincaré, when questioned in the Chamber, said that the Government had made several overtures at the Genoa Conference to engage the Russian delegates in conversation, but without success. He admitted that France had no concern with the internal régime in Russia. The French attitude towards Russia was fully known in regard to settling the economic questions. The French Government only asked "the Soviet Government to accept the ordinary principles regulating the relations between nations." This, M. Poincaré said, was also the "attitude of the United States."[122] M. Poincaré was desirous of seeing the conversations between the British and

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[119] Parl. Debates,, Vol. 169, 768, Feb. 12, 1924.
[120] *Ibid.*, Vol. 22, 533, Feb. 16, 1924.
[121] New Statesman, Vol. 22, 533, Feb. 16, 1924.
[122] *Times*, April 10, 1924, 13.

Soviet Governments succeed. He drew the attention of the fact that the situation of the Russian stockholders could not be decided by individual understanding between nation and nation. Any settlement must take into consideration the total debt. The British Government was advised to keep this fact in mind during the conversations. In case the British Government wished France to take part in the conversations, then the French Ambassador should refer at once the matter to Paris.[123]

The anticipated Anglo-Russian Conference to settle the outstanding differences between the two nations was convened in April, 1924. Mr. MacDonald, in opening the Conference, made clear the fact that when a country entered into international relations, especially of a kind involving commercial relations, there must be mutual confidence and a spirit of accommodation on both sides. The de jure recognition accorded to Russia by Great Britain was "unqualified recognition," nor had Great Britain any intention of receding from that position. However, if this de jure recognition was to mean anything, an honest effort must be made by both sides to face the actual situation.[124] The Conference, he declared, demanded the best that both nations could bring to it. His Government was prepared to show all consideration to Russia which it properly could. England would be able, with the restoration of confidence, to assist in Russia's economic reconstruction. The Prime Minister said: "Our interests are mutual, but if we cannot reach an understanding here and now, frankly I do not think you will be able to repeat the attempt with this or any other British Government, and I do not see where else you can turn with better prospects."[125]

Mr. MacDonald believed that the negotiations to be successful must pay no attention to those distractors who aimed to cast vituperation at one or the other side. The Conference must always keep in mind its opportunities. Any agreement should have in view something more than the object of driving a smart business bargain. There must be the will to agree. He said:

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[123] *Times*, April 10, 1924, 13.
[124] *Ibid.*, April 15, 1924, 14.
[125] *Ibid.*
[126] *Ibid.*

"What promises we see fit to make we shall keep. But our people and interests must be justly dealt with." He did not expect to pay an "improper price" for an agreement, nor was such a condition expected from the Russians.[126]

The Conference was, according to Mr. MacDonald, to consider three main questions. These were (1) to liquidate the past; (2) To reach agreement as to rights and obligations actually existing as between the two countries; (3) To provide as far as possible for peaceful and profitable relations in the future. The first of these heads would take into account the claims of British holders of Russian bonds, and other property owners where holdings were taken away by the Soviet régime. The Russian counter-claims for damages suffered were also to be discussed. The second head dealt with the status of treaties made with the old régime. The third head was intended to replace the Trade Agreement by a new commercial treaty, which should remove the hindrances caused by the differences in the British Soviet Constitutions.[127]

The Prime Minister said he would speak very frankly about "propaganda," or "hostile activities." The activities might be excused when Governments were at enmity with each other, but could not be condoned when a nation was seeking friendly relations with another nation. He said: "It is my duty to make it plain that the people of this country will require more than formal undertakings, and as you know, I myself, have too intimate a knowledge of international movements to be deceived by false distinctions. This will have to be discussed firmly, but I hope in the most amicable spirit, and I also hope, settled in the same spirit."[128]

M. Rakovsky stated the sense of the Russian delegation. He declared that the Soviet Delegation had been furnished with wide power to settle all political questions, and to make on the spot all necessary decisions. While the problem was complex he did not see that any insurmountable obstacles stood in the way of an understanding between Great Britain and the Union

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[127] *Times*, April 15, 1924, 14.
[128] *Ibid.*

of Soviet Socialist Republics. Regarding the possibilities of entering into closer commercial and financial relations, M. Rakovsky said: "The conditions for this existed; the economic structure of Great Britain and that of the Union were complementary." On their side they were ready to do all they could to adjust economic differences which hitherto had stood in the way of "economic and financial co-operation."[129]

M. Rakovsky said in regard to British recognition that Russia had hailed the act with acclaim, because they saw in it the desire of Great Britain to work with Russia to secure "universal peace."[130] In connection with this recognition Mr. MacDonald said that propaganda internally inspired might be excusable, but it was illegitimate when externally encouraged. Its cessation was a condition to the re-establishment of cordial relations between the two states.[131] The Anglo-Soviet Conference aroused considerable apprehension among responsible Frnech officials. It was believed that a secret effort was being made to reach a settlement advantageous to both negotiators, and detrimental to the Russian creditors of other nations. M. Poincaré was very sensitive to the nature of the Conference. He feared that the first interests of France might be sacrificed at the Conference then in session. In a senatorial speech, he read the Note sent to the British Ambassador. In the Note, he said: "A special settlement in favor of the holders of Russian stock of a certain nationality to the exclusion and without the approval of the others, would inevitably prejudice the settlement of the whole. It would run the risk of injuring other holders and of thus provoking on the part of the latter protests of a nature to create complications of an international order." M. Poincaré did not believe that in making these observations he was departing from the essential reserve kept by statesmen.[132] Mr. MacDonald admitted that the Conference was called to adjust the outstanding issues between the British and the Soviet Government.

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[129] *Times*, April 15, 1924, 14.
[130] *Ibid.*
[131] *Ibid.*, Editorial.
[132] *Ibid.*

The question therefore of the participation of any other Government in the negotiations did not arise.[133]

The French *Temps* pretended to observe two paradoxes involved in the London negotiations. First, the Soviets were requesting a loan thus acknowledging that they were unable to get along without capital. This admission was therefore a contradiction of the main theory of Communism upon which the Soviet régime was reared. Second, the British Labor Party was now assiduously defending the rights of British capital which formerly it fought. The need of a market for British industry was alleged to be the underlying motive for the Conference.[134]

The Labor Government showed that it was not inclined to sacrifice any capitalistic concepts of government. Mr. MacDonald said in regard to contractual obligations: "Unless people know that contractual agreements will be honored to the last letter they will risk nothing. Upon that all credit, however it is given and whoever gives it, must depend." It was evident from the beginning that the question of credit was of outstanding importance. M. Rakovsky said that Russia "requires for its development large quantities of industrial products and credits." It was, therefore, hoped that the other outstanding issue like the debts would be adjusted before the question of credits was approached.[135]

A Conference of London bankers on the eve of the Anglo-Russian Conference, issued a manifesto containing the conditions upon which a loan could be made to Russia. This manifesto contained six conditions. These were: (1) that public and private debts should be recognized; (2) private property should be restored; (3) the creation of a proper civic code, courts of law, and guarantees of private contract; (4) that confiscation be abandoned in the future; (5) that the Soviet Government should not interfere with private trade; and (6) that the Soviet Government abandon all propaganda, especially from governments from whom they requested financial assistance. The

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[133] *Times*, April 15, 1924, 14.
[134] *Ibid.*

"big five" joint stock companies of London were represented in the manifesto.[136]

The Soviet Delegation having been informed of the position of the British on the debt issue were in a position to make a reply. They acknowledged a readiness to set aside "a lump sum to cover the pre-war debts." This action, however, was contingent upon receiving a long-term loan from the British Government. Bonds issued before March 12, 1917, only, were to be recognized. The claim of those who subsequently took part against the Soviet régime would not be allowed. Small claims were to receive priority treatment. The proceeds of the loan were to be used to purchase machinery and other goods required to revive Russian industry and agriculture. The British Delegation replied, that in event a loan was concluded it must necessarily be of a limited amount. The British Government could not assure any guarantee for the proposed loan. The British wanted to know if recognition of the debts included payment of back interest, and if interest payments would be resumed.[137]

The Soviet Delegation replied that their Government was not prepared to pay the full value of the pre-war debts. They considered that the back interest should be cut off. They pointed out that due to the war and subsequent internal turmoil Russia was not in a position to pay in full. The loan was urged as a means of restoring Russian economic life and as an impetus to Anglo-Russian trade. The Russian State Bank would secure the loan. The British again stated that their Government could not guarantee a loan. However, the efforts of the Russians to negotiate a private loan would be looked upon sympathetically by the British Government. This attitude was favorably received by the Russian Delegation.[138]

After four months of apparently fruitless negotiation the Conference finally reached an agreement on some of the questions at issue. These understandings have remained mostly

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[135] *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 125, 657, 658.
[136] *Ibid.*
[137] *Times*, May 22, 1924, 14. *Round Table*, Vol. 14, 685, Sept. 1924. *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 126, 512, Oct. 1924.
[138] *Ibid.*

unfulfilled due to a subsequent change of Government, which failed to agree with the Treaty commitments. At the time of the conclusion of the Treaty the Paris *Temps* saw considerable advantages accruing to England as a result of the Treaty. The Soviet Government expressed a willingness to make an exception, in favor of Britain's citizens, in regard to the decree cancelling the debts, and nationalizing the property. In matters of trade England was to receive most-favored nation treatment. These were valuable advantages of an economic and political character. England then gained on paper the concessions which the Germans tried to obtain at Rapallo. In regard to the loan to Moscow the English Government retained complete liberty of action. The *Temps* thus comments upon the partial moratorium granted to Moscow in regard to Inter-Allied debts. It said: "This postponement *sine die* merely applies to Russian debts, since the Treaty is only Anglo-Russian, but as a matter of fact England cannot ask more from her faithful Allies than she demands from the Bolshevists. Here, again, it is only a question of doctrine, since the payment of Inter-Allied debts is obviously impossible in the present state of things. But it is good that this impossibility should have been declared thus solidly."[139] The French attitude was suspicious and apprehensive of the favorable treatment accorded the Russians to the exclusion of such generous treatment for themselves from England.

The Treaty was the recipient of much adverse criticism and comment. The conviction was held in many quarters that essential British rights had been sacrificed. It was claimed to be neither a treaty nor an agreement. Any treaty presumes a certain amount of reciprocity. This Treaty was accused of having given no advantage of any kind to England. A loan is the center of the agreement. This was not floated as the Commons thus far refused to pledge the national credit of England to secure the loan. While the Russians requested loans they condemned capital. The question was asked whether it would be expedient to sanction a loan where the proceeds might be used to promote disorder in the Balkans, Egypt, India, and the

[139] *Times*, Aug. 9, 1924, 10. Le Temps quoted.

East? The Labor Government recognized the Soviet repudiation of their obligations. Respect for the integrity of international laws is the investors only protection against loss.[140]

By Article II, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the monopoly of the Foreign Trade belongs with the Soviet Government. Soviet trade representatives are given diplomatic immunities. This is a dangerous precedent. Clause 2 provides that the commercial transactions shall come under the jurisdiction of the British Courts. However, the Russians gave no security to recognize the jurisdiction of the British Courts. Under these privileges not much progress could be made. Coasting trade shall be open to England on the same terms granted to other nations. However, by Article XIII the Soviet Government reserves to the Union Government the right to carry goods and passengers between the ports of the same or different seas. Through rates may be established. This might hinder England as in the case of Germany's through rates. The conditions of the the Treaty operate to the disadvantage of England, at least they could be so employed.[141]

The Russian Treaties raised the important question, what would be the position of the Dominions in relation to them. The Treaties were concluded between Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the one part, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other. The crown was eliminated, and the terms used instead do not include the Dominions. There was evidence that the negotiations marked a forward step in restoring friendly relations between the two nations. The opinion prevailed that the economic provisions of these Treaties were contrary to British interests. These would not prove fruitful to commercial relations between the two nations.[142] Article X is of great importance. It provides that the Government of the Union will take into account the business belonging to the Englishmen and nationalized by the Soviet Government. It recognized its liability to grant "just compensation for such claims." How far this will lead to cash returns to the expro-

[140] *The aSturday Review*, Vol. 138, 161, Aug. 16, 1924.
[141] *Ibid.*
[142] *Round Table*, Vol. 14, 684, 685, Sept. 1924.

priated remains to be seen.[143] The British Government by providing its guarantee, would secure satisfaction for its own subjects. The reasons for the guarantee were that Russian credit was worthless. The guarantee would supply the required funds, but could not restore Russian credit. The industrial situation would be favorably affected, it was thought.[144] These concessions marked a departure from adherence to strict Communist principles.

If one were in ignorance of the conditions under which the British conducted the negotiations they might regard it as a betrayal of British interests. The experts at the Foreign Office were handicapped by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ponsonby, who was largely responsible for the negotiations.[145] The first paragraph of Article I, contained the "most favored nation" clause. However, certain reservations were retained which made it possible for the Soviet Union to discriminate against English Commerce and yet remain within the Treaty terms. British commerce was here outmanouvered.[146] Article VIII, provides for "national treatment" of citizens of one country in the domain of the other. This, under certain circumstances would prove injurious and discriminatory to British subjects in Russia.[147]

Article VI provided for the payment of British landholders, but did not include holders of shares in Russian concerns nationalized, who received no benefit from the Treaty. British security holdings were put at between £40,000,000 and £50,000,000. The British Government agreed to be satisfied with the terms agreed upon by the "parties concerned." Again, no terms shall be binding unless they represent at least not less than half the capital value of British holdings. Thus it would be entirely possible for Russia to capitalize these terms by reaching an agreement with those purchasers of Russian bonds at a greatly depreciated value. These, provided they equalled half the

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[143] *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. 126, 512, Oct. 1924.
[144] *Round Table*, Vol. 14, 685, 686.
[145] *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. 122, 497, Oct. 1924.
[146] *Ibid.*, 498, 499.
[147] *Ibid.*, 500, 501.

value of the British holdings, might be settled by Russia at such a figure that would represent a gain both to Russia and the purchaser of depreciated bonds. In event of this possible contingency occurring the bond holders whose holdings represent substantial investments would be sacrificed. The British Government in this event would be powerless to alleviate the situation.[148]

By guaranteeing the loan the British Government would, for the first time use its great influence to condone the repudiation by a foreign government of its obligations. Such action might compromise the eminent position of British finance in the international market. The opinion was expressed that "the estrangement of the already irreconcilable extremists in the Labor Party would not have been too high a price to pay for the failure of the Russian Treaty in its present form."[149]

The Treaty had been signed about two months, and diplomatic relations were evidently functioning normally between the two nations when suddenly like an unexpected thunder crash the Zinovieff letter was published. The letter contained the suggestion for the exchange of workers between the two nations to "extend and develop" propaganda of Leninism. The natural British inclination to compromise must first be overcome before successful work could be conducted in England, and the Dominions against capitalism.[150] The Foreign Office sent a letter to M. Rakovsky protesting against the letter of Zinovieff to the British Communist Party. The Zinovieff letter was believed to have come from the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The letter contained instructions to British subjects "to work for the violent overthrow of existing institutions in this country, and for the subversion of His Majesty's armed forces as a means to that end." The Soviet Government apparently in correct diplomatic relations with England, should not permit any parallel Russian organization to disseminate its propaganda throughout England. To allow such activities was not only a breach of the international comity,

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[148] The Nation and the Athenaeum (London) Vol. 36, 103, Oct. 18, 1924.
[149] *Round Table*, Vol. 14, 686, 687, Sept. 1924.
[150] *Times*, Oct. 25, 1924, 12. Text of letter.

but also of the "solemn undertakings repeatedly given to His Majesty's Government."[151]

On June 4, 1923, the Soviet Government undertook "not to support with funds or in any other form, persons, or bodies, or agencies, or institutions whose aim is to spread discontent, or to foment rebellion in any part of the British Empire, and to impress upon its officers and officials the full and continuous observance of these conditions." The Soviet Government if possessing power to carry out its engagements should do so. If it does not possess such authority then it should not enter into international commitments, which it was unable to fulfill.[152]

M. Rakovsky, in denying the Zinovieff letters referred to the Anglo-Russian Treaties and agreements which provide that any incident tending to disturb the relations of the two nations should be settled by "direct conversations." By adhering to this rule many incidents of a disturbing nature might be liquidated in a "friendly way." M. Rakovsky called attention to the fact that when a distinguished English professor spoke emphatically against the Soviet Government at the Conference of the League of Nations, the Soviet Government made no protest. These statements also were considered to have been in violation of the agreements between the two nations. The letter was characterized as a "gross forgery" intended to hinder British-Soviet friendship, and as a "tissue of absurdities."[153] There was considerable discussion as to the authenticity of the letter. The British Foreign Office, however, was convinced of the accuracy of the letter as published. The partisans of the Labor Government claimed it was a fabrication released at the opportune moment to discredit the Government in the estimation of the British public. However, the letter has the well-known ring of Zinovieff about it, and may very well be authentic.

It would appear that the Soviet Government has not relinquished its policy of repudiation and denunciation of solemn obligations notwithstanding the English Treaty. The Zinovieff declaration on April 15, 1924, over precipitating the revolution

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[151] *Times*, Oct. 25, 1924, 12 and Bulletin, No. 6, June 30, 1925, 9. American Library, Paris.

[152] *Ibid.*

[153] *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1924, 11. Text of Reply.

in England would indicate this much. He plainly stated that in certain events obligations would not be honored. The Zinovieff letter was probably intended to hasten the English revolution.[154]

Sir Arthur Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under the Baldwin Government, sent a note to M. Rakovsky, stating that the Treaty concluded by the MacDonald Government had been under review. It was found inexpedient to recommend the Treaty to the "consideration of Parliament," or to the King for ratification."[155] Mr. Chamberlain also told M. Rakovsky that the Russian note characterizing the Zinovieff letter as a forgery, could not be accepted by His Majesty's Government. Nor is the Zinovieff letter the only incident arousing the resentment of the British Government. He said that "activities" complained of, were not confined merely to the Zinovieff letter alone. There was, on the contrary, an insiduous attempt at propaganda being pursued in English of which the Zinovieff letter was merely a specimen.[156] The Soviet reply stated that they could not accept any of the consequences that would arise between the two nations as a result of the position taken by the British Government. The Letter of Zinovieff was again described as a "forgery." It was alleged that known agencies existed on British soil whose purpose was to organize the downfall of the Moscow régime. The offer of an impartial investigation commission was respected by the British Government.[157]

The Spectator had supported the Russian Treaty, not on account of any liking for the Soviet or their aims, but because it was deemed necessary to restore once again Russia to the comity of nations. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state was a first condition also of foreign affairs. It was hoped that trade, the "universal solvent," might have an effacious effect in modifying the Soviet Government. The idea of a commercial Treaty was also approved, nor were any objections made against the proposed loan. The

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[154] *Times*, Oct. 27, 1924, 13. See chapter on Propaganda.
[155] *Ibid.*, Nov. 22, 1924, 12. Text of Chamberlain's note.
[156] *Ibid.*, 12.
[157] *Ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1924, 12. Text of Russian reply.

Zinovieff letters had, however, shown them that they were too hasty in their approval of the Treaty. They were unable to treat with anyone who permitted, or encouraged interference in England's internal affairs.[158]

In the latter part of October, 1924, the French Government under Herriot, followed the example of England and Italy in according recognition to Soviet Russia. De jure recognition was to be accorded to that section of the former Russian Empire, which acknowledged the sovereignty of the Moscow régime. Previous treaties and obligations held by Frenchmen were to be honored. Relations were to be re-established when "confidence will have been justified." Interference in internal affairs was to be abandoned. In reply, the Soviet Government appointed an Ambassador to negotiate matters of controversy with France, with the object of reaching a satisfactory settlement. With the renewal of "misunderstandings" friendly intercourse should revive. Commercial relations were to be re-established. Propaganda was to be stopped, and a "friendly solution" of disputes sought by negotiation.[159] The French conditions of recognition were more reserved than those of England.

The fall of the labor Government was a blow to Rakovsky's hopes. He had hoped, in full sincerity to construct a bridge between Russia and England. His efforts were frustrated by the election which returned a Conservative Government. The new Government was ushered into power as a result of the Zinovieff letter, and general hatred of the Soviet ideas. M. Rakovsky was summoned back to Moscow for instructions. Serious issues had arisen. Rakovsky had heard that England was contemplating to organize the world against Russia. He was confident that no evil consequences would eventuate, and to that effect would inform Moscow. He felt that despite differences of social conations, yet co-operation might be established between the two nations.[160] A commercial treaty, if negotiated and desirable, must be divorced from any obligation to grant a loan. The remarks of M. Rakovsky regarding non-

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[158] *The Spectator*, Vol. 133, 633, November 1924.
[159] Bulletin, No. 6, June 30, 1925, 7, 8. American Library, Paris.

interference in internal affairs were of importance. However, so long as the Third International can conduct subversive propaganda the resumption of a normal, friendly feeling will be retarded. His efforts at a solution were largely neutralized by the revolutionary invectives that were emitted almost continuously by responsible Soviet leaders.[161]

The British Foreign Office has evidence of the trouble making fomented, and encouraged by the Bolsheviki. The recent uprising in Egypt was probably encouraged by Soviet agents. The clearing house of Soviet propaganda is located in Vienna. The British also know that the ferment in India was largely the result of Soviet agitation. Therefore, knowing these facts, the British Government does not allow the recognition of Soviet Russia to make any appreciable difference in its attitude towards the present Russian régime.[162]

A resume of the British relations with Soviet Russia during the past seven years shows results far from encouraging. The British nation, with the deep common sense and practicality which characterize their actions, entered into a series of negotiations with Soviet Russia with every evident intention to resume friendly normal intercourse with them. With this object in view the Trade Agreement was negotiated; later de jure recognition was accorded; and in August, 1924, the Anglo-Russian Treaty was concluded. Propaganda has evidently continued without remission. Whatever the cause and whoever is responsible, a spirit of mistrust and suspicion has pervaded throughout the entire negotiations and relations. The results which have accrued to England, as a reward of her undoubtedly sincere desire to resume relations with Russia, ought to serve as a warning that extreme vigilance is necessary in connection with any relations assumed with Soviet Russia.

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[160] *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. 123, 323, March 2, 1925.
[161] *Ibid.*, 325, March 2, 1925.
[162] *N. Y. Times*, Feb. 27, 1925, 4.

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Trade Possibilities

The advocates of recognition have very strongly emphasized the commercial advantages to be derived from such action. It is the purpose of the present chapter to present a view of Soviet Russia's economic condition as it existed since the war. Russian production at the present remains considerably below the pre-war scale, although some improvement has recently occurred. Too much importance, however, should not be attached to the realization of pre-war production, since the present productions of the important nations exceeds their pre-war figures, especially in industry. The recent improvement in Russia internal conditions, while highly desirable, is not sufficient in itself to affect America's economic prospects either favorably or unfavorably. Russia has never figured prominently in the field of international trade. This has been due to her isolated position, and especially to the simple requirements of her population. Other western nations of vastly smaller populations than that of Russia have purchased and consumed much larger quantities of American products than Russia. An historic survey of Russian-American commercial relations presents at least no sound basis for any too exalted optimism of present possibilities. However, a distinct change must occur in the desires and wants of the Russian peasantry before any extensive commercial relations can develop with America. The Soviet policy towards trading with foreign nations with its severe restrictions has not succeeded in attracting the required capital needed for internal development. Their policy of promoting exports and restricting imports, while not censurable, does not promote trade.

During the pre-war days the Russian population gained their livelihood by engaging mostly in agriculture, grazing and forestry. There was also some mining, manufacturing and hunting. Each of these occupations produced more commodities than the people engaged in them could consume. The surplus was sent to other sections where a demand existed. The minerals were

sent from the Urals to the industrial sections about Moscow and Petrograd. Oil and coal were shipped many miles to points of utilization and consumption. In this manner the economic life was kept functioning normally, insuring a degree of prosperity.[1] However, as a result of the war, much of this economic machinery became functionless, or greatly demoralized.

After the Bolshevists gained power in November, 1917, the report was circulated that the United States would forbid all exports to Russia. This was the occasion for much unwarranted discussion and nervous anxiety. The following facts regarding the imposition of restrictions upon Russian trade will clarify the situation. On November 1, 1917, the export of controlled commodities to Russia was forbidden by the War Trade Board, unless the Russian Supply Committee gave its previous consent. All unlicensed trade was forbidden on November 19, and in February, 1918, permission was required from the State Department to obtain the necessary license for Russian trade.[2] This commercial embargo failed to stop the Bolshevists in their persistent efforts to establish some form of relations with America.

In May, 1918, they renewed the offensive for American recognition by offering a prospect for the establishment of commercial relations. This proposition was brought to America by Colonel Robins, who had been in Russia with the American Relief Administration, upon his return. The project was formulated by the Council of National Economy[3] in Russia, with the approval of Lenin who himself presented the plan to Colonel Robins. This latter move was purely economic, or at least professed to be so. The Soviet leaders pointed out that the war completely altered Russo-American commercial relations. The favored position formerly occupied by Germany, as an exporter to Russia, could be filled by America since Russia required agricultural machinery and manufactured articles. Colonel Robins upon returning, urged upon the Washington authorities the advisability of appointing an expert economic commission.

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[1] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 38, 249.
[2] Dennis, A. L. P., Foreign Policies Soviet Russia, 458, 459.
[3] *Ibid.*, 463, 464.

The commission was to survey the Russian field and recommend such plans as were deemed feasible. The argument was advanced that the International Harvester Company had increased its volume of business under Soviet rule. This accomplishment was claimed to augur well for other American concerns. However, upon investigation, it was discovered that the Harvester Company was obliged to discontinue operations due to interferences exercised by the Soviet régime.[3]

In August, 1919, M. Martens, the so-called Soviet Ambassador to America, said that the Bolshevists had large quantities of raw materials for shipment to America. The statement reaffirmed the declaration that the Soviets desired to purchase $200,000,000 worth of commodities in America. The merchandise was to have been shipped immediately. Mr. Strem, the Bolshevist representative in Stockholm, claimed to have been duly authorized by the Bolshevist authorities at Moscow to guarantee payments. The Bolshevists were then ready to issue importation permits which allowed goods to be received into Russia from foreigners. He also announced that a gold credit was about to be established in Stockholm to be drawn upon for trade purposes.

The following were the credits and commodities desired by Russia; $15,000,000 for railway materials; $30,000,000 for farming supplies and tractors; $10,000,000 for machinery and machine tools; $5,000,000 for hardware and metals; $30,000,000 for boots and shoes; $20,000,000 for textiles, dry-goods, etc.; $25,000,000 for cotton; and $25,000,000 for foodstuffs. No gold credit was ever established in Stockholm. These figures may be regarded as an effort made to create a false impression of Russian economic strength. In regard to this feeler, from the unrecognized Bolshevist Trade Bureau in New York, Secretary Lansing stated that no arrangements had been made to permit the resumption of commercial relationships between the United States and Russia. While the restrictions as regards trade with the Central Powers were removed, the ban was still maintained in regard to Russia.[4] The American Commercial Association

[4] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies Soviet Russia, 463, 464.

to promote trade with Russia made an attempt to have the State Department remove the restrictions. The effort was not successful.[5]

Secretary Colby, in June, 1920, declared that there was no trade with Russia either licensed or regular. But on July 7, 1920, "the restrictions which have hitherto stood in the way of trade and communication with Soviet Russia" were removed, except those covering munitions. Whereupon the State Department issued the following instructions to members of the consular and diplomatic services concerning Russian trade. They were to "take no action which officially or unofficially, directly or indirectly, would assist or facilitate commercial or other dealings between American citizens" and citizens of Soviet Russia.[6] However, restrictions of various descriptions were attached to the above announcement. No mail to or from Russia would be accepted; no passports would be issued. Those who engaged in Russian commerce did so at their own risk. Any commodities and materials purchased might be questioned in the courts. These discouragements and reservations were not at all favorable towards a resurrection of Russo-American commercial relations.[7]

The extent of Russia's economic demoralization becomes at once evident when pre-war conditions are contrasted. *After several years of Soviet management, practically all the industries

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[4] *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 13, 1919, 4.
[5] *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1920, 19.
[6] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies, 467.

*Number of Workers

Region	Sept. 1, 1918	June 1, 1920	Per cent of decrease
Ivanovo-Voznesensk	146,300	30,600	79
Valdimir	103,100	21,200	80
Kostroma	17,600	8,100	57
Moscow	368,100	216,400	41

Petrograd	Numbers
1917	365,777
1918	144,530
1920	102,000

[7] Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic, 305.

revealed the same process of decadence. In 1914 there were 7,285,000 spindles in use, while in 1920 only 385,000 spindles were in operation. In 1920 employment in textiles had fallen to one-fourth the pre-war figure. In 1913 there were 37 cement plants in operation, and in 1920 only one plant partially operating. In 1913 there were 140 blast furnaces in operation, as compared with 12 in 1920. In 1914 there were 275 glass plants and 20 china manufacturing plants operating with 93,000 employees. In 1920 these were reduced to 67 and 11 respectively, employing 32,000 workers.[8]

The Moscow industrial center which was the dynamo of Russian economic life in pre-war times has suffered serious decadence. This was shown by the number of workers employed in the various centers of this district. The following statistics show the collapse in this section during the early part of the Soviet control.*

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[8] Brasol, B. L. Balance Sheet of Soviet Russia, 84.

	1914	1920
*Gold Ural region	103 poods 22 lbs.	11 poods 29 lbs.
Gold Western Siberia	97 poods 34 lbs.	1 pood 39 lbs.
Gold Eastern Siberia	1,679 poods 34 lbs.	92 poods 21 lbs.
Total	1,881 poods 10 lbs.	106 poods
Platinum	298 poods	205 poods

BALANCE SHEET COMPARATIVE OUTPUT

	1913	1920
Ores of different kinds	581,000,000 poods	8,000,000 poods
Copper ore	69,000,000 poods	219,000 poods
Manganese ore	17,377,000 poods	216,000 poods
Chromide ore	1,500,000 poods	105,982 poods
Salt, Perm region	26,000,000 poods	2,000,000 poods
Salt, Donetz Basin	39,000,000 poods	7,500,000 poods
Salt, Baskunchak region	41,000,000 poods	1,200,000 poods
Oils vegetable (approximately)	25,000,000 poods	500,000 poods
Paper	24,000,000 poods	2,000,000 poods
	1914	
Smelted cast iron	257,000,000 poods	6,000,000 poods
Matches, (in thousands of boxes)	3,808	632

NUMBER OF WORKERS

REGION	SEPT. 1, 1918	JUNE 1, 1920	PER CENT OF DECREASE
Ivanovo-Voznesensk	146,300	30,600	79
Valdimir	103,100	21,200	80
Kostroma	17,600	8,100	57
Moscow	368,100	216,400	41

The number of manual laborers employed in Petrograd decreased as follows:

PETROGRAD	NUMBERS
1917	365,777
1918	144,530
1920	102,000

The figures with regard to the precious metals stood as follows:

	1914	1920
Gold Ural region	103 poods, 22 lbs.	11 poods, 29 lbs.
Gold Western Siberia	97 poods, 34 lbs.	1 pood, 39 lbs.
Gold Eastern Siberia	1,679 poods, 34 lbs.	92 poods, 21 lbs.
Total	1,881 poods, 10 lbs.	106 poods
Platinum	298 poods	205 poods

BALANCE SHEET

COMPARATIVE OUTPUT

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Salt Baskunchak region	41,000,000 poods	1,200,000 poods
Oils vegetable (approximately)	25,000,000 poods	500,000 poods
Paper	24,000,000 poods	2,000,000 poods

		1914
Smelted cast iron	257,000,000 poods	6,000,000 poods
Matches, (in thousands of of boxes)	3,808	632

The above figures show the exhaustion of Russian economic life at its lowest ebb. Great industrial possibilities would appear to exist when it is understood that even Russia's pre-war production of raw materials merely touched the fringe of her natural resources. However, under prohibitive restrictions capital will be very slow in developing Russian resources. The material and social growth of the nation is hindered by the absence of the necessary financial energy. With the depletion of the gold reserve and the collapse of industry it became apparent that the gold resources of the nation must be replenished by some method. Otherwise, the ordinary processes of Russian life would utterly decay. Gold was also necessary for conducting propaganda campaigns inaugurated in other nations. Cash was essential to the solution of Russian economic problems. In order to obtain funds concession-granting was devised as the most advisable expedient.[9]

Following the removal of the Allied economic blockade, after its apparent failure, there appeared to have resulted a flow of goods towards Soviet Russia in the spring of 1920. The Soviet authorities reported the following volume of imports between May 8 and June 19: 269 car-loads of agricultural implements; 117 of paper; 8 of leather; 11 of tanning extract; 62 of garden seeds; 827 of seed potatoes; total 1,297 car-loads. In addition large quantities of agricultural machinery were expected; namely, 15,000 threshing machines; 7,000 reapers; 400 cultivators; 102,000 ordinary files; and 330,000 saw files. These articles reveal in which direction Russian economic depression was most pronounced.[10] Too much reliance should not be placed upon these figures and estimates since subsequent trade was not of a prominent nature. The figures, while worthy of attention, were

[9] Brasol, B. L. Balance sheet of Sov. Russia, 85, 86, 251.
[10] Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic, 302.

not of sufficient amount to produce any great advance in the economic recuperation of a vast populous community like Russia.

Mr. Boon, who spent ten months in Russia and the bordering states, studying the business possibilities, and social conditions, reported his observations to the *New York World*. He said: "I was at the the beginning predisposed in favor of opening up trade relations with the Soviet power, feeling that this would do much towards solving the Russian problem." But, after considerable experience and contact with Russian actualities, that he became convinced that commercial relations with Russia were inadvisable.[11] The possibility of trade with Russia, in any considerable quantities, was meagre until normal political and economic conditions were restored. Russian purchasing power depends upon her ability to sell. If production is revived she will again be able to export raw materials and grains. Russia's total exports before the war amounted to $750,000,000 annually. This export trade must be revived before she can import her necessary commodities.[12]

Upon the inauguration of the Harding Administration the Moscow authorities immediately sent a message to the American Government which proposed the resumption of commercial relations. The appeal was received by the President directly, and referred to the State Department for consideration. It was but natural, after agreements of a commercial nature had been negotiated with England, that an effort in the same direction should be attempted with the new Administration. Economic experts remained passive concerning the possibilities of Russian trade. They observed that Russia lacked the products upon which to base such trade. Credit facilities were also absent. Secretary Hoover pointed out that no export commodities remained in Russia except gold, platinum, and jewelry in possession of the Soviet régime. The United States had removed the trade restrictions, but no evidence existed that American business men were anxious to engage in such trade. The State Department officials regarded the overtures as pure propaganda.[13]

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[11] Bulletin, Russian Information Bureau, Jan. 15, 1921, 2.
[12] *Ibid.*, May 21, 1921, 7.
[13] *N. Y. Times*, March 23, 1921, 1

The published text of the Soviet note stated that Soviet Russia was from her very beginnings anxious to establish friendly relations with the great American Republic. The purpose was to establish mutually advantageous relations. The Soviet Republic hoped the new Administration would not prove as hostile as the Wilson Administration and "will clearly see the great advantage for the two republics of the re-establishment of business relations, and will consider the interests of both peoples which imperatively demand that the wall existing between them should be removed." The promise was given that Russia has no "intentions of interfering in the internal affairs of America." The contention was advanced that since the Soviet authorities had consummated commercial and trade agreements with other nations" the absence of such relations with America seems to Soviet Russia particularly abnormal and harmful to both peoples." The Central Executive Committee, accordingly, proposed to send a commission to the United States" to solve the question of business relations, and of resumption of trade between Russia and America."[14]

Secretary Hughes, in his reply to the Russian note, affirmed our solicitude for the sufferings of Russia. America also desired to promote conditions whereby commerce could be established upon a firm foundation. But he said "It is manifest to this Government that in existing circumstances there is no assurance for the development of trade, as the supplies which Russia might now be able to obtain would be wholly inadequate to meet her needs, and no lasting good can result, so long as the present causes of progressive impoverishment continue to operate." Before trade could be resumed Russia must change her productivity. The basis of economic production must be "securely established." Production is conditioned upon "the safety of life, the recognition by firm guarantees of private property, the sanctity of contract and the rights of free labor." The following were also conditions precedent to the resumption of commercial intercourse. The Secretary remarked "If fundamental changes are contemplated, involving due regard for the

[14] *N. Y. Times*, March 24, 1921, 1. Text of Russian note as reported.

protection of persons and property and the establishment of conditions essential to the maintenance of Commerce, this Government will be glad to have convincing evidence of the changes, and until this evidence is supplied, this Government is unable to perceive that there is any proper basis for considering trade relations."[15] The initial attempt of the Moscow régime to re-establish commercial relations met with a decided refusal.

Mr. Hoover re-echoed Secretary Hughes' reply refusing the Soviet overtures. Concerning trade possibilities, Secretary Hoover said, "As a matter of trade, the first thing to be determined about Russia is, if and when they change their economic system. If they so change its basis as to accept the right of private property, freedom of labor, provide for the safety of human life, etc., there is hope of their recovery from the miseries of famine; there is hope of a slow recovery in production and the upbuilding of trade."

"Nothing is more important to the whole commercial world than the recovery of productivity in Russia. However, without a fundamental change in their whole economic system, there will be no consequential trade or production, and no stoppage of continuous degeneration."[16] It was doubtless a realization of the wisdom and the truth contained in these remarks that led Lenin to introduce his new economic policy whereby rights were conceded to private ownership.

Secretary Hughes, in reply to Gomper's inquiry about the status of Russia and the possibility of renewing commercial relations, made the following observations. He depicted the conditions that existed in Russia. These resulted from her participation in the Great War, and the subsequent three years of internal turmoil and revolution which have left the nation in a paralyzed condition. He said, "In fact the devastation of industry in Russia has been so complete, the poverty of the country is so acute, the people are so hungry and the demand for commodities is so great that at present Russia represents a gigantic economic vacuum, and no evidence exists that the

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[15] *N. Y. Times*, March 26, 1921, 6. Text Sec., Hughes' reply.
[16] *Ibid.*, March 26, 1921, 1.

unfortunate situation above described, is likely to be alleviated so long as the present political and economic system continues."[17]

The Secretary said that in many respects the post-war conditions in the several European nations were similar. This situation resulted from the decrease of man-power, and the presence of many wounded. There was, however, an apparent difference while other nations were taking such action as tended to "re-establish confidence" the "authorities of Russia have tended to undermine its political and economic relations with other countries." The credits which Russia urgently needed were not forthcoming. In the absence of credit production and the proper utilization of her enormous supplies of raw materials remain quiescent and undeveloped. These will thus remain until "credit may be extended to Russia on a sound basis."[18]

No restrictions existed against commercial intercourse. The Secretary showed that in April, 1920, the barriers to trade through the Baltic ports were removed, while on July 8, 1920, the ban on direct trade with Russia was lifted. Nevertheless, the volume of trade remained unimportant due to Russia's inability "to pay for imports." The report that a commission representing the Soviets was authorized to expend a large sum and actually was alleged to have placed orders amounting to six and one-half billion dollars in the United States, Europe and Asia was shown to have been an exaggeration. Payments could not be guaranteed and as a result deliveries were small. Instead of stimulating production in the above nations, it only served to depress still further Soviet credit.[19]

The charge that resumption of trade relations would cause many of the idle mills to resume operations was declared unfounded. The records show that of our total trade exports and imports, before the war only 1.3 per cent was alloted to Russia, and besides her purchasing power in 1921 was less than before the war. The evidence all showed that such intercourse would have very little effect upon the industrial and agricultural prosperity of America. Even the removal of restrictions had not

[17] *N. Y. Times*, April 18, 1921, 1. Text of Hughes' reply.
[18] *Ibid.*, 2. Text of the letter to Gompers.
[19] *Ibid.*

appreciably increased the volume of trade. Secretary Hughes, however, stated that "mutually profitably commercial relations on an extensive scale" were desirable. These must await "readjustments in Russia which will make it possible for that country to resume its proper place in the economic life of the world."[20]

It was evident that the reputed $175,000,000 gold reserve of the Soviet régime would, even if expended entirely in the United States for commodities, scarcely produce an impression on our volume of business. It would, however, destroy the meagre possibilities of a restoration of a system of sound currency and finance. A rumor was circulated that if America recognized the Soviet régime, Russia would immediately export immense quantities of lumber, flax, hemp, fur and other commodities to America. In reply to this report, Secretary Hughes said that Russia had no exportable commodities which might be made "the basis of immediate profitable trade with the United States." Their transportation system was inadequate, hence, the export of any commodities which happened to be in Russia would only increase the already great misery of the Russian people.[21] It is now known that Russia was economically exhausted at this time, therefore, these persistent efforts to renew trade relations were probably prompted by propaganda considerations. Just as Secretary Hughes pointed out that even if the reputed gold reserve was entirely spent in America it would not have much affected American economic life, so the present attempt to concentrate public attention on the value of Russian crown jewels as a basis for trade may also be productive of some disillusionment. The fact that resort is now made to crown jewels as a medium of credit or exchange, while justifiable, nevertheless, plainly indicates that Russian economic conditions are yet considered below normal.[22]

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[20] *N. Y. Times*, April 18, 1921, 2.

[21] *Ibid.*, Hughes' letter.

[22] Secretary Hughes presented the following statistics to prove the extent of Russia's economic stagnation. In December, 1920, the following supplies were gathered: Horse-hides, 3,831, 12 per cent of the amount expected; colt-hides, 1,142, 35 per cent of the amount expected; cattle-hides, 22,761, 20.6 per cent of amount expected; calf-hides 15,679, 14.6 per cent of amount expected; sheep-hides, 37,771, 58 per cent of amount expected; flax (poods) 22,871, 12 per cent of amount expected; bristles. 99, 14 per cent of amount expected." *Ibid.*

The *Izvestia*, official organ of the Moscow Government, complained at the failure of the trade overtures. It declared that the bourgeois Governments could not accustom themselves to the presence of a socialist republic among the nations. Concessions would be made only "under the pressure of the laboring classes and the commercial interests." This organ deprecated the suggestion that a new bourgeois régime be installed in Russia before resuming trade relations. The English who entered into such an agreement did not demand such a change in Government as a condition precedent, nor did Russia advise America to alter her scheme of Government. America might have been influenced by reports of uprisings and rebellions. Concerning the necessary element of protection to capital, the *Izvestia* stated that the treatment accorded the Vanderlip syndicate, a capitalistic concern, should have been sufficient evidence to the Washington Cabinet of Russia's good intentions.[23]

The contention of Secretary Hughes that Russia possessed no exportable commodities, was denied, and even if true, that in itself would not prevent Americans from exporting to Russia. Russia required various forms of manufactured commodities. Also, if the foreign policy of America was directed by American industry and commerce, these splendid opportunities would have been eagerly seized. The foreign policy was claimed to have been dominated by the agricultural elements who were interested in preventing the agricultural recuperation of Russia. Russia's temporary absence from the world markets was asserted to be the principal reason for American pre-eminence in agriculture. The following prediction was made "little by little the industrial interests of America will predominate and will force the Government of the United States to change its policy towards Soviet Russia." Martens was of the opinion that a rapproachment was near, and that the establishment of commercial relations would prove easier than in the case of Great Britain.[24] Five years time have demonstrated that these predictions have largely misjudged American political and industrial psychology.

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[23] *N. Y. Times*, May 17, 1921, 19. Text of the Russian reply.
[24] *Ibid.*

No pronounced urge has appeared to compel action towards a renewal of trade relations. The reported treatment of capital failed to create much sentiment in favor of commercial relations among American industrialists.

The decay of the Russian transportation system was shown by the decrease in the net operating profits. Prof. Miluikov asserts that in 1916 the roads produced a net profit of 140 million rubles. In 1918 after nationalization the operating loss was 8 billions. The expense of running the roads, other nationalized concerns, and supplying the workers in 1919 was 24.1 billion rubles. The income of 13.5 billions expected would return the big deficit of 10.6 billions. The facts were worse than the estimates, the final deficit was 33.9 billions, and in 1920 it amounted to 315.6 billions.[25] Even considered in terms of depreciated currency these amounts convey a fair conception of the internal decay.

Travellers through Russia have observed many miles of empty and unemployed box cars standing idly by on sidings. Many of these with the bottoms gone, or otherwise depreciating from exposure. Many locomotives were silently resting in the yards gradually becoming more unfit for usage and the victims of rust. It was the opinion of carefully informed students that some of this equipment might be recovered and made serviceable. This view might have been correct. But since the economic depression was so extensive, and the credit of the Soviet régime at zero it did not appear probable that Russia would be able to secure the finances urgently needed to ensure her industrial recovery. At least the world's financial center had not exhibited any decided inclination to favor Russia with a loan. This was true of nations that had extended recognition to Russia. The probability of securing funds in America in view of the policy maintained by the Administration was very remote. Yet America was the only nation with any very large gold reserve.[26] The roadbeds of the railways were in fairly good condition, while the ties appeared well preserved, only requiring rolling stock to

[25] Miliukov, P. N. Russia Today and Tomorrow, 211.
[26] Hullinger, E. W. The Reforging of Russia, 174.

revive movement. Mr. Hullinger asserted "Hundreds of thousands of freight cars now scattered on side-tracks and railway yards throughout Russia are quite capable of repair. Their trucks are in good condition. All they need are floors and walls and Russia has plenty of wood."[27] The transportation system which served as the arteries of Russia's economic life comprised a 40,000 mile system in pre-war days. The rolling-stock was reduced from 500,000 cars to about 130,000. The number of cars and locomotives built in 1913 vastly exceeded those built in 1921.[28]

It was maintained that until trade was restored to its normal course there would be much heard about Bolshevism, but once the restoration was effected the situation would clear up. Normal relations, it was claimed, depended upon opening up one-seventh of the earth's area to trade and commerce. Normal conditions could not be resumed simply by signing a peace treaty. Lloyd George said he would rather see Russia Bolshevist than England bankrupt. The thesis was advanced that should diplomatic relations be established, or rather that after trade was esumerd, the theories of Government would have to adjust themselves to facts or perish. This brilliant forecast made several years ago might then have appeared possible but subsequent events have demonstrated that Moscow clings tenaciously to its politicpl theories despite the resumption of diplomatic and trade relation with western Europe.[29]

Russia possesses three export commodities whose relative importance had been considerably over-estimated, namely petroleum, platinum, and manganese. Of these the most portant and most discussed, is oil, which has enjoyed a p ominence out of all proportion to the quantity involved. The reports revealed that the Russian oil resources were becomng rapidly depleted as a result of applying modern methods of mining. Crude oil may become scarce or exhausted in about a decade. The stocks and plane of production elsewhere show that at least for the present, the immediate future output of

[27] Hullinger, E. W. The Reforging of Russia, 174.
[28] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 38, 250, 254.
[29] *Annals*, Vol. 84, 126.

Russia is not so primarily important. The manganese reserves are now being supplied from other areas outside of Russia which were mostly discovered during the war. The monopoly in platinum, before the war unquestioned, is now being contested from sources uncovered as a result of war-time necessities.[30]

The average imports and exports of Russia for the five years before the war, taking Russian data for imports, and for export values, the figures given by countries of destination, were as follows:

Exports from Russia	$988,000,000
Imports into Russia	421,000,000
Positive balance	$567,000,000

The oversea's trade of Russia with nations like China and Japan, computed on the same basis as the above gives the following statistics.

Imports into Russia	$97,000,000
Exports from Russia	34,000,000
Negative balance	$63,000,000

Hence, the excess net of positive over negative balances was $504,000,000 which may be regarded her full trade balance.[31] These statistics whether absolutely accurate or not at least prove that a healthy internal condition was shown by a favorable trade balance. This explains why the Soviet authorities are making such severe efforts to produce a favorable trade balance.

Russian foreign trade represented about 4 per cent of all international trade in value. As an exporter Russia ranked sixth, and as an importer ninth, and seventh in the total value of all foreign trade. Germany had the largest commerce with Russia. She supplied about one-third of all Russian imports,

[30] *American Economic Review*, Vol. 12, 454.
[31] *Ibid.*, 450.

and took about one-fourth of Russian exports. Russia's chief exports were soil-products, and the average annual exports before the war were as follows: Barley 167,000,000 bu.; wheat 161,000,000 bu.; Oats 63,000,000 bu.; Rye 29,000,000 bu.; Corn 26,000,000 bu.; Potatoes 7,000,000 bu.; Flaxseed, sunflower and other seeds 600,000 tons.[32]

Australia, Argentine, Canada, and the United States now supply Europe with the two hundred million bushels of wheat formerly supplied by Russia. To do this means a utilization of more acreage in this country, and farmers naturally are desirous of knowing how much longer this situation will continue. During the seven years from 1907 to 1914 the United States averaged an annual export of wheat to Europe amounting to 3,130,000 long tons. Over the seven-year period from 1914 to 1921 America averaged 6,425,000 long tons of wheat annually to Europe. The average annual export of Russia in pre-war times was about 5,000,000 tons of wheat. Thus America has alone taken over the task of supplying two-thirds of the bread-grains which formerly were supplied by Russia.[33]

The resurrection of agriculture in Russia depends upon the creation of correct political conditions. Students of the Russian agricultural problem claim it will require a long time before Russian agriculture will fully recover. Its loss has been more complete than any other thing. The loss in tools, draft animals, machinery, and other agricultural instruments has been enormous. Much time will be required to restore the confidence of the peasant in the matter of producing sufficient for export. Even if exportable supplies of grain were available great difficulty would be experienced in shipping same. The railroads and coal mines were in such a condition as to have made efficient transportation almost impossible. Therefore, quite a number of years are likely to pass before Russia will again resume her former position as a grain-exporting nation of any large proportions.[34]

During the period of the Hague Conference in August, 1922, a suggestion was made that America should send an expert

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[32] *American Economic Review*, Vol. 12, 451, 452.
[33] *Ibid.*, 452, 453.
[34] *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 36, 183.

technical commission to investigate, and report upon the economic situation in Europe. The Soviet leaders replied to this suggestion, that it would be all satisfactory to them if in turn a similar commission might be appointed by themselves to investigate conditions in the United States. This proposition was refused as America feared the effects of probable propaganda. The Soviet press expressed their displeasure thus: "The proposals of the American government concerning the sending of a special commission to Russia could not arouse any other feeling in Russia, but that America having rendered help to the starving, thinks that it can now do anything in Russia that it desires." American efforts towards a reconstruction of Europe and Russia were unsuccessful.[35]

In June, 1922, Secretary Hoover in a statement analyzed the situation that prevailed in Russia. He was convinced that the most vital problem for American business men in regard to Russia was not trade, but investment Investment capital was necessary to restore production. He thought that for several years the possibility of selling goods to Russia would be of minor importance. The exhaustion of Russia's gold reserve would effect her capacity to make payments. The advisability of sending investment capital in Russia, depended on the Soviet policy, and general internal conditions. The action of foreign governments was not so important in this regard.[36]

The statistics presented below compare the production of minerals in 1912 with that of 1921–22, on the basis of poods and value. These show that the output of coal in the latter period was one-third of the former period both in amount and value. In 1921–22 the petroleum production was somewhat more than one-half that of 1912, with the value about fifty per cent higher. Ore output in 1921–22 was practically zero. Gold and platinum output in 1921–22 was around one-sixth and one-fifth of the former production. The total value, for all minerals,

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[35] Dennis, A. L. P. For. Pol., etc., 479.
[36] *Ibid.*, 480. Secretary Hoover quoted.

in the latter period was slightly in excess of one-third of the former period.[37]

The entire mining program approximated about 35 per cent of the 1912 production.[38] The working program of the metal industry for the period October 1, 1921, to October 1, 1922, calculated at pre-war prices amounted to 165,000,000 rubles. This was less than 20 per cent of the actual output for the year 1913.[39]

The story of Russia's electrical industry reveals evidences of decay in many respects paralleling that already observed in connection with the mining industry. A comparison of the figures for 1912 and 1922 makes this clear. The production of high and low tension current in 1922 was 18 and 27 per cent respectively of the 1912 production. Cable production in 1922 was almost normal having been 91 per cent of the 1912 output. Miscellaneous items produced in 1922 stood at 45 per cent of the amounts for 1912. However two items, electric lamps, and accumulator branches, in 1922, showed considerable increases

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[37] ARTICLE	QUANTITY POODS .000 OMITTED		VALUE RUBLES	
	1912	1921–22	1912	1921–22
Coal imported	1,865,000	654,000	185,000	65,000
	305,000			
Petroleum	500,000	264,000	65,000	92,000
Ore	620,000	19,000		13,000
Salt	115,000	94,000		
Gold	2,600	428½	200,000	
Platinum	340	65	70,000	10,000
		Total.....	520,000	180,000

Reported in U. S. Commerce Reports Supplement, No. 55, 3. 1 pood equals 36, 128 lbs.

over the production of 1912 having been 247 and 127 per cent of the 1912 output.[40]

In 1912 the textiles produced in the present territory of Soviet Russia were as follows: Cotton fabrics, about 575 rubles; woolen fabrics, 75 million rubles; linen, hemp and jute, 90 million rubles; silken fabrics, 40 million rubles; miscellaneous, 70 million rubles; total 850 million rubles. This was about three-fourths of the production of the entire Russian Empire. In 1922 these items amounted to the following: Cotton fabrics, about 107,000,000 rubles, or 19 per cent of the production of 1912; linen, hemp and jute, 19,000,000 or 21 per cent of 1912; silken fabrics, 3,000,000 or 8 per cent of 1912; miscellaneous, 15,000,000 or 22 per cent of 1912; total 200,000,000 rubles, or 22 per cent of 1912, production.[41] In 1922 the program of foodstuffs amounted to only 16 per cent of the pre-war production. The production of spirits dropped to 1½ per cent; sugar to 7 per cent; while vegetable oils rose to 22 per cent of the pre-war figures respectively.[42] The program for chemical production in 1922 was 30 million rubles, while the pre-war production was

[38] U. S. Commerce Reports Supplement, No. 55, 3.
[39] *Ibid.*, 6.
[40] *Ibid.*, Supplement, No. 55, 11, 12. Statistics for Russia' selectrical industry are here presented.

ITEM	PROGRAM FOR 1922 IN RUBLES	PROPORTION COMPARED WITH PROGRAM PER CENT	PROPORTION COMPARED WITH PRE-WAR PRODUCTION PER CENT
High tension current	4,390,500	56	18
Low tension current	3,068,000	65	27
Cable production	6,700,000	284	91
Electric lamps	2,507,000	91	247
Accumulator branch	1,950,500	133	127
Miscellaneous	643,000	71	45
Total	19,259,000	Av. 62	...*Ibid*

[41] *Ibid.*, 13.
[42] *Ibid.*, 16.

120 million rubles.[43] These figures illustrate the extent of Russia's industrial depression as it existed in the year 1922 in various lines of industrial activities.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, a German economist, confirms the record of Russian industrial decadence. He stated that in Russia under the Bolshevist régime, industry has been destroyed to the vanishing point. The factories and mines have been mostly destroyed or ruined, and the railroads used up. Of about 30,000 locomotives, in serviceable condition which Russia had before the war, only about 5,000 were in usable condition. The treasury was empty and exportable goods were lacking. The grain production was so reduced that Dr. Nansen, President of the International Relief Association for Russia, claimed that not less than ten million people died of starvation during the years 1921–1923. Nevertheless, while hunger existed in the land the Soviet Government sold grain to foreign markets. This was done in order to obtain gold wherewith to make the purchases that the Government considered necessary.[44] This reveals how the industrial, transportation, credit and economic systems of the nation were undermined. While production remained at a small portion of the pre-war figure.[45]

Russia consumed before the war, $1,435,000,000 worth of manufactured goods annually, of which amount $1,250,000,000 was domestic production. The remainder $185,000,000 was imported. In 1922 the imports were very small, while production amounted only to about $250,000,000. The number of banks in pre-war times was 28,000. These had deposits of about $3,300,000,000 or $22.00 per capita. Since the establishment of the State Bank in December 1921, and of the Co-operative Bank in 1922, about 200 financial institutions with branches were restored. Their total deposits reached only $11,000,000 or less than eight cents per capita of the population. The circulation was reduced from $6.00 to 75 cents per capita.[46] It was estimated that for the restoration of Russian economic life at

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[43] U. S. Commerce Reports Supplement, No. 55, 18.
[44] *Annals*, Vol. 108–110, 82.
[45] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 38, 250.
[46] *Ibid.*, 254, 255.

least $2,000,000,000 would be required to revive agriculture, and $1,500,000,000 to restore the transportation system. The mining, metallurgy, and the manufacturing industries would require additional large amounts which would bring the probable total to about $6,000,000,000.[47]

The production of farming equipment such as scythes, sickles, plows, harrows, reapers, binders, threshers, and seed-drills had almost disappeared.[48] Russian agricultural stagnation was evidenced by the following facts. Russia produced in pre-war days a total of bread and fodder cereals of 50,100,000 tons. This permitted an export of 11,200,000 tons. Her 1922 crop of cereals was estimated at 33,500,000 tons. Russia's meat production amounted to 3,000,000 tons, and in 1921 to 1,260,000 tons. The number of cattle decreased from 43,400,000 head to 20,000,000 with almost corresponding decreases in weight. Sheep fell from 90,300,000 to 40,000,000. Horses dropped from 37,000,000 to 20,000,000. Hogs remained about normal. Flax-fibre and hemp-fibre were produced to the amounts of 750,000, and 400,000 tons respectively. This allowed a considerable amount for export of each commodity. Flax and hemp seed were raised to the amount of 1,033,000 tons which permitted an export of 153,000 tons. Production in these commodities had been greatly reduced in the post-war period.[49] The production of sugar had suffered an equal reduction. The yield per dessiatine was reduced from 880 poods in 1916, to 118 poods in 1921.[50] Governor Goodrich, after an exhaustive study of Russian internal conditions, reported similar evidences of decadence in Russia's agricultural economy.

Russia's imports and exports consist of four main groups; namely foodstuffs, raw materials and semi-finished products, animals and manufactured articles. The extent of Russo-American trade for the years 1922 and 1923 reveal the following comparative facts. Exports to America in 1922 were absent entirely, and in 1923 amounted to 75,000 poods. Imports from

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[47] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 38, 255.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*, 251, 252, 253.
[50] International Conciliation, April 1923, No. 185, 219.

America in 1922 amounted to 23,131,000, and in 1923 to 1,921,000 poods. In 1922 America contributed 12.6 per cent of Russia's entire foreign trade in quantity, and 0.7 per cent in 1923. A very marked dimunition had occurred in the latter year. Much the same relationship was maintained when values in gold rubles were compared. In 1922 the value of exports to America amounted to 2,000 rubles, and in 1923 to 797,000 rubles. In 1922 the value of American imports amounted to 38,922,000 rubles, and in 1923 to 18,696,000 rubles. In 1922 America contributed 11.1 per cent to the value of Russia's entire foreign trade, and 5.6 per cent in 1923. Russia's trade with all nations showed some considerable improvement in 1923 over 1922. This, however, did not affect America. In 1922 her adverse balance was 188,178,000 gold rubles, and in 1923 a favorable balance of 61,762,000 rubles was established, and was mostly with surrounding nations. Germany received the largest portion of Russian trade in 1923.[51]

These improvements in her trade situation in 1923, were mostly obtained at the expense of the peasant. The figures, while evidence of some improvement, are very small when compared with the figures of international commerce generally. They do not constitute a basis for any great optimism in regard to future commerce. Secretary Hughes refuted the fallacy of the valuable character of Russian trade. He said: "Other peoples are trading with Russia, and our people are trading with Russia," but our trading was relatively insignificant. The Secretary stated that figures showed that even states recognizing Russia had not increased their trade with her to any appreciable extent. Emphasis was placed upon the fact that purchases were conditioned by production.[52]

The reports of the American Bankers' Association on Russia were very unsatisfactory. They asserted that conditions in Russia were such as to discourage the further investment of American capital in Russian enterprises. The report finished

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[51] Russia's Foreign Trade for 1923, 15, 14. Published by Russian Information Bureau, Washington, D. C.

[52] *N. Y. Times*, March 22, 1923, 2.

with this recommendation: "It is earnestly to be hoped that there may be changes in policy and improvement in conditions which will make trade and investment more practical, but for the time being the obviously wise thing for American business, in general, is that of watchful waiting. Here and there some particular commercial transaction or industrial enterprise may possibly be undertaken with profit, but these instances are the exceptions."[53] This particular advice from an authoritative source should be carefully studied by American enterprises which have serious intentions of entering the Russian investment field. Secretary Hoover again stressed the necessity of Russian economic reconstruction, and a revival of production. The peasants needed machines and animals. The workmen required tools and the factories raw materials, and machinery. Her transportation system needed repairs, and equipment. If an extensive industrial renaissance was to occur, skilled workmen and trained executives were imperatively required. The element of self-interest must be provided which is absent from nationalized industries.[54]

Leo Pasvolsky, a Russian economist, said: "Russia can acquire a paying capacity, let us repeat once more, only by developing an export surplus." The largest amount of Russian exports consumed by America occurred when the United States purchased $9,000,000 worth of furs from Russia in 1912 or about 1 per cent of her total exports. America usually contributed around 10 per cent of Russian imports. Since Russian imports may not increase very greatly there would not appear to be any great hope for American trade despite periodic increases. Russia usually buys, as natural, from those to whom she sells most. Hence the scope for American credit investment would not appear very favorable.[55]

The Russian trade between 1909 and 1913 showed exports

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[53] Dennis, A. L. P. Foreign Policies, 481, 482. Report quoted.

[54] *Ibid.*

a America's share of Russia's foreign trade, export and import, in value and quantity was relatively greater to the whole in 1922 than before. The whole of Russia trade was small for this year which served to increase the American proportions.

[55] *Annals*, Vol. 114, 60.

to have averaged 1,501,010,000 rubles, and imports averaged 1,139,600,000. This produced a favorable trade balance of 361,410,000 yearly average. The United States was an unimportant factor. The old régime bought from America about 79,000,000 rubles worth of goods annually, equal to about $40,000,000. These consisted usually of raw materials and semi-finished articles and manufactured goods. These imports constituted about 5.8 per cent of Russia's total. Their exports to America amounted to 14,000,000 rubles or .9 per cent of their total. These consisted of flax, licorice root, sheep and goat skins, hides, wool, bristles and manganese ore. In 1922 their imports totaled 274,400,000 rubles, while exports stood at 78,800,000 rubles. The balance was sharply adverse, and some effort must be made to secure a favorable balance. Accordingly by reducing the domestic consumption, mostly of cereals, to an irreducible minimum a favorable balance was obtained which served to bolster appearances. The figures for the year 1923 put imports at 144,200,200 rubles, and exports at 206,000,000 creating a favorable balance of 61,799,800 rubles. Even the foreign trade for 1923 was only 12.1 per cent of the foreign trade of 1913.[56]

Krassin, the commissar for foreign trade, when asked whether a trade agreement, such as was consummated with England, was desirable before obtaining recognition from the United States, said: "Most assuredly yes, while the Foreign Trade Monopoly is indispensable to our government, we are not and cannot be self-contained. We need American help, and especially money for the development of our industries." The future of Russia was depicted as a nation wherein 250,000,000 souls would live. This vast population would be in need of materials such as America can supply like agricultural machinery, tractors, automatic machines, dyes and chemicals. In return for these articles Russia would produce flax, timber, platinum and gold. It was, therefore, maintained that the future should bring Russia and America closer together.[57]

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[56] *Saturday Evening Post*, Dec. 13, 1924, 90. 1 ruble equals .515c.
[57] *Ibid.*, 92.

As a matter of prudent advice to American business it should be remembered that English concession holders were the victims of disillusionment, indicating how little recognition really accomplished.* Their organizations were the subject of constant espionage and interference. These troubles began mostly after relations had been resumed, and most English merchants were dissatisfied with their situation. This condition of the English concessionaire should be an object lesson for impetuous American concession seekers.[58]

M. Zinovieff intimated that under certain conditions Russia might be willing to pay a portion of her international obligations. One of these conditions was that Russia should be granted a loan of 500,000,000 gold rubles at 6 per cent. He contrasted Japan and Russia as respective fields for safe investments. Referring to a loan placed by Japan in America at 7 per cent, he said: "Russia would agree to a similar loan if the interest were ower." Zinovieff claimed Russia was in a better position to give security for loans than Japan weakened by the earthquake. The tone of this request was not of a character to interest capitalists to advance funds to Russia.[59]

Even as late as September, 1924, a German observer reported that economic condition in Soviet Russia were still in a lamentable shape. The populations of various places were on the verge of starvation, while roving bands traverse southern Russia seeking what subsistence might be available. These were largely reduced to a primitive nomadic condition of existence, while starvation continued. The Soviet Government made little attempt to alleviate the situation. It was employing what small surplus of grain remained for purposes of propaganda organization. Under these circumstances, he said that no assistance could be expected from American sources. "Europe continues" he said "to believe the bluff that one can prosper in business in Russia." This remark was equally applicable to America.[60]

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[58] *Saturday Evening Post* Dec. 13, 1924. 97.
a Treated more fully further on in this discussion or connection.
[59] *N. Y. Times*, May 26, 1924, 3.
[60] *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1924, 3.

M. Tchitcherin in an interivew regarding the position of Secretary Hughes, pled for the resumption of commercial relationships. He declared that such relationships were both logical and mutually advantageous. The responsibility of the Soviet régime for the activities of the Third International, was denied. He also said that important officials in capitalist governments were members of the Second International. He said "despite radical differences in the régimes of Soviet Russia and America it does not follow that a compromise between the two Governments is impossible. Numerous facts serve to show, should there be a desire to negotiate, a compromise satisfying to both sides could be found."[61]

Zinovieff advanced an argument to demonstrate Russia's economic recovery. He said that in May, 1923, the foreign trade was 14 per cent of the pre-war volume, and in May, 1924, it was 20 per cent. The last harvest amounted to 78 per cent of pre-war output in 1923 to 41 per cent in 1924.[62] These statistics are valuable but not very convincing, especially when the total of our commerce in pre-war days with Russia and at pre-war production, was unimportant. Advocates for the resumption of Trade with Russia point to the ineffectual attempts of the State Department to regulate such trade. Russia was claimed to have purchased from the United States during the year 1924 forty million dollars worth of cotton alone. An American was reported to have sent a thousand farm tractors to Russia. Russia was described as one of the world's biggest markets, and she was especially hungry for American goods.[63] Unless the mujik, who constitutes about 80 per cent of the population, has his wants and desires stimulated the prospects for any extensive permanent trade are absent. The evidence of our historic commercial relations with Russia would indicate this fact. Leon Talmy, Director of the Information Bureau of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, Limited, gave the following explanation for the small amount of Russo-American commerce. He said that American business men would not grant the kinds

[61] *N. Y. Times*, Sept. 27, 1924, 17.
[62] *Ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1924, Sec. 8, 16.
[63] *Ibid.*

of credit Russia needed. Better terms could be obtained from England and Germany. The bulk of Russian trade thus went to these countries.[64] The extent of Anglo-Russian trade is given at or rather in another connection.

Krassin in referring to the existing trade relations between the United States and Russia, said that despite America's attitude the reformed Amtorg had a new agreement with the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Its chief purpose was to purchase "cotton, paper, and machinery." This was accepted as an indication of American willingness to trade with Russia. It was maintained that this company and the Russian bank for foreign trade were favored by the Americans in the form of special credits. He said the "Continuation of trade relations between the two countries undoubtedly will result eventually in the recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States."[65] This prophecy yet remains to be fulfilled.

The New Economic Policy was not new in principle at all, but simply an attempt by gradual stages to return to the rules of barter and trade; to conditions of trade prevailing here; to the principle of wages paid for services rendered. Many industries are still governmentally operated, but a tendency was evident to return industries back to private operators. Capital is necessary to develop the enormous natural riches of Russia. However, it can only be obtained by the manner in which America obtained her capital, namely by making the investor feel that his capital is safe from seizure and confiscation.[66] In Russia one of the leading questions continues to be, when will America grant the necessary means to rebuild the economics of the nations.[67] The evidence thus far presented shows that a persistent effort is being made to obtain capital.

The experiences of British merchants in Russia were reported by Mr. James of the *New York Times*. He said: "According to British merchants it has proved impossible to resume business relations with private Russian firms, not only because Soviet

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[64] *N. Y. Times*, Nov. 16, 1924 Sec. 8, 16.
[65] *Ibid.* Nov. 21, 1924, 3.
[66] Pamphlet Foreign Policy, No. 22, Series 1923–24, 5, 6.
[67] *Ibid.*, 18.

laws hamper them, but because private Russian concerns cannot establish credit abroad." The Soviet régime also demanded permission for a private Russian concern to place money in London. It was evident that since the Soviets were endeavoring to develop and expand their own foreign business, that they were not favorably disposed towards trade conducted between Russian individuals and concerns having foreign connections.[68]

Russian trade with the United States, however, began to show evidences of improvement in 1914. The Russian Information Bureau reported the following facts. The heavy industries reached from 40 to 60 per cent of pre-war production; light industry from 60–80 per cent; the grain crop 58 per cent; the sown area in agriculture 88 per cent; houses 74 per cent; and cattle 90 per cent of pre-war figures respectively. The amount of trade between Russia in Europe and the United States for the year 1924, according to the Department of Commerce, was $48,280,896 compared with $45,000,000 in 1913. Of this amount over $40,000,000 represented exports from America to Russia. The turnover showed a large increase over 1923, but remained at about the pre-war level. The gain was largely the result of cotton purchases by Russian trade organizations. There was also an increase in imports from Russia. The Russian trading agencies claimed that the amount given by the Department was too small. They set the amount for the first nine months of 1924 at $51,000,000.[69] In the comparison of post-war with pre-war amounts, an erroneous notion is likely to be held if we assume that identical figures in both instances convey the same meaning. The purchasing power of money in post-war times has deteriorated considerably, when compared with the purchasing power in pre-war times. Thus the same amount in 1924 would not purchase the same quantity of commodities as it would have purchased in 1913. The actual articles of commerce sent to Russia in 1913 must have hence exceeded the volume in 1924, although the value remained equal. This

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[68] *N. Y. Times*, Feb. 27, 1925, 4.
[69] *Ibid.*, March 6, 1925, 3.

fact must be retained in mind, otherwise a false impression of comparisons would probably result.

The amount of trade with Soviet Russia had gradually increased until it reached about $58,000,000, total turnover for the first half of 1925. The four organizations interested in the promotion of Russian-American trade are the Amtorg Trading Corporation, which represent the larger Soviet syndicates and the State trading organs of the Constituent Republics; (2) the All-Russian Textile Syndicate; (3) the Allied American Corporation, also known as the "Almerico"; (4) Centrosoyus, which acts as the trading office for the Soviet consumer's co-operatives; and (5) Selskosoyus which represents the Soviet agricultural co-operatives.

The figures below in footnote, represent the amounts for exports to, and imports from Russia for the first six months of 1925 ending June 30. The total turnover for this period was $58,058,911. This was about equal to the total turnover for 1924. An examination of American exports to Russia shows that cotton easily ranks first in value. Flour occupies second place followed by machinery of various descriptions. Other commodities were sold in varying amounts. Of imports from Russia furs, as usual, occupied the most prominent place, having been far in excess of any other item. Sheep casings were second, while flax and hemp fibres came next. Licorice root was fairly prominent. Other commodities such as bristles, caviar, potassium, mushrooms and lentils were imported in varying small amounts. The total imports of $5,448,364 represents a small volume of business.[70] American banking firms extended credits to the extent of $36,752,783. This eclipsed all previous records. American credits advanced amounted to 69.8 per cent of all

[70] *Russian Review*, Vol. 3, No. 16, 326, 327.

advances. This represented a material advance of the Soviet credit situation over previous years.[71]

The entire turnover between the two countries for 1924 was $63,416,147 according to the Russian trading companies in New York. The transactions concluded Europe would swell the

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AMERICAN EXPORTS TO SOVIET RUSSIA FIRST HALF OF 1925

COMMODITY	TOTAL
Agricultural Machinery	$ 3,672,758
Machines and Spare Parts	1,302,632
Leather	305,518
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals	188,342
Resin	122,394
Metals	805,516
Typewriters and Office Supplies	312,226
Oil-Well Supplies	689,970
Auto-Transport	629,361
Flour	17,822,395
Dredges	1,212,869
Cotton	26,479,500
Miscellaneous	94,289
Total	$53,637,770
Shipped	52,610,547
Credits:	
From Banks	30,917,152
From Firms	3,773,081
Total Export Credits	$34,690,223

AMERICAN IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA FIRST HALF OF 1925

COMMODITY	TOTAL
Furs	$ 3,831,013
Sheep Casings	710,528
Bristles	93,262
Caviar	168,999
Potassium	16,560
Licorice Root	249,465
Mushrooms	48,592
Lentils	11,787
Calfskins	9,721
Fibers (Flax and Hemp)	252,862
Miscellaneous	55,575
Total	$5,448,364
Credits:	
From Banks	2,062,550
From other Sources	70,032
Total Import Credits	$2,132,582

[71] *Journal of Commerce*, Aug. 5, 1925, 1.

total to $69,757,761. This was $23,257,761 in excess of the pre-war trade of $46,500,000. Exports to Russia were $52,692,-549, and imports $10,723,598 leaving a favorable balance of $41,968,951. It was alleged by proponents of recognition that 500,000 bales of cotton representing $400,000,000 would be purchased by Russia in event of establishing diplomatic relations. Russia would also buy $200,000,000 worth of machinery and export platinum and other products to us.[72]

These figures of the two years mentioned, indicate that diplomatic recognition is not essential to the enlargement of commerce. However, the alleged figures were used as a powerful weapon to swing sentiment in favor of recognition. The large purchases which it is contended Russia would purchase in America in event of recognition, are mostly conjectural, and advanced by interested parties. It does not appear probable that the Soviet Government could command the necessary $600,000,000 credit to transact the above probable purchases. Not, at least, so long as trade restrictions are imposed on commerce. Even if never realizable, nor expected to be, yet they serve the desired purpose of creating sentiment favorable to recognition of the Soviet régime.

The foreign trade of the United States with Russia in Europe and Asia for the period 1910 to 1925 showed varying degrees of activities as herewith indicated. The years from 1911 to 1914 inclusive, showed about the same general activity with some slight variations. The period 1915–17 shows a very rapid increase in our Russian trade which reflected the war-conditions, reaching the maximum in 1917. This condition corresponded with the movements of American commerce with other nations at this time. The low mark for 1918 showed the effects of the Bolshevist revolution. From 1919 to 1923 the trend was erratic, reaching the minimum for the entire period in 1923. The upward

[72] Cong. Rec., Vol. 66, pt. 2, 68 Cong., 2 sess., 1198.

swing in 1924 and 1925 has been quite pronounced so far as figures in Russian trade go.[73]

Trotsky accused America of being very poorly informed of conditions in Russia, and of economic prospects there. This presumed ignorance was attributed by high Government officials to the press censorship maintained by Russia, which prevented correspondents from sending out accurate information. Such information as has arrived was of such a character as to cause capital to seek other fields. Trotsky maintained that Russia would become a promising market for American products. In reply it was stated that Russia's economic resources were well known. However, so long as present policies continue, the attitude of American capitalists would scarcely change.[74] The new economic policy adopted by Lenin in 1921, was merely "strategic retreat," and was considered as such by the Soviet leaders. Until Russia becomes a safe place for investment, American financiers will not greatly extend credits. If the

[73] Dept. of Commerce, Inclosure 32662. Bureau For. and Dom. Commerce Russian Trade for 1910–1925. *a*

	RUSSIA IN EUROPE		RUSSIA IN ASIA	
	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	IMPORTS	EXPORTS
1910	$12,687,797	$18,463,598	$1,140,468	$ 1,070,163
1911	14,726,509	24,151,483	1,172,749	1,306,550
1912	26,279,295	26,098,377	2,067,575	1,216,760
1913	22,322,957	25,965,351	2,054,113	944,356
1914	12,306,334	22,260,062	2,263,063	5,696,275
1915	2,433,222	125,792,954	653,373	44,198,950
1916	4,478,990	309,806,581	4,139,705	160,701,673
1917	12,350,179	315,250,020	2,164,252	109,260,439
1918	6,784,603	8,902,449	3,975,404	8,433,069
1919	2,953,480	30,259,745	6,709,608	52,176,440
1920	1,825,390	15,446,832	10,655,196	13,280,886
1921	168,769	14,426,823	874,491	1,113,313
1922	334,956	28,501,998	187,877	312,027
1923	1,347,259	6,305,392	134,440	1,002,997
1924	8,006,113	41,314,355	24,352	634,223
1925	*a*10,424,570	64,628,093	214,000	677,333

a First ten months of 1925.

[74] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 623. Statement of high American Officials, names not given.

Soviet foreign trade monopoly was abolished, there might be a resumption of private dealings resulting in the extension of needed credits. The claims for the economic year of 1925–1926, in agriculture and industry are not fully convincing. The promise of a large export of grain in 1925 failed to materialize, and as a result the necessary imports were reduced. The actual blockade of Russia was one erected by herself, which made foreign investments in Russia a hazardous undertaking.[75]

Trotzky argued that recognition would augment trade, also that false politics hindered proper economic relations with America. Trade, however, had grown without recognition. It must also be proven that recognition of Moscow by other nations has helped the commerce of these nations. False politics would appear to exist on the side of the Soviet régime rather than on America's side. Since 1920 America has raised no objections to trade with Russia, which increased with Russia's purchasing power. As the Soviet attitude towards capital has changed, so has America's desire to invest capital increased. Last year (1925) American exports to Russia exceeded those of any other nation. This was due to the fact that Russia required machinery and cotton. This increase was accomplished without recognition, while nations having accorded de jure recognition with the express purpose of obtaining trade, failed in their purpose. America had diplomatic relations with all Europe save Russia.[76]

In regard to concession granting, the following quotation from Lenin made to the Communist International at Moscow in 1923 is important. He said: "As concerns trade, I wish to emphasize again that we are trying to organize mixed companies, that we are organizing them already; that is, companies in which a part of the capital belongs to private capitalists, including foreign capitalists, and the other to us. First, we learn in this manner what is of most importance to us—to trade, and second, we have always the possibility if we find it necessary, to liquidate such companies, that is to say, we risk nothing."

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[75] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 623.
[76] *Ibid.*, 624.

The United States Government has attempted to present accurate information about Russia to American manufacturers of any progress since the civil war period. There has been no recommendation that American exporters should cultivate the Russian market, nor that capital should be invested in that country. Since America has no representative in Russia it must largely depend for statistical information upon the Soviet Government without verification of its accuracy. While such information is helpful it does not compare favorably with news obtained by other nations through customary channels.[78] The difficulties of doing business with Russia are very manifest. The Foreign Trade Monopoly exerts, by means of import and export licenses, a strict control of all goods entering the country. The export of goods is also under so many restrictions that experience and training are of little importance in trading with Soviet Russia. Firms sending goods into Russia cannot enter claims or investigate the use of articles. They cannot modify conditions of sale, or secure satisfaction in event of errors. The Moscow agent for trade with America is the State Trading Company. All buying and selling transactions are negotiated through it. It forms the "bottle-neck" through which all American-Russian trade must pass. Complete control of trade with Russia, either on the outside or inside, is held by Moscow. American business may well seriously contemplate possibilities before submitting itself to such restrictive conditions.[79]

Judge Gary expressed his views of Russian trade possibilities thus: "Capital or credit will not be extended to any individual or nation except in accordance with sound business principles. To the extent that the Russian people are entitled to credit they will receive it, when the facts are fully disclosed." Three conditions are necessary to facilitate trade. First, there ought to be a form of Government based on moral principles, which the world can trust. Second, Russia ought to make some arrangement or promise to pay her debts. Third, law and order should

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[77] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 626.
[78] *Ibid.*, 627.
[79] *Ibid.*, 626, 627.

obtain generally throughout the land.[80] Mr. Bush believed that America refused recognition on moral grounds. She has been accused of being devoted to the dollar ideal. England, France, and Germany yielded to Russia's trade argument and recognized Russia. Have they gained any profits, as a result of such action? He said: "They have sold their heritage of international law for a mess of pottage." Russian foreign trade is a myth. Before the war it equalled that of Belgium, today it is even smaller. Trade will go on whether we recognize them or not. The development of Russia's vast raw material resources can well await the time when the laws will provide greater "protection and safety."[81]

The year 1925 registered some economic progress, but this was the result of circumstances over which the Soviet Government had no control. The Russian harvests were of greatly enlarged output providing a purchasing surplus of 2,000,000,000 rubles or about $1,000,000,000. This surplus was produced by the perseverance of the toiling peasant, who asserted himself. The industrial dilapidation is revealed by the fact that when the peasant desired to exchange his surplus for articles like leather, machinery and textiles which he needed, the Government was unable to supply him. It occurred despite the fact that industrial production reached 70 per cent of pre-war output. Two factors mainly caused the collapse, namely: the breakdown of the foreign trade monopoly; and the inability to handle the grain surplus. The presence of Canadian and South American wheat on the world market lessened the demand for Russian grain. The foreign trade of Russia for 1924–1925, showed an adverse balance of $55,400,000 as compared with a favorable balance of $65,000,000 for the preceding twelve months.[82]

The following statistics show the investment of foreign capital within the present Russian Soviet boundaries in pre-war days. An amount of 235, 668,400 rubles escaped expropriation having

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[80] *Current History*, Feb. 1926, 629.
[81] *Ibid.*, 631.
[82] *Saturday Evening Post*, Jan. 23, 1926, 118.

been invested in that section of the former Russian Empire now included within the border nations.[83]

NATIONALITY	AMOUNT IN RUBLES
French	648,089,700
British	500,564,400
German	317,475,700
Belgian	311,812,400
American	117,750,000
Italian	2,106,200

Of the total foreign investments in Russia in the present Soviet boundaries, French and English capital represented 57.2 per cent. The allied and associated countries contributed 78.7 per cent; Germany and Austria 16.1 per cent; and neutrals 5.2 per cent. The Italian investment was negligible. The French not having any important commerce with Russia are thus especially interested in having the debt and capital investment recognized.

A study of the results obtained by England after the negotiation of a trade agreement, may be of especial value to American business. Previous to the ratification of the treaty with Soviet Russia many reports were circulated that the conclusion of such a treaty would revive England's Russian commerce. Unemployment in England would be greatly relieved by the conclusions of the treaty. The following statistics show that even the Trade Agreement concluded in March, 1921, failed to have any great effect in reviving Russian commerce.

EXPORTS OF BRITISH PRODUCE AND MANUFACTURES TO RUSSIA
(000's omitted)

1913		1923
18,103	Souviet Russia	2,492
	Succession States	9,267
18,103		11,759

[83] Dept. of Commerce, Miscel. Series No. 124, 5 etseq.

Difference between 1913 and 1923, £6,344,000

The export figures to all countries for 1913 and 1923 are £525,-253,000 and £767,328,000 respectively. At this rate, the figures of 1923 for Russian commerce, should have been considerably increased over those for 1913 to have been on a normal basis with other nations. It is clear from the above table that the cry of Russian trade was not well founded.[84]

In Parliament, the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. McNail, declared that one of the essential necessities to the promotion of commercial intercourse between nations, is that a civilized legal system be maintained where traders can take suits for enforcement of contracts. Modern trade rests upon contracts and provisions should be made for the administration of justice.[85] The contention was advanced in the Commons that the reason British trade with Russia did not assume larger proportions was due to the absence of political recognition. The Under-Secretary denied that most English business men thought political recognition would result in increased volumes of Russian trade. It was alleged that recognition would loosen credit, and result in the extension of loans by the British banks to promote Anglo-Russian trade. The timidity and reluctance of the banks to advance funds was ascribed not to the absence of political recognition, but to the precipitate manner by which valid obligations were repudiated. Future debts it was indicated might also be ignored, leaving the creditors without recourse in a nation where the absence of a system of jurisprudence prevents the enforcement of contract obligation.[86] These words are very significant and ought to be seriously considered. The present appeal by Soviet agents for credits and the resumption of commercial relations may be perfectly sincere. They may realize by this time that credits can only be obtained by conforming to those rules of business ethics which obtain in the business world. Again, the plan may be one of carefully concealed duplicity. The strategy may possibly be to conform in every respect to ordinary business ethics for a period of years, maintaining in the meantime

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[84] *Times*, Oct. 27, 1924, 13.
[85] Parliament Debates, Vol. 162, 844, Mar. 29, 1923.
[86] *Ibid.*, 845.

the Soviet system, until sufficient capital is induced to enter Russia to revive her economics, then by a governmental act suddenly expropriate all of it. In this latter eventuality, Russia would be the gainer in capital and productive wealth while the rest of the world would lose without remedy. Nor is it possible that the public sentiment of America, or any other nation would sanction disastrous war in order to protect the investments of their nationals made in the full knowledge of the risks involved. The recent fulmination of Trotzky against America as a financial octopus, does not accord in spirit with his plea to America to resume commercial relations with Russia.[87] American business might well ponder these possibilities before proceeding to invest too heavily in Russian prospects. English business recognized that trade was almost at a standstill. This was admitted by a business man interested in Russia to be due not to the absence of recognition but to lack of proper economic conditions, which if removed would revive trade.[88]

Russian exports to England in 1913 amounted to 267,801,000 gold rubles or 17.6 per cent of all Russian exports, and 5.2 per cent of all the United Kingdom's imports for that year. During the past war period the relative amounts sent to England, increased. This was not due, however, to an increased production, but to a greater proportion of the decreased production being sent to England. In 1921 the United Kingdom took 39.7 per cent of Russian exports and in 1922, 31 per cent. The nature of the commodities sent to England were about the same as in pre-war periods, namely raw materials, semi-finished products, and foodstuffs, but the volume was much reduced. The entire export trade of Russia to all nations in 1920 was 0.07 of the 1913 amounts, in 1921; and 1922 to 6 per cent respectively of 1913. The export trade for 1923 amounted to 11 per cent of 1913.[89] A very marked improvement is evident during these years, although the amounts remained at a low figure.

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[87] *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Feb. 16, 1926, 19.
[88] Parliament Debates, Vol. 162, 845.
[89] U. S. Commerce Reports, Supp. No. 199, 1.

The statistics presented on the following page give the value of the commerce between Russia and Great Britain for the years 1913, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923. The figures show that after the depression of 1921, a market recovery was accomplished in 1922 and 1923. The amounts were yet small in comparison with Britain's commerce with other large natione. The figures for 1920 are subject to certain limitations. English imports for this year, ot paper and cardboard from Russia almost all came from Finland, in addition to a large proportion of timber. Much flax and hemp originated in Latvia. Most of the British export of cotton and woolen goods to Russia in this year (1920) went to the four border states.

The English Trade Agreement of 1921 protected the nationals of the one in the country of the other doing business there according to local law. In Russia, however, the export trade remained a Governmental monopoly with the power to grant or withdraw licenses at will. The Soviet trade policy since 1922 (latter part of 1922 forward), has been, as previously stated, to curtail imports and greatly expand exports.[91]

I cite here certain representative opinions of the British attitude towards trade with Soviet Russia. A. G. Marshall, a director of a British export co-operative organization, which had an agreement with the Soviet régime, shared his views with a large number of other British industrialists. As reported in the *Financial Times* of January 3, 1924, he said in part: "Russia means to have a favorable trade balance; it has made up its mind it is going to pay for imports with its exports, and unless it can so pay for them, it is not going to import the goods. That is bad from the British point of view." Again, "The prospects of trade are limited by the growth of Russian exports. They will only grow much quicker than they are doing by enabling the Russians to re-establish their industries. The great difficulty has been the granting of credit."[92] Evidently British finance was unable to perceive the advantages of investments in Russia, which are subjected to special trade limitations.

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[90] U. S. Commerce Reports, Supp. No. 199,1, (on next page).
[91] *Ibid.*, 2.
[92] *Ibid.*

[90] British Trade with Russia, 1913 and 1919–1923

MOVEMENT	1913 £	1919 £	1920 £	1921 £	1922 £	1923 £
Imports from Russia	40,270,539	16,678,322	33,522,892	2,694,674	8,176,002	9,308,000
Exports to Russia	18,102,683	12,764,717m	11,992,083	2,181,007	3,678,525	2,493,000
Re-exports to Russia	9,591,270	4,455,504	4,841,300	1,038,473	1,210,283	1,900,000
Total Exports and Re-exports	27,693,953	17,220,221	16,833,383	3,391,290	4,716,998	4,483,000
Total Trade	67,964,402	33,898,543	50,356,275	6,085,964	12,893,000	13,791,000

R. W. Barnett, M. P., speaking at a meeting of the board of directors of the Baker Consolidated Oil Fields (Limited), said that their company in connection with other companies were interested in the resumption of trade with Russia. However, they desired to trade with the prospects of success and profits in view. They had no desire to consume their time without at least a reasonable reward. He agreed that de jure recognition of the Soviet régime would have no very important influence on the trade situation. This was also the view taken by the Government. Trade would only resume with a restoration of confidence, and "Confidence would not be restored by recognition."[93] His views regarding the effect of recognition on trade were subsequently verified.

The *Financial Times*, on December 29, 1923, discussed the Soviet policy of supervising foreign trade. Mixed companies doing business in Russia were represented by the Soviet Government on one side and foreign interests on the other. Inquiries have revealed that none of the famous Anglo-Russian commercial houses were interested in forming mixed companies, nor were there any prospects in that direction. The Soviet Foreign Trade Commissariat exercises strict supervision over the export and import operations of mixed companies. This Commissariat has the right to buy on preferential terms any goods a mixed company might import. In case of exports to another nation if dissatisfied with the conditions, the Soviet Government is empowered to instruct its trade delegations to purchase same at preferential rates. The view was held that so long as these artificial limitations are imposed, no first-class house interested in Anglo-Russian trade, would be induced to enter the Russian field. It was emphasized that only as "old-established clients" would be induced to re-engage in Russian business could there be any improvement and the credits so badly needed, made available. Russia was within her rights when she erected tariff barriers to prohibit foreigners. She was wrong when she endeavored to interfere with the disposal of goods sent abroad by foreigners as a result of their activities in Russia. Under these

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[93] U.S. Commerce Reports, Supp. No. 199, 2, 10, 11. Also *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 124, Oct., 1923, 459, 460.

conditions the business world was unable "to give effect to its willingness to help Russia."[94]

The study of Russian commercial prospects shows that no trade of large proportions is likely to materialize between America and Russia so long as Russia maintains her injurious restrictions upon commerce with capitalist nations. Another fact is that Russian trade with America never was of any real importance. The recent movement to utilize the increase in trade between the two nations as an argument to recommend speedy recognition of Soviet Russia by America is not established upon a very substantial foundation. The figures of American trade with other prominent nations for a series of years show that increases in trade are not confined specifically to Russia, but have occurred in connection with our commerce with other nations. The total amounts of our trade with Russia are small when compared with the totals of our trade with other important nations. Russia, with a population twice the size of that of Germany, during the first ten months of 1925 (her highest record) purchased from America about one-seventh of the amount purchased by Germany in 1924.* If the Russians per capita would purchase one-half as much from America as Germany did in 1924, her (Russia's) trade with us would be from six to seven times its present volume. France during the same period purchased from America four times as much as Russia, while England, our best customer, bought over fifteen times as much in value as Russia did in the ten months considered.

If the years 1913 and 1924, years about normal, are compared, an increase is evident. The proportions of Russian purchases from America in 1913 bear the same general relationships to the purchases made by the other nations as was observed in the comparisons for 1924. The totals, as already stated, are small compared with other nations, while their relative position remains almost unaltered. The trade argument in behalf of recognition

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[94] U. S. Commerce Reports, Supp. No. 199, 11; *Round Table*, Vol. 14, 686, 687; *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. 124, Oct. 1923, 459, 460; *The Spectator*, Vol. 132, June 1924, 988.

* The figures of American Commerce with England, Cermany, France and Canada are given for purposes of comparative study.

EXPORTS OF U. S. TO RUSSIA

00000 OMITTED

	1912	1913	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
England	564.3	597.1	1,825.0	942.1	855.8	882.3	982.9	
Germany	306.9	331.0	311.4	372.3	316.1	316.8	440.5	
France	135.3	146.1	676.1	224.9	266.9	272.0	281.6	
Canada	329.2	415.4	971.8	593.6	576.6	651.9	624.0	
Russia	26.0	25.9	15.4	14.4	28.5	6.3	41.3	64.6
IMPORTS FROM								
England	272.9	295.5	513.8	238.7	356.8	404.1	366.4	
Germany	171.3	188.9	88.8	80.2	117.4	161.3	139.2	
France	124.5	136.8	165.6	141.3	142.8	149.6	147.6	
Canada	108.8	120.5	611.8	335.4	364.0	415.9	399.0	
Russia	26.2	22.3	1.3	.16	.3	1.3	8.0	10.4

fails to carry conviction. Russia possesses almost unlimited resources and untold possibilities which require the touch of capital and labor to develop them, but unless the restriction to trade are removed, and the average Russian decides to use more commodities to satisfy his wants, Russian trade is destined to remain relatively unimportant.

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[1] Commerce of Navigation of the U. S., 1912, 46.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1913, 10.
[3] Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the U. S., 1920, 12.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1921, 12.
[5] *Ibid.*, 1922, 12.
[6] *Idib.*, 1923, 10.
[7] *Ibid.*, 1924, 12.
[8] Dept. of Commerce, inclosure 32662, Bureau of For. and Dom. Commece.

XI

Conclusion

From the discussion of this subject certain conclusions seem warranted. (1) America has historically conditioned her recognition policy upon the fact that a government was representative of the governed, or was presumed to be so. Recognition was also made contingent upon the recognized nation giving satisfactory evidence that she would conform to those standards of ethics which regulate the conduct of members of the international community. These conditions having been satisfactorily fulfilled and recognition having been deemed expedient by the President it has been accorded. Recognition by the United States has usually been a cautious procedure, and upon occasions, involved considerable time before it was finally conceded. The attitude pursued towards Soviet Russia is not a departure from America's historic policy, but a continuation, and an application of it to a new circumstance. The policy of the last three Administrations towards Russia has not been founded, as supposed in some quarters, upon a blind and unreasoning prejudice but is thoroughly reasonable and consistent and in harmony with the precedents.

(2) Efforts at Bolshevist propaganda have been made by Russia in Europe and America, and have recently been particularly active among certain elements of our population where seditious results seemed most likely to be obtained. (3) Diplomatic recognition, while such purposes persist would merely increase the facilities for the dissemination of propaganda. Characteristic purposes of the Soviet Government, of the Russian Communist Party, and of the International inimical to established governments, appear inseparable in fact from each other.

The Soviet Government is under the domination of an irresponsible and autocratic directing group. It was specifically designed to function as a centralized world-government after the international revolution was an accomplished fact. With the object of hastening this result it encouraged, directed and

supported every movement having these ends in view. If we seek the ultimate source of power in any of the above organizations, it is generally found to repose in the same persons. Therefore, the contentions that one division of the above political trinity is not responsible for the activities of another, is regarded by the American Government as untenable because the centralization of authority in these divisions, separately or unitedly, is vested in the same limited group which determines policy. No interlocking directorate in industry, apparently was ever more completely or efficiently organized.

(4) The experiences of certain recognizing nations do not lend support to an argument for Russian recognition by the United States. (5) An examination of representative, public, congressional and press expressions of opinion fails to disclose any large or general sentiment favoring the establishment of unqualified diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Party affiliation does not appear to have determined the convictions held by any of the indivudals whose sentiments have been studied.

(6) The benefits to be derived from commercial relations, after granting recognition, have been shown to be illusory. Unquestionably some persons were sincere in their advocacy of the trade agreement, but the concrete facts and the comparative evidence do not substantiate any optimism as to resultant trade. No restrictions are imposed upon trading with Russia, and those who are firmly convinced that the Russian trade is very profitable, can now engage in it with utter freedom.

Recognition is not essential to the conduct of trade relations. American trade with Russia has always been of inconsequential proportions. Some European nations which early entered the Russian commercial field with the evident object in view of pre-empting and monopolizing the benefits of such intercourse have, after years of experience, realized the falsity of these convictions, and are in some instances, completely disillusioned regarding the profits to be derived from such relations. The restrictions maintained by Soviet Russia thus far on foreign commerce, are a discouragement to it. The trade argument in favor of recognition is, therefore, unwarranted.

Finally, the present attitude, while consistent is by no means unchangeable, under all possible circumstances, but may be so altered in complete harmony with our traditional policy, in order to grant Russia the recognition she deserves whenever she presents indisputable evidences of integrity, and sincerity in her desire to satisfy the conditions which America, considers fundamental to the granting of recognition. Until then America can do nothing. The facts discussed in the survey of the preceding chapters demonstrated that the position of the various American Executives, assumed towards Soviet Russia, was and remains justifiable and therefore, confirmed.

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